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Abstract 
This dissertation explores interactions between households, states and markets and their 
relation to socio-economic inequalities among working-age households. The focus lies 
on three aspects that are addressed in three different empirical studies: the importance of 
the welfare state, economic risks and opportunities within households, and the link 
between these two aspects and broader patterns of inequality at the societal level. The 
first paper analyses the relation between the regulation of social benefits, social risks, 
and household nonemployment in 20 European countries using internationally 
comparative institutional and survey data. The study reveals that eligibility conditions 
and activation policy vary systematically with the effect of social risks on the 
probability of household nonemployment. The strength and direction of influence 
depends on the specific policy area and risk factor. The second research paper analyses 
the duration of household nonemployment for British and German couples from the 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s. Dual joblessness has become longer over time, which is 
related to changes in the household composition of nonemployed couples. The third 
paper analyses consequences of welfare shifts between households on changing patterns 
of inequality between 2005 and 2010. Changes in the distribution of household 
employment, benefit transfers, and family types in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Poland, and Spain are analysed in terms of their contribution to developments in income 
inequality between households. The analysis of income distributions suggests that 
changes in socio-demographic and economic household characteristics in a population 
can have a substantial impact on different income groups. The overarching conclusion 
of the dissertation is that certain aspects of household composition have a universal 
potential to lower households’ economic activity and welfare but that the impact of 
these factors varies strongly according to the broader context in which the households 
are situated. Social policies that have the potential to reduce inequalities between 
households need to consider possible adverse effects on economic risk structures and 
spill-over effects to other areas of social protection. Future research should continue 
studying the household’s role in relation to the market, the state, and individual needs 
and resources; incorporate additional economic and welfare regime aspects into the 
analyses; and explore further statistical tools to do so.  
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Preface 
The following paper provides the theoretical and conceptual framework for the 
dissertation “Household Nonemployment, Social Risks and Inequality in Europe”, 
which was prepared at the Universities of Mannheim and Luxembourga under the joint 
supervision of Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Louis Chauvel. The purpose of the doctoral 
project was to better understand the role of households in structuring inequalities in 
terms of labour market access, economic risks, and social rights among the working-age 
population. The project focussed on three main research questions: 
- How is the context of social protection related to international variation in 
household nonemployment? 
- What factors influence the duration of household nonemployment in different 
institutional contexts? 
- How does the distribution of employment across households influence income 
inequality in a given context of family structures and social protection? 
In order to answer these questions, three empirical studies were conducted in the form 
of separate research papers. The framework paper provides a background to these 
studies, clarifies their relation in theoretical terms, and discusses the results. The three 
research papers can be found at the end of this manuscript under the following titles: 
1) Activating households: Nonemployment risks and social benefits in Europe  
2) The duration of couples’ nonemployment in the United Kingdom and Germany: 
Household composition, individual resources and social policy  
3) The many shapes of the welfare triangle: How employment, family structures 
and welfare rights relate to changes in the distribution of household income in 
different countries 
a The initial phase of the project was conducted in a research project financed by the German Research 
Foundation. Between 2013 and 2015, the project was supported by the Fonds National de la Recherche, 
Luxembourg (Project Code: 6003496). 
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Framework 
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In sociology as well as economics and social policy studies, household nonemployment 
has been identified as an important element for understanding the distribution of 
poverty risks and social exclusion within society. In modern societies, earnings from 
employment play the central role in an individual’s material position and well-being. 
The amount of market income at a given point in time also influences individuals’ 
ability to save for times of need, afford health care and participate in leisure activities 
and social life. A lack of employment can have severe consequences: Long-term 
unemployment has been shown to reduce physical and mental health, leading to 
negative spill-over effects on the health of unemployed individuals’ spouses (Marcus 
2013). Persons living in nonemployed households show an increased risk of poverty and 
(in some countries) material deprivation (de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011). Children and 
adolescents living in households with either one or both parents in long-term 
unemployment have a reduced probability of attaining higher secondary education later 
on and increased chances of being nonemployed as young adults (Berloffa, Matteazzi 
and Villa 2016, Gebel 2011). The family is thus crucial for understanding socio-
economic inequalities and their reproduction. As Albertini (2008, p. 286) highlights, 
“The nexus between the household and economy is implicit in the two terms 
themselves (the Greek word oikonomia means house or household 
administration). The relevance of this nexus has also been much stressed in 
sociological research; in fact, since its origins, sociology has paid much 
attention to the study of the economic role of the family.”  
 
This role was more apparent in pre-industrial societies and even up until the mid-20th 
century before the steep rise of female employment. Nevertheless, the household is still 
an “important economic actor whose decisions and behavior directly affect the welfare 
state and the market”. Moreover, “the family remains the main unit of redistribution of 
economic resources, and of caring and domestic services (…) and the most important 
unit of production of in-kind income” (ibid). 
Therefore, when assessing the financial and social possibilities offered by employment 
and the consequences of not having a job, the study of the household context is of great 
relevance. The household’s special role within countries’ welfare production systems 
makes it the “merging point” at which individual resources and needs meet the 
`2 
 
opportunities and restraints offered by the market and the state. Modern welfare states 
have developed compensation mechanisms that support or substitute families’ 
possibilities to offset negative consequences of job loss within their households. In 
some cases, however, family- and welfare state support mechanisms are insufficient to 
keep households employed and/or out of poverty. Some countries manage to protect 
against certain situations of need in certain household types better than others. The 
effects of labour market dynamics on households depend on family structures and 
institutional arrangements around work and welfare. Inequality between households 
based on individual characteristics and their combination determines the distribution of 
labour market chances within a country, and of welfare state redistribution. The 
institutional interplay within welfare production systems can reduce inequality in life 
chances but can also create new types of inequality or foster its reproduction. 
This doctoral project therefore aimed at investigating the household’s role in structuring 
socio-economic inequality while taking the joint influence of labour markets and 
welfare states into account. In the framework of this project, household worklessness is 
considered a manifestation of social risks, which are defined as situations of individual 
disadvantage leading to welfare loss (Pintelon et al. 2013). These risks are stratified in 
society and relate to broader inequalities, e.g., between educational and occupational 
groups, gender and cohorts. High levels of inequality are associated with higher levels 
of poverty and lower levels of average health and social peace (Chauvel and Leist 2015; 
Chakravarty 2009). This societal cost of inequality therefore justifies the study of its 
underlying causes. 
The three analytical papers of the dissertation explore the interactions between 
households, states and markets and their relation to socio-economic inequalities. The 
analyses focus on the working-age population, i.e., pensioners and student households 
are excluded in order to focus on the population groups that are most dependent on 
labour market income. The first paper addresses the question of how the context of 
social protection influences the risk of household nonemployment. It analyses the 
relation between the regulation of social benefits, social risks and household 
nonemployment in 20 European countries using data from comparative institutional 
databases and EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions)1. 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living- 
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The focus is on interactions between benefit conditionality and household-level labour 
market risks related to family composition, health, age and education. The benefits of 
interest are in policy areas that address these risks either by promoting employability or 
by compensating for income losses induced by these risks. The specific policy measures 
studied include the strictness of activation within unemployment benefits and social 
assistance as well as eligibility restrictions towards non-activating minimum income 
protection, disability pensions, and early retirement programmes. The study reveals that 
these policies vary systematically with the effect of social risks on the risk of household 
nonemployment.  
While the first paper analyses the link between household nonemployment and 
institutional configurations at the macro level, the second paper focuses on the 
household level from a long-term perspective. The main interest lies in what influences 
the duration of households’ nonemployment in different institutional contexts. In a 
comparative study of the German Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household and 
Population Survey2, the duration of household nonemployment is analysed from the 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s. Focussing on couples, the chances of ending joint 
worklessness are analysed in relation to family composition, both partners’ educational 
resources and work experience. In addition, the persistence of dual joblessness is 
compared between time periods before and after reforms that changed the national 
systems of unemployment and in-work benefits. The analysis shows that couples’ 
nonemployment has become lengthier over time and that this prolonging of spells is 
related to changes in the family constellations of nonemployed couples. 
Changing family constellations as well as changes in the distribution of social benefits 
and their relation to household employment are the subject of the third paper. Again 
taking a long-term perspective, the study analyses the relation between these socio-
economic and demographic changes and inequality at the macro level. The main interest 
of the study lies in how the distribution of employment across households influences 
income inequality in a given context of family structures and social protection. Using 
EU-SILC data for 2005/2006 and 2010/2011, between-household inequality in different 
parts of the income distribution is analysed for Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland 
and Spain. The study explores how changes in the distribution of household 
conditions. 
2 For more information, see http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.221178.en/about_soep.html and 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps. 
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employment, benefit transfers and family types are related to changes in the distribution 
of household income. Results show that the analysed countries differ in their initial 
inequality patterns and continued to do so in 2010. Accordingly, changes in the labour 
market, family structures, and welfare state support have varying impacts on inequality 
for different population groups.  
The remaining sections of this paper are dedicated to the theoretical and conceptual 
framework of the dissertation and a discussion of the results. Section 2 lays down the 
theoretical foundation of the dissertation, and Section 3 presents the research design of 
the three dissertation papers. The studies’ results are discussed in Section 4, and Section 
5 provides a conclusion and outlook on future research. 
2. Theoretical background: Households between individual labour market risks 
and welfare state compensation 
This chapter begins by tracing the historical roots of studying household 
nonemployment in the social sciences and concludes that many of the elements that are 
crucial for understanding worklessness and its consequences were identified – or at least 
hinted at – very early on. These elements provide the main coordinates of this 
dissertation project and are further elaborated on in Sections 2.2 to 2.6. The 
differentiation between unemployment and other types of nonemployment is discussed 
in Section 2.2, as are the social rights attached to these statuses and their combination 
within households. Section 2.3 examines the connection between nonemployment, 
household structure, and social risks. How welfare states address such risks is the 
subject of Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 clarifies how social policies can interact within 
households and thereby influence their employment outcomes. Finally, the 
consequences of households’ labour market risks and welfare policies are discussed in 
Section 2.6 in regard to income inequality between households.  
2.1 Some ideational roots of studying household nonemployment 
The majority of studies addressing employment patterns in Western countries focus on 
individual employment. In order to assess the conditions for employment, its 
distribution and its individual and societal impact, it is necessary to consider the 
absence of employment, as well. This has a long tradition in the social sciences, and 
many of the themes addressed in contemporary studies of unemployment were put on 
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the research agenda by 19th- and early-20th-century scholars. As a result of the industrial 
revolution, the impact of technological change on labour displacement was a topic of 
great interest for political economists and philosophers such as David Ricardo, Thomas 
Malthus, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx (Woirol 1996). The matter of mass 
unemployment became a fundamental point in dispute of ideational debates in 
economics. The notion of the self-regulating nature of markets and social systems 
implied that long-term unemployment was mainly perceived as a matter of personal 
choice between work and leisure. In the Marxist understanding, a large unemployed 
‘labour reserve’ was a genuine characteristic of capitalism and a mechanism for 
guaranteeing low wages. 
Although classical liberal economists recognised the role of the family as an economic 
unit (cf., e.g., Mill 1909), they paid little attention to the impact of unemployment on 
the family context. 
“While contemporary liberalism is often identified as a set of ideas committed to 
political rights and self-determination, classical liberalism allowed for exclusion from 
self-determination based on what was considered to be the non-realization of human 
capacities for liberty and so justified exclusion based on class, race and gender; it did 
not recognize the barriers in the private sphere of the economy and the family to the 
realization of the capacities it valued in the public sphere.” (O’Connor and Robinson 
2008, p.32) 
This stance was highly visible in the New English Poor Law of 1834 and in the 
establishment of work houses across Europe based on the British model. In the new 
industrial production system, unemployment was seen as delinquency, and working-age 
poverty as self-induced. Europe’s approach to poverty and unemployment changed over 
the second half of the 19th century with increased ‘cross-fertilisation’ between liberal, 
socialist, and conservative (i.e., Christian-familist) ideas (O’Connor and Robinson 
2008, Opielka 2008). The disruption of old societal structures and rural exodus led to 
concentrated poverty in industrial cities. The persistency of the ‘social question’ and the 
rise of the labour movement drew public attention towards the consequences of poverty 
for public health and social peace. Across Europe, municipalities, churches, and trade 
unions established relief funds against work incapacity and unemployment. In 
Germany, the first social insurance systems served to appease the working class while 
suppressing the labour movement. In other countries (e.g., France, Belgium, Denmark 
and Finland), union-based self-help developed into national, state-supported systems of 
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voluntary unemployment insurance (Vandale 2006). Statistical studies on poverty were 
initiated from members of the socialist movement, communal charity organisations and 
public officials alike (Pankoke and Sachse 1992). The study that gave way to the (first, 
local) Ghent system of unemployment insurance, for example, was based on a social 
investigation that was commissioned by the city council of Ghent after an initiative by 
the labour unions (Vandale 2006, p. 648). In England, Booth’s and Rowntree’s 
pioneering works in the 1880s and 1890s attempted to create an objective definition of 
poverty in terms of minimum subsistence income. This ‘poverty line’ allowed for a 
quantitative assessment of the poor population and led to the insight that poverty risks 
varied over the life course (Glennerster 2004). Because the studies were based on 
household surveys, they were among the first to draw attention to the family aspects of 
material need. These ideas had a decisive impact on the liberal welfare reforms between 
1906 and 1914, one of which was the introduction of public unemployment insurance. 
This development was accompanied by discussions on the insurability of different 
employment risks and also raised concerns that benefits might diminish individuals’ 
need and motivation to work (Llewellyn Smith 1910).3 
The emerging systems of unemployment protection thus represent a manifestation of a 
new kind of liberalism that “argued for a lessening of the consequences of inequality” 
but “favoured inequality on economic incentive grounds” (O’Connor and Robinson 
2008, p. 35). Keynesian liberalism can be seen as continuation of this logic. As it 
accepts the possibility of long-term market equilibria without full employment, state-
intervention is seen as a legitimate means of avoiding market failure or correcting for its 
consequences (p.36, ibid). Welfare states after World War II adapted this principle to 
various degrees, along with ideas of universalist, citizenship-based rights and 
conservative-familist approaches to social security, based on national political, 
economic and cultural background (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
In the same decade that Keynes (1936) published his The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, the Great Depression created new interest in 
unemployment and its social consequences among sociologists and social psychologists. 
In comparison with the Rowntree study 30 years earlier, the household context shifted 
3The relationship between unemployment and benefit levels, wages and price levels was vividly 
discussed by economists in the 1920s and 1930s (Pigou 1933, Keynes 1936, Hutt 1939). 
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even further to the centre of attention, as did the status and identity of the unemployed 
within society. Marie Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel, for example, studied the 
effects of unemployment in the Austrian village of Marienthal (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld and 
Zeisel 1971; Lazarsfeld 1932). The community of 1,500 inhabitants had developed 
around a local textile factory whose closure in 1930 had left the entire village (except 
for 80 persons) without a job. Using what would nowadays be described as “mixed 
methods approach” (Pickel 2009), the study combined several methods of data 
collection (e.g., observations of behaviour, households’ financial accounts, and 
interviews) to assess the effect of mass unemployment on the material and 
psychological condition of the unemployed, their wives and their children. Zawadzki 
and Lazarsfeld (1935) analysed similar aspects in Poland using a data source that was 
quite unique and innovative for the time: a sample from a nation-wide collection of 
personal accounts of the experience of unemployment and financial hardship by the 
Institute for Social Economy in Warsaw. Among the topics covered in both studies were 
job search behaviour, general motivation and well-being, families’ activities in daily life 
and their adaptation to low and decreasing incomes in terms of aspired and actual 
consumption, nutrition and health status. Due to the interest of both studies in families, 
they were able to describe the spill-over effects of unemployment on other family 
members as well as households’ joint efforts to compensate for job loss, e.g., by 
documenting women’s selling of home-produced goods. Bakke’s (1934) study that 
combined statistical data with personal journals of unemployed men in London also 
deserves mentioning. The Yale-based professor investigated the effect of the British 
unemployment insurance on work motivation. 
The title of Bakke’s study, “The unemployed man”, is exemplary in its predominant 
focus on male job loss, which was the case with most early explorations of 
unemployment; however, a small minority of scholars also advocated studying female 
labour market participation very early on. Tawney (1911), for example, analysed female 
unemployment, benefit receipt, and job searches in British cities. She discussed the 
specific problems that women faced, e.g., their engaging in mostly seasonal or low-
wage work due to lack of training and childcare duties. Early sociologists were thus not 
completely blind to gender-specific issues. An interesting aspect of the Marienthal study 
was its comparison of the behaviour between the men and women in the village. The 
study found that men began to walk and move more slowly the longer they were 
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unemployed. Women, however, did not change their pace and seemed busier overall. In 
contrast to their husbands, they were engaged in productive activities outside of 
employment, such as looking after their children and running their households. The 
study was therefore amongst the first to differentiate between different kinds of 
nonemployment, its relation to gender roles and its implications for psychological well-
being. 
The distinction between joblessness and other types of nonemployment also took centre 
stage when it came to measuring unemployment. Until the 1930s, data on 
unemployment had hardly been representative and were mainly based on administrative 
accounts of labour unions or local municipalities. The first representative surveys in the 
US aimed at distinguishing involuntary unemployment from other types of 
nonemployment due to housekeeping, disability or education. This led to the distinction 
between “unemployment” and “inactivity” (Bancroft 1957), a terminology still widely 
used today, although admittedly problematic in its implications.4 
As this short review of early research on unemployment demonstrates, the study of this 
subject is highly complex. Individual employment and nonemployment cannot be 
analysed without recognizing the multifaceted system of market forces, household 
structures, social norms, and (state) institutions that shape their causes and 
consequences, which has led to a growing sophistication in terms of the methodologies 
used for the analysis of joblessness. In parallel, there has been specialisation within and 
between the disciplines concerned with joblessness. Echoes of the aforementioned 
earlier works on unemployment can therefore still be found in the publications of 21st-
century economists, sociologists, political scientists, and scholars of psychology and 
public health. 
This quick historical excursion also offers a good introduction to the topics and 
questions addressed in this dissertation. Processes within households play a decisive 
role in the study of joblessness and its relation to social risks and inequality. Most 
4 It is well documented that many of those deemed “inactive” are productive within their household and 
wider community (Nicaise 2007). This productivity has the potential to influence households’ real 
income in the positive. Housewives’ unpaid work or their caring for relatives outside of the household, 
for example, makes it unnecessary to purchase domestic services from the market. Another example of 
active inactivity is individuals in full-time education. Although they may not be active in the labour 
market at present, their activity can be interpreted as an investment in future employment and wages. 
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studies in quantitative sociology take these processes into account by analysing 
individual worklessness dependent on household context, which is typically done by 
adding information on other household members to individual-level regression models. 
This dissertation aims to go beyond this approach by studying the household level 
directly. Analysing the meso level of households adds another perspective to what is 
already known about the mechanisms of nonemployment at the macro and micro levels 
of society. Analysing households instead of individuals is more complicated. 
Employment patterns between households are a result of the interplay between labour 
market demand, individual characteristics, family structures and state policies towards 
employers, employees and families. The extent and distribution of household 
nonemployment in a society can therefore be defined as an outcome of interactions 
between the institutions of the labour market, family and state at the household level. 
By the same token, these three areas also shape the financial impact of household 
nonemployment regarding households’ incomes and their distribution. In order to shed 
light on these interdependencies, the following sections discuss aspects of labour market 
participation, social risks, welfare policy and inequality that are particularly relevant 
when studying the household level. 
2.2 Unemployment, nonemployment and the household level 
As mentioned above, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary joblessness 
caused disputes early on in the study of unemployment. Pragmatic approaches to the 
subject were led by the motivation to achieve useful concepts for assessing social 
realities and guiding policy makers’ decisions concerning these realities. In order to do 
this, it became necessary to distinguish between persons who are out of employment but 
available to the labour market in principle, and those who are not. Individuals in the 
former category are defined as unemployed, while those in the latter can be 
differentiated into subgroups depending on the reason for nonemployment (Clasen et al. 
2006). First, there are persons incapable of work due to severe sickness or disabilities. 
Second, some might pursue activities not related to employment, such as housekeeping 
or education. The final group consists of persons who have retired from employment. 
Retirement can occur at the statutory pension age or prematurely through early 
retirement schemes or other pathways of early exit from work (Ebbinghaus 2006, Kohli 
et al. 1991). Early retirement is not necessarily voluntary and may result from poor 
employment prospects, e.g., due to bad health or low education (Hofäcker 2010). 
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When attempting to measure countries’ labour market performance, the focus is most 
often on the unemployed. For this purpose, the number of persons searching for a job is 
related to the total size of the working-age population; however, this indicator can be 
misleading about the actual labour market reserve of a country. Unemployment rates 
vary more across Western countries than do all categories of nonemployment taken 
together (Clasen et al. 2006; Erlinghagen and Knuth 2009). Individuals with the same 
profiles in terms of gender, education and health define themselves as unemployed in 
one country but incapacitated in others. This may be less related to real differences in 
public health and instead depend on the regulation of joblessness within countries’ 
welfare regimes (Börsch-Supan 2011). Incapacity benefit schemes in different countries 
vary in terms of access criteria, i.e., the level of impairment necessary to be eligible for 
the benefit. In the case of insurance benefits, prior contributions play a role, as well. For 
those without insurance claims, some countries have installed special social assistance 
schemes that are often more generous than those for the general population. Some 
incapacity benefits may also be open to persons with partial disabilities. In other cases, 
individuals with some degree of work ability do not qualify for disability benefits, but 
instead for unemployment benefits (Mabett 2005; Maschke 2008; OECD 2010). Due to 
the broad definition of work ability in the German system, for example, nonemployed 
persons with health limitations often receive unemployment benefits. In the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, and Sweden, many of these individuals would be eligible for 
disability or partial-disability benefits. While in the latter cases, the term “hidden 
unemployment” has been frequently used to describe the unused labour market potential 
due to generous disability benefits, the case of Germanyis an example of potentially 
large shares of “hidden sickness” among those officially considered able to work 
(Beatty, Fothergill and Macmillan 2000; Brussig and Knuth 2010). 
Nonemployed individuals without disabilities may also be categorised differently 
depending on which rules are applied to the specific benefit they receive. Until recently, 
older recipients of unemployment benefits had frequently been considered inactive 
rather than unemployed due to their low re-employment prospects and proximity to the 
pension age (Clasen and Clegg 2011b). In some countries, social assistance claimants 
are not required to register as unemployed and may therefore not consider themselves as 
such. This is even more likely if their benefit claim does not depend on  proof of job 
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search or other work-related activities, which is often the case for mothers of young 
children (Immervoll 2009). 
International variation in the composition of nonemployment is therefore also related to 
gender roles, policies towards families and different labour market opportunities for 
men and women. Female labour market participation is generally higher in countries 
that offer flexible working-hour arrangements, generous leave schemes, and affordable 
childcare services (Nieuwenhuis 2014). Women may therefore have a higher probability 
of considering themselves unemployed in countries in which their prospects for 
combining work and family duties are higher. In a context of obstacles towards 
combining work and care, mothers may more frequently define themselves as 
unavailable for work. Gendered employment outcomes and their relation to family 
duties point towards the relevance of the household level for assessing the causes and 
consequences of nonemployment. Previous research has shown that individuals’ 
employment decisions are dependent on their household context. According to New 
Home Economics, the basis of a common household is defined by the joint economic 
production of cohabiting individuals (Becker 1965, 1985). Decisions on employment 
and the division of labour within households can be modelled as result of a bargaining 
process between their members. This negotiation factors in each individual’s earnings 
prospects, their preferences, the budgetary needs of the household and the time needed 
for work unrelated to paid employment. Income needs and time constraints result from 
the household structure: For example, both increase if there are dependent children in 
the household or older persons in need of long-term care.  
Due to the variety of labour market statuses that are combined within households, it is 
conceptually more sound to analyse household nonemployment rather than household 
unemployment. As Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) have demonstrated, individual and 
household nonemployment are two distinct indicators that measure different aspects of 
the labour market and social structure. Their joint investigation sheds light on the 
societal distribution of employment and on households’ potential to compensate for 
individual labour market risks. This fundamental role of households constitutes the 
reason that household nonemployment is generally lower than individual 
nonemployment. Studies on the development of household nonemployment rates 
between the 1970s and mid-2000s have shown that fluctuations in individual 
nonemployment rates are not necessarily paralleled by developments in household 
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nonemployment. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, household nonemployment in Great 
Britain and Australia followed an upwards trend that was not offset by drops in 
individual worklessness. In the 1990s and 2000s, Germany began to show the same 
pattern (Gregg, Wadsworth and Scutella 2010, p. 143). The phenomenon of a shrinking 
gap between individual and household nonemployment rates is generally referred to as 
‘polarisation’. While the number of fully employed households increases, the number of 
fully nonemployed households also increases or remains stable. The general cause is 
that macroeconomic improvements or successful employment policies do not reach 
households to the extent that would be expected if employment and nonemployment 
were distributed randomly across households.  
Corluy and Vandenbrouke (2013) have found that polarisation has increased in most of 
the old EU member states since 1995 with the exception of the United Kingdom, where 
the trend towards higher polarisation came to a halt in the 2000s. The UK nevertheless 
remains one of the EU member states with the highest overall levels of polarisation. 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Luxembourg are the only EU countries with negative 
polarisation, which indicates that employment is spread more equally across households 
than it should be under the expectation of a random distribution. In contrast to other 
European countries, those with negative polarisation are characterized by more 
traditional gender roles in terms of household division of labour and by low female 
employment rates. However, rising female employment rates caused polarisation to 
gradually increase until it reached values around zero at the end of the last decade. 
Among the new EU member states studied by Corluy and Vandenbrouke, polarisation is 
generally positive but decreased in most cases between 2000 and 2008 except in 
Cyprus, Lithuania and Romania. These three countries differ in their overall level of 
polarisation. In Cyprus, polarisation is rather low, while in Lithuania and Romania, it is 
higher than the EU average. The highest rates of polarisation are found in Belgium and 
the United Kingdom, followed by Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Lower 
levels that are nevertheless above the EU average can be found in Germany, France, 
Ireland and Poland. Medium levels of polarisation (i.e., around the EU average) have 
been measured in Austria and the Netherlands. Portugal, Estonia and Latvia have low 
but positive polarisation levels (Corluy and Vandenbrouke 2013, p. 18).  
Variety also prevails when examining the impact of household joblessness and low 
work intensity within households on their financial situation. Although living in a 
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workless household is clearly associated with increased poverty risks at the individual 
level, not all countries with higher rates of household nonemployment display higher 
rates of relative poverty (De Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011). In some countries, changes in 
relative poverty are related to changes in the distribution of household nonemployment, 
but other factors seem more important elsewhere. In most of the new EU member states, 
strong increases in individual employment between 2004 and 2008 have led to a 
reduction in household joblessness, polarisation and poverty risks, although poverty has 
decreased more intensely among in-work households. A reduction of household 
nonemployment has also contributed to falling poverty among the working-age 
population in the United Kingdom. Ireland is a country case with increasing household 
joblessness, but this was counterbalanced by the expansion of social protection during 
the boom period. As a result, poverty risks have decreased for the entire population. 
Sweden, Finland and Germany, on the other hand, have witnessed increasing poverty 
rates for work-poor and work-rich households (Corluy and Vandenbrouke 2013, pp. 32, 
36-37). 
The conclusion that can be drawn from these examples is that the financial and 
distributional impacts of household joblessness depend on the national context of labour 
market opportunities and welfare state arrangements. These elements interact with 
demographic factors, thus forming country-specific structures of labour market risks. 
Fertility and patterns of household formation determine the number of potential earners 
per household, and educational differences within and across households translate into 
varying employment and wage prospects. These inequalities form the basic coordinates 
of households’ social risks and their potential to compensate for them. The effects of 
these risks unfold through their interplay with institutions in the labour market and the 
welfare state. Realised compensation depends on how well welfare regimes are adapted 
to general risk structures. As these structures have changed in many countries while 
polarisation has increased, the following section discusses the nature of old and new 
social risks and their combination within households. 
2.3 Households and social risks  
Following Pintelon et al. (2013, p. 54), social risks can be broadly defined as 
“socioeconomic circumstances associated with a significant loss of income and an 
increased poverty risk”. As a result of long periods of economic growth and low 
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unemployment in many European countries, such risks were long seen as rather 
predictable and related to specific types of work inability: old age, disability and 
(temporary) job loss. Welfare state expansion in the decades following World War Two 
was mainly concentrated in these three areas, and social protection was generally 
organised around the male breadwinner model, albeit to varying degrees (Lewis 1997). 
This arrangement of welfare production became increasingly dysfunctional as large-
scale socioeconomic developments transformed European societies from the 1970s 
onwards (Esping-Andersen 2009).  
The industrial decline caused by technological change and increasing international 
competition decreased the demand for manual workers. As a consequence, structural 
unemployment among low-educated men increased. At the same time, the educational 
expansion of the 1960s caused more women to enter the labour market. This expansion 
– along with the decline in wages in the more service-centred economy – changed work 
patterns and gender roles within households. Cultural change in gender norms also led 
to an increase in temporary partnerships and unstable family constellations. As a result 
of labour market- and family changes, fertility began to drop, leading to societal ageing. 
The family thus decreased in importance as a legal entity and provider of social 
security. Simultaneously, labour markets’ capacity to offer stable and sufficient income 
to households declined. At the macro level, mass unemployment and a shrinking 
working-age population endangered the financing of public social security systems 
(Clasen and Clegg 2011a; Esping-Andersen 2009; Nieuwenhuis 2014). 
Institutional adjustment to these transformations has been slow in many European 
welfare regimes, and new configurations of economic and social exclusion have 
emerged (see Chapter 2.4). Social vulnerability in post-industrial societies is the result 
of a number of interacting factors that have been summarised under the term “new 
social risks” (Taylor-Gooby 2004). According to Ranci (2010, p. 6), “New social risks 
arise at the point where job insecurity, income instability, increasing fragility of family 
support and inertia of welfare institution intersect”. Because this point of intersection is 
found at the household level, “the most appropriate scale of observation at which to 
reconstruct social vulnerability seems to be the household”, which is “the basic unit for 
collecting and distributing resources and converting them into well-being” (ibid, p. 19). 
Ranci defines three “fundamental functionings” of households: 1) “the acquisition and 
use of resources necessary for the material survival of household members”, 2) “the 
`15 
 
management of major life events (…) that preserves the material survival of household 
members” and 3) “the provision of social care for dependent members (…) while 
material survival (and/or management of major life events) has to be guaranteed” (ibid).  
Within a household, individuals’ resources in terms of wealth, work ability, and 
education are thus employed to satisfy the material and social needs of its members. 
Ideally, its activities are balanced such that both social and material needs are met. Due 
to the socio-economic changes described above, achieving such a balance has become 
more difficult for many, e.g., because of unstable employment or the lack of a partner in 
the household to help with additional employment or care work. Such difficulties are 
not limited to temporary situations of income shortage. Unemployment can have 
scarring effects on future wages through signalling and human capital deprivation 
(Gangl 2006). Interrupted or precarious employment also decreases future income by 
preventing or cutting personal contributions to social security schemes, such as 
unemployment insurance or pensions (Bonoli 2006a). 
Bonoli (2006b, p.7) identifies five types of social risks that are new in the sense of their 
being typical for post-industrial societies: difficulties with reconciling work and family, 
being a single parent, having a frail relative, possessing low or obsolete skills, and 
insufficient social security coverage. Although unemployment or individual 
nonemployment could be conceived as an “old social risk”, the phenomenon of 
household nonemployment is better understood in terms of new social risk. Within 
households, the risk of joblessness coincides with other risk factors, such as old age, 
childcare needs and low education. In many cases, household nonemployment is a result 
of a household’s inability to compensate for such risks. Therefore, aggregate household 
nonemployment rates may be more rigid if social risks tend to accumulate in certain 
households. Vandecasteele (2011) has demonstrated that job loss is a poverty-triggering 
event across all educational groups and social classes. For certain social groups, 
however, this event adds to the increased chances of poverty due to other risk factors. 
For singles, the risk of poverty due to job loss is greater than for persons living with a 
partner. This is especially true for single parents. Becoming a parent induces poverty 
more frequently among single women, long-term unemployed persons, persons with 
low education and those in unskilled manual work. Union dissolution is a poverty-
triggering event, especially among women and long-term unemployed men. The 
consequence of risky life events thus often depends on whether other risk factors are 
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already present in a household. Research has shown that rather than being exposed to a 
single risk factor, poor households typically face situations of multiple risks. Such 
situations of cumulative disadvantage tend to aggravate over time (Halleröd and Bask 
2008). 
The increase in polarisation between work-rich and work-poor households (cf. Section 
2.2), especially in cases in which falling individual nonemployment does not translate 
into lower household nonemployment, may be the result of such a ‘clustering of risks’. 
Several hypotheses on this matter can be found in the literature. Over the past decades, 
increased educational homogamy has been observed within couples. This assortative 
mating is said to have led to a split within couple households between highly educated 
individuals with high employment and wage prospects and those with low education, 
employment and wages (Esping-Andersen 2007; Ultee et al. 1988). Another factor to 
consider is the increase in single households since the 1970s, which mainly affects 
single mothers and low-educated, non-partnered men. Both categories are subject to 
new social risks: The former are exposed to problems of work-family reconciliation, the 
latter to decreased demand for low-skilled labour and high precarity in the low-wage 
sector of the service economy (Bonoli 2006b). Statistically, the higher probability for 
unemployment of single households leads to higher household nonemployment rates at 
the aggregate level of society; however, decomposition analyses of polarisation trends 
have shown that the share of certain household types in society is not the main 
explanatory factor of changes in household nonemployment. In most countries, 
changing polarisation within household types has contributed more to changes in 
household nonemployment than have changes between household types.5 Convergence 
in male and female labour market participation explains large shares of the trend in 
countries with increasing polarisation. This factor interacts with region, age and 
education. Educational homogamy, however, cannot be confirmed as a relevant reason 
behind risk clustering (Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth 2010; Corluy and Vandenbrouke 
2013). 
5 There are some exceptions to this pattern. In Germany, for example, changes in the household 
nonemployment rate between 1984 and 2004 can be better explained by changes of household shares 
than by within-household-type changes in polarisation (Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth 2010, p. 154). In 
Belgium, between-household-type polarisation contributed more to changes in household 
nonemployment between 2000 and 2008 than did within-household-type polarisation (Corluy and 
Vandenbrouke 2013, p. 16). 
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As indicated above, childbirth can enhance the poverty risk of certain social groups, 
including the unemployed. The relation between having children and household 
nonemployment varies across countries and household types (Corluy and Vandenbrouke 
2013, p. 24). For couples, having children increases the risk of dual nonemployment in 
some countries, especially for single-earner households (Härkönen 2011). The effect of 
children on household nonemployment can therefore be traced to a number of factors 
that influence women’s employment rates. Personal preferences play an important role 
in women’s career trajectories (Hakim 2006), as do the preferences of women’s partners 
and cultural norms concerning gender roles. Women’s education, the type and quality of 
jobs available to them, and policies of work-family reconciliation are additional factors 
that influence employment decisions (Esping-Andersen 2009, Kangas and Rostgaard 
2007). The way social policies are designed thus has an important effect on the nexus 
between the labour market and the specific combination of individuals’ characteristics 
within households and their care- and income needs. Policies to reconcile work and 
family life need to be seen in the context of other welfare state transfers and services. 
Benefits for the working-age population have undergone a series of reforms over the 
past decades in response to the discussed economic and demographic changes. Over the 
years, the policy debate has concentrated increasingly on employability and labour 
market integration (Clasen and Clegg 2011a, Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst 2008). The 
following section outlines these policy changes, and Section 2.5 discusses interactions 
between policies and household characteristics in greater detail. 
2.4 Social risks in the welfare state 
The large-scale socio-economic changes that have occurred since the 1970s have 
initiated a process of reforms within European welfare states that is still going on today. 
Western European welfare states initially reacted to structural unemployment by 
reducing their labour supply. For this purpose, the social benefit systems were opened 
up to a wider spectrum of the population. Because of the shortage of jobs, certain 
groups of unemployed persons were relieved from the need to search for new 
employment by extending eligibility for unemployment insurance towards the pension 
age and introducing special unemployment assistance schemes for persons who had 
exhausted their insurance claims. Many countries introduced early retirement schemes, 
which also offered an option for employers to reduce labour surpluses (Ebbinghaus 
2006). A third method of reducing the labour supply was extending the scope of 
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sickness and disability benefits. The opening of exit routes out of the labour market was 
thus primarily directed towards groups with low employment prospects due to poor 
health or older age. Most of these routes offered paths to exit the labour market early by 
bridging the gap between job loss and pension receipt. Another group deemed eligible 
for passive benefits (in some countries) was mothers. In these countries, parental-leave 
schemes tended to offer employment breaks of several years, and in many cases, single 
parents were not considered unemployed while on benefits. France and Ireland even 
installed separate benefit schemes for this group (Clasen and Clegg 2006a; Ebbinghaus 
2006, Morel 2007). 
The different strategies of labour shedding were successful insofar as they kept certain 
groups out of the labour market by securing their financial situation via other means. In 
the long term, however, this approach proved unsustainable. The policies gradually 
increased fiscal pressure on welfare states through two mechanisms: First, the extension 
of public alternatives to market income created work disincentives within benefit 
systems, which led to an inflow of long-term benefit receipt by the newly emerging 
social risk groups (Clasen and Clegg 2011a). For women, state transfers were able to 
balance the consequence of decreasing male employment, increasingly common divorce 
and single motherhood and the lack of childcare options. Moreover, increased 
unemployment was not restricted to the first wave of workers hit by industrial decline. 
Globalised competition and shifts in labour demand towards highly skilled personnel 
led to a persistently heightened risk of unemployment among low-skilled workers. 
Given these workers’ poor employment and wage prospects, unemployment insurance 
and assistance were more frequently prolonged. In some countries’ institutional 
arrangements, unemployed persons with health problems could opt for disability 
benefits that were typically more generous, less likely to be means-tested and did not 
require them to be available to the labour market (Erlinghagen and Knuth 2010). 
Second, the increasing receipt of working-age benefits coincided with increases in 
pension claims. The maturation of public pension systems caused pension claims to 
become more generous. At the same time, employment rates began to drop. Thus, 
welfare systems became more cost-intensive while their financial base declined both in 
terms of insurance contributions and taxes (Ebbinghaus 2006). 
By the end of the 1980s, employment rates in many European countries were only 
partly reflected by official unemployment statistics due to high shares of benefit 
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recipients in systems aimed towards the ‘inactive’. The continuous trend of rising life 
expectancy and falling birth rates put additional pressure on welfare states, which led to 
a re-orientation in national welfare and labour market policies (Clasen and Clegg 2011b, 
Eichhorst et al. 2008). The promotion of labour market participation became a central 
purpose of reforms, and activation became one of the ‘buzz words’ of social policy 
debates in the 1990s and 2000s. Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) were used 
more heavily than before and were promoted by OECD and EU recommendations 
(Armignon 2007). Parts of these policies were directed at the demand-side, e.g., hiring 
subsidies or loosening employment protection. At the centre of attention, however, were 
supply-side measures to ‘activate the inactive’ within social benefit systems. At the 
heart of activation lies a combination of enabling and demanding policy instruments to 
promote labour market re-integration. Enabling measures include, for example, training 
and counselling. The demanding aspect of activation policy refers to the benefit 
recipient’s obligation to engage in job search or other work-related activities and to the 
possibility of sanctions (i.e., benefit cuts) in case of non-compliance (Marchal and Van 
Mechelen 2013). The United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands were among the 
first countries to condition benefit rights on mandatory job search- and training 
activities (in 1989, 1990 and 1995, respectively) (Finn and Schulte 2008; Kvist, 
Pedersen and Köhler 2008; Vis, Kersbergen and Becker 2008). In the late 1990s, other 
countries followed, including Sweden, Germany, France and the Czech Republic. 
Initially, the target groups of activation programmes differed significantly across 
countries. Scandinavian countries first concentrated on young social assistance 
claimants and then moved towards unemployment insurance and other age groups 
within social assistance. The United Kingdom initially focussed on beneficiaries of 
contributory unemployment benefits, while Germany and France first had a stronger 
focus on recipients of unemployment assistance (Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst 2008). Over 
time, the scope of activation was widened in most countries, which also affected groups 
that were traditionally deemed unfit to work, such as single mothers and recipients of 
disability pensions (Weishaupt 2013). By the mid-2000s, ‘work first’ had become the 
guiding principle of labour market- and benefit reforms across Europe.  
The rise in benefit conditionality was often accompanied by a restructuring of the social 
benefit systems (Clasen and Clegg 2011b). In order to increase labour supply, benefits 
that were expanded in the 1970s and 1980s were now cut in terms of generosity and 
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duration. The United Kingdom, for instance, abandoned earnings-related unemployment 
payments in the 1980s and restricted them further in 1997 when the contributory benefit 
was limited to six months and the right to long-term unemployment allowance became 
dependent on overall household income. In the Netherlands, unemployment assistance 
was abandoned and merged with general social assistance in 1995, and job-search 
requirements were tightened for most claimants. Similar reforms were carried out in 
Germany in 2005. In Poland, the unemployment benefit system installed in the initial 
phase of economic transition was continuously cut back between the mid-1990s and the 
mid-2000s. Other types of social transfers in Europe were also restricted or abandoned 
altogether. Early retirement schemes, for instance, were heavily retrenched in many 
countries but are still in place in others, such as in France, Spain, Germanyand Hungary 
(Ebbinghaus and Hofäcker 2013). Eligibility conditions for disability benefits became 
tighter in the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Hungary and the United Kingdom, among 
other countries (Clasen and Clegg 2011b). 
Many reform projects thus included a redefinition of who was able and supposed to 
work in principle. This redefinition also included mothers. Categorical benefits for 
single mothers were discontinued, and mothers were less frequently exempt from 
activation requirements. If they were exempt, the exceptions were restricted to mothers 
of small children below school- or kindergarten age. Strategies to lower the employment 
barriers for women and carers became increasingly prominent in policy agendas across 
Europe. Childcare services, part-time arrangements and leave schemes are now the main 
instruments employed to increase female employment rates. The Scandinavian countries 
advanced in this field particularly early. Beginning in the 1970s, public social services 
offered child- and long-term care to employed families, thereby facilitating women’s 
employment while simultaneously offering employment possibilities. France and 
Belgium also developed day-care services in the 1970s that complemented the already-
existing ecoles maternelles, but in the 1980s, a policy of ‘free choice’ was adopted by 
offering cash benefits for stay-at-home mothers alongside public childcare (Morel 
2007). The Netherlands represents an interesting case in its reliance on flexible part-
time arrangements for safeguarding the combination of parenting and work. As a result, 
the one-and-a-half earner household is more common in the Netherlands than elsewhere 
in Europe. Parental-leave schemes have also been subject to reforms over the past 
decade. In Germany and Luxembourg, overly long leave periods have been shortened in 
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order to prevent women’s labour market detachment. Both countries also included 
fathers in the new leave arrangements, a policy first adopted in the 1990s in the Nordic 
welfare states (Daly 2011). In some states, however, there are no leave schemes 
available to parents except for maternity leave directly after child birth. These countries, 
which include Greece, Italy and Spain, are often also less likely to provide or subsidise 
formal childcare. In the case of elderly care, the availability and public funding of 
formal care services is still very limited in many countries. To families in Central and 
Eastern Europe, long-term care services are rarely available (Styczyńska 2012, Bettino 
and Verashchagina 2010) and also in Western and Southern Europe, care services can 
be scarce and expensive (Leitner 2003). Care by family members is often prioritised by 
governments, though it remains insufficiently funded. Ironically, many households turn 
to migrant care workers from Eastern Europe in order to fill these gaps in social 
protection (Simonazzi 2009). 
Many welfare regimes thus remain insufficient when it comes to securing individuals’ 
ability to work despite care responsibilities. Moreover, families with low wages and 
single parents often find it difficult to provide an adequate level of income for their 
households (Bahle, Ebbinghaus and Goebel 2015). Adaption to social change has been 
partial and incomplete, particularly in the continental and Southern European welfare 
systems. This has led to a dualisation of the population into groups that are relatively 
well-protected by the traditional, status-maintaining social insurance schemes and a 
group of ‘outsiders’ who face insufficient incomes and social security coverage due to 
instable working careers and low wages (Palier 2010). But also the Scandinavian 
welfare states and those of the United Kingdom and Ireland do not perform well for 
every social risk group. While nonemployment among couples and single parents in 
Denmark is extremely low, those that experience this situation face a higher risk of 
poverty than do those in the United Kingdom, a country with a comparatively high 
percentage of nonemployment among both household types (Bahle, Ebbinghaus and 
Göbel 2015). Depending on the overall architecture of a welfare regime, therefore, some 
categories of social risks are confronted quite successfully, while others may be 
neglected. Within households, this creates the institutional context of decisions on 
income and employment. The following section deals with the influence of welfare state 
policies on households’ economic activity. 
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2.5 Welfare policies’ interactions and household employment 
The previous section revealed that apart from adapting benefit systems, countries began 
to introduce or extend additional policies to deal with new social risks in post-industrial 
society. The modernisation of welfare regimes centred around the promotion of 
households’ self-sufficiency via labour market integration, which is most obvious in the 
field of activation and policies of work-family reconciliation. These reforms altered the 
benefits available to various population groups, thereby influencing the status 
composition of the nonemployed population (DeDeken and Clasen 2011). Status 
combinations within households are therefore also likely to have changed. This section 
discusses the interaction of benefit rights within households. Three types of interactions 
are of special interest here: those between different risk factors and benefit generosity, 
those between different kinds of benefits, and those between labour market statuses 
within households. These three areas are interconnected as both risks and benefits are 
combined within households. As a result, households’ employment outcomes depend on 
a combination of factors that together determine their earnings possibilities, benefit 
rights, and access to services. These factors are found in households’ composition 
regarding the number of adults and children, health and skills, and the work and 
insurance records of adults. 
Corluy and Vandenbrouke (2013, p.24) have shown that the probability of household 
nonemployment is greater for individuals with disabilities, low-educated persons and 
those who are either very young or close to retirement age. Previous research has found 
that these risks interact with the regulation of social benefits. Benefit generosity, for 
instance, has varying effects depending on the type of benefit system and the social 
group concerned. Biegert (2011) has found, for instance, that the probability of 
women’s nonemployment is more strongly affected by replacement rates in 
unemployment insurance than that of men. Disability pensions, in contrast, have a 
greater impact on men's probability of nonemployment. The generosity of social 
assistance benefits even has opposite effects for both genders: While higher benefit 
levels are associated with higher levels of nonemployment among men, they seem to 
reduce nonemployment among women. An exception is the group of women with 
tertiary education, whose probability of being nonemployed rises with higher levels of 
social assistance. Overall, however, educational differences in the effects of institutions 
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are more pronounced among men, particularly among those with medium levels of 
education.  
Studies on reforms of such benefits have revealed that restricting the access and 
generosity of transfers can bring more individuals into work if combined with effective 
activation measures (Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst 2008). However, transitions into other, 
alternative benefit systems are also observed as a (mostly unintended) consequence of 
reforms. Garcia Mandico et al. (2016) have studied transitions after a large-scale re-
assessment of disability insurance claims in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2009 
and have found that only half of those leaving disability insurance moved into 
employment. The other half either moved into unemployment benefits or other states of 
nonemployment. Studying such spill-over effects in Austria, Staubli and Zweimüller 
(2013) have shown that there was only a moderate increase in employment after raising 
the early retirement age, and this increase was mainly among healthy, highly educated 
workers with high earnings. Older workers with low wages and poor health instead 
moved into unemployment or disability benefits. Inderbitzin, Staubli and Zweimüller 
(2013) have found similar substitution effects between benefits and have additionally 
observed benefit complementarity, i.e., the combination of unemployment and disability 
benefits or a sequential take-up before entering retirement. Larsson (2006) has reported 
complementarity effects between unemployment and disability insurance in Sweden, 
and an interaction of former wages with replacement rate ceilings in different benefits.  
Substitution and complementarity can also occur in the area of activation policy. Certain 
groups may be included or excluded from job-search and work requirements: Age 
limits, degrees of disability, and being a lone parent are criteria that determine on who is 
targeted by or exempt from activation. Such exemptions may enable some households 
to receive benefits while none of the members are required to seek employment. Even in 
the absence of generous exemptions, activation may not effectively reduce the number 
of nonemployed households if access to alternative benefits is granted relatively easily. 
As mentioned above, policy changes over recent decades have redefined countries’ 
norms about who, in principle, should work to earn their living and who, in contrast, 
should instead be allowed to rely on public support. Increasing employment among the 
working-age population has played a central role in many countries’ benefit reforms. 
However, as Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst (2008, p. 432) put it, “activation programmes 
effectively help screen the benefit recipients and differentiate between beneficiaries 
`24 
 
available for work and those not available (‘shaking the tree’), but obviously they are 
insufficient tools for the labour market integration of weaker groups.”  
For these weaker groups, having dependent children can be a cause of household 
nonemployment, but the extent of this risk depends on the country and social group 
concerned (Corluy and Vandenbrouke 2013; Härkönen 2011). Having children 
increases the need for income in households, thereby creating incentives to intensify the 
labour supply. Even so, the amount of time that can be spent in paid employment may 
be heavily restrained if no childcare – formal or informal – is available. In countries that 
have implemented generous leave schemes and childcare arrangements, mothers’ 
employment rates are generally higher (Esping-Andersen 2009, Nieuwenhuis 2014). If 
childcare is expensive, specialisation within couples becomes more attractive. Low-
wage earners (particularly single parents) are likely to be dependent on social benefits if 
their salaries cannot cover both the needs of their families and child-care costs. 
Activation policies that take these family issues into account usually focus on the role of 
mothers in child-rearing and paid work rather than on parenthood in general. Some 
countries acknowledge mothers’ childcare needs and time constraints by exempting 
them from job-search requirements while on benefits. Such exemptions are typically 
tied to the age of the children and expire once they have reached a certain age threshold 
(Haux 2013). This strategy potentially avoids poverty, e.g., by preventing low-wage 
parents from having to carry the financial burden of childcare. In the long-term, 
however, lock-in effects in benefit receipt may occur due to labour market detachment 
and the loss of human capital. 
These effects are particularly harmful considering the finding that women’s skills are 
crucial to overcoming the so-called “macho-effect” within couples, i.e., of households’ 
reluctance to have a female breadwinner, even in the event of the husband’s job loss 
(Härkönen 2007, p. 53). The institutional context of the welfare state plays into such 
within-couple dynamics. In countries with generous leave schemes, women’s 
probability of working full-time is higher than their probability of working part-time or 
not at all. The availability of child-care services increases the probability of mothers’ 
employment in general (Kangas and Rostgaard 2007). Passive child benefits, in 
contrast, diminish female employment (Nieuwenhuis 2014). Studies suggest that 
women are less likely to compensate for their partners’ job loss by finding employment 
or increasing their work hours if there are structural barriers to doing so, e.g., a lack of 
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full-time childcare offers. Women’s compensation for male job loss is also less likely if 
unemployment benefits are either too generous (Ehlert 2012) or means-tested at the 
household level (McGinnity 2002). 
The latter is related to a more general problem of work disincentives within targeted 
benefits. In systems that apply strict means testing, most (if not all) household incomes 
are taken into account when determining the benefit amount to which a claimant is 
entitled. Every additional hour worked by household members thus diminishes the 
benefit. Unless the income gain from employment surpasses the simultaneous loss of 
benefits, partners and other household members of unemployed persons are unlikely to 
increase their labour supply. In some benefits (e.g., the German Arbeitslosengeld II and 
the French Revenu de Solidarité Active), a proportion of earnings is disregarded from 
the means test in order to ease transitions from benefits to employment (Bahle, Hubl 
and Pfeifer 2011). This strategy, however, can encourage the take-up of marginal 
employment in order to top up the benefit. The possibility of combining benefits and 
work also creates work disincentives in lower wage spectrums (Eichhorst 2012, 
Oorschot 2002). 
In theory, disincentives could be stronger for households that have higher financial 
needs, for example, in the case of dependent children. Benefit rates tend to be higher for 
families and reaching an adequate wage may be more difficult. Härkönen’s (2011, 
2007) results on the effect of children on dual joblessness both support and challenge 
this claim. He found nonemployment spells of couples to be longer if they received 
means-tested benefits. In five out of nine countries, having children increased the risk of 
entering dual nonemployment. However, although this effect was particularly strong in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, it was not caused by these countries’ focus on means-
tested benefits. Weak employment protection and a low extent of policies supporting 
mothers’ employment seemed to be more relevant factors. The finding that the child-
induced employment risk was more persistent in these countries over time nevertheless 
seemed related to means-testing.  
While incentive structures created by social policies have a significant impact on 
household employment, their ultimate effects depend on the specific labour market 
context. High aggregate unemployment can lead to discouragement within households 
and prevent partners of jobless persons from acting as ‘added workers’. A large low-
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wage sector may reinforce disincentive effects within benefits, which may be further 
intensified if childcare is expensive or if many jobs are fixed-term and do not offer 
access to higher-tier social security. If men have better access to higher wages and work 
hours, specialisation within households according to traditional gender norms becomes 
more likely, even if social policy supports maternal employment. Household 
employment patterns are thus a result of structural and cultural factors (Steiber and Haas 
2010). They depend on the economic opportunities and incentives offered by the 
welfare state and labour market while simultaneously being shaped by the norms of 
gender roles and family life. 
2.6 Inequality between households 
The discussion thus far has addressed interactions between welfare policies, labour 
market opportunities and household composition regarding household employment. A 
special emphasis has been placed on the relation between these institutional areas and 
social risks, i.e., situations of social disadvantage and welfare loss. While households 
are important places of risk compensation, the accumulation of several risk factors is 
frequently observed in socially vulnerable households. The extent to which risks cluster 
within households has an effect on the distribution of work between them and therefore 
also on the distribution of work incomes.  
Unfavourable combinations of household structures, labour market demand and state 
policies towards both of these spheres can increase levels of social vulnerability and 
poverty. Barbieri and Bozzon (2016), for example, have demonstrated that poverty as a 
consequence of child birth is a greater problem for households in Southern European 
welfare states than in other parts of Europe. The authors ascribe this finding to a 
combination of familist policies and a strong dualisation of labour markets and social 
protection. In the Mediterranean countries of Europe, public support for families is low 
in terms of both benefits and services; therefore, child- and elderly care are provided 
informally or bought on the market. At the same time, labour markets offer relatively 
secure conditions for well-established workers, while younger workers and immigrants 
face unstable work conditions, low pay and lower social rights. Although flexibilisation 
is a general trend in post-industrial labour markets, the consequences for families are 
most severe in ‘familistic’ regimes that offer little to no support for labour market 
‘outsiders’. Those whose jobs do not grant access to social insurance often have very 
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limited access to alternative incomes. Citizens of Greece and Italy, for example, have no 
general right to social assistance. In Spain, such a right exists, but benefits are low and 
vary by region. Moreover, they are typically not accessible for persons younger than 25, 
and decisions on claims are often made on a discretional basis (Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer 
2011).  
The welfare state therefore has an important influence on the structure of social 
vulnerability (Ranci 2010, p. 22) as well as on households’ strategies to overcome it. 
Regarding households’ potential to alleviate poverty risks and – more generally –  
maximise income, certain household structures and within-household employment 
patterns may be more beneficial in some countries than in others. Means-testing of 
unemployment benefits (e.g., in the United Kingdom and Germany) could encourage 
the formation of single households among jobless persons who would not be eligible for 
the benefit if they lived with their parents or partners (Eichhorst, Grienberger-Zingerle 
and Konle-Seidl 2008). A welfare system that offers generous pensions but less support 
and security for younger generations offers incentives to form multi-generational 
households. In Greece, Spain and Poland, for example, old-age benefits play an 
important role as a form of protection against child poverty (Bradshaw and Huby 2014). 
The tax system can also have an influence on household formation. In Germany, Poland 
and Luxembourg, for example, spousal tax-splitting favours single-earner and one-and-
a-half earner couples over double-earner households and single parents. The latter two 
scenarios lead to a greater number of households with a reduced ratio between income 
earners and dependent family members. These households are more likely to be socially 
vulnerable in terms of housing conditions and per-capita income. Due to a strong 
division of labour in these households, they are also less able to compensate for their 
main earner’s job loss by increasing the labour supply of other members. Nevertheless, 
the effects of risk clustering are not restricted to multi-adult households but also apply 
to single adults. Because single households cannot rely on another person to balance 
earnings limitations, they are at a higher risk of poverty and deprivation (Callens and 
Croux 2009; Ehlert 2012, Halleröd and Bask 2008). 
However, even if other household members are present and increase their work intensity 
in economically challenging situations, it is not clear whether the earnings of an added 
worker can effectively counterbalance the main earner’s income loss. Fackler and Hank 
(2016) have studied the effects of unemployment on the income trajectories of German 
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households and found job displacement to lead to long-term losses in earnings and 
overall household income. While they have been able to show that welfare state 
transfers have compensated for this loss to a significant degree, they have not been able 
to find an added-worker effect on household income. An earlier study comparing 
couples in the United States and Germany, in contrast, found some proof of added 
worker effects (Ehlert 2012). Women were more likely to act as added workers in the 
US than in Germany, where unemployment benefits operated as an important financial 
cushion. This cushion, however, has become weaker over time, and households in 
Germany are less likely to recover financially from unemployment today compared with 
the 1980s. This finding concerns male income trajectories in Germany as well as those 
of women in both Germany and the US. Overall, male earnings have buffered female 
unemployment to a greater extent than female earnings have compensated for male 
unemployment. 
Women therefore still rely more on the family as mechanism of redistribution than do 
men, which may explain why female poverty is more often a result of employment 
changes and demographic events, e.g., child birth or separation. For men, demographic 
events play a minor role compared with unemployment (Callens and Croux 2009). The 
rate of both labour market- and demographic events is higher today than it was at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Family and employment situations have become more unstable, 
exposing more households to financial risk. Families headed by low-educated, low-
wage earners and the growing number of single households (particularly single mothers) 
are especially vulnerable. Rising female employment rates have counterbalanced these 
risks to different degrees depending on countries’ overall adaptation to these socio-
economic changes. 
The effect of increasing employment among women has been debated in studies on 
income inequality. According to Esping-Andersen (2007), the steepest increase in 
women’s labour market activity has been among higher-educated women (mostly living 
with higher-educated men), which has led to a widening gap between economically 
strong and weak households. Although Corluy and Vandenbrouke (2013) have 
confirmed that changes in male and female employment rates are important reasons for 
increasing polarisation of employment among households, they have not found such a 
link between polarisation and educational homogamy. Kollmeyer’s (2013) study of 
thirteen European countries, Australia, the United States, and Canada has found that 
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higher female employment generally reduced inequalities between 1967 and 2005. At 
the same time, growing educational homogamy and single motherhood have had 
disequalizing effects. Harkness’ (2010) results for a similar sample of countries in the 
mid-2000s specify that cross-national variance in inequality is less related to the 
population shares of couples and single households. Inequality within household types 
better explains variation, i.e., gaps between single working women and between dual- 
and single-earner couples. Nieuwenhuis’ (2014) confirmed previous findings that 
partners’ earnings became increasingly correlated between 1975 and 2005. This 
development could have increased inequality between couples but was counterbalanced 
by generally decreasing disparities among women’s earnings and increasing shares of 
women's’ earnings in overall household income. As a result, female earnings had an 
attenuating effect on between-couple inequality. 
Thus, although changes in family structures have lowered households’ redistributive 
capacities (Albertini 2008, Peichl, Pestel and Schneider 2012), this is not the main 
source of rising income inequality. Moreover, the impact of family composition on the 
income distribution varies considerably across countries. Households’ work intensity 
seems to be a stronger predictor along with national wage structures and tax-benefit 
systems (Biewen and Juhasz 2012; Medgyesi 2014). Kollmeyer’s (2013) study also 
points to the importance of other demographic and institutional factors. A large 
population share of persons older than 65 increases inequality, while union density, 
centralised wage bargaining and welfare state generosity lower it. Nieuwenhuis (2014) 
has found that women’s earnings reduce between-couple inequality more in countries 
that focus their family policy on promoting mothers’ employment, than in countries that 
emphasise passive financial support for families. In the latter, women are likely to be 
employed to a lesser degree and to contribute less to household earnings, thus 
accentuating male earnings inequalities.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the theoretical discussion is that household 
nonemployment is an important indicator for risk accumulation within households. 
Social risks result from situations of incompatibility between individuals’ resources and 
needs with the demands of the labour market, and from the degree to which societal 
institutions compensate for this mismatch. These institutions are mainly found in the 
area of the welfare state and the household and family. As we have seen, these areas do 
not exist independent of each other. Welfare policies’ level of support for persons in 
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need tends to depend on the household context of those seeking support. This can 
influence patterns of household formation, which, in turn, influence patterns of 
employment and income redistribution within and across households.  
3. Three research papers on household employment and income risks 
3.1 Research strategy 
The theoretical discussion in Section 2 leads to the conclusion that household 
employment decisions are interrelated with opportunities and incomes offered by the 
labour market and welfare state. The supply of labour by households is dependent on 
the extent to which members’ characteristics meet the demand in terms of skills, health 
and age. Work preferences may be rooted in social norms but are determined to a large 
extent by households’ income needs and restrictions concerning the feasibility of work, 
both of which are dependent on household structure. Larger households need more 
income than smaller ones, while dependent children and frail relatives require care. If 
not available otherwise, this care has to be provided by household members, which 
reduces the amount of time that can be devoted to paid employment. The consequences 
can be dire, especially in households with a single employable person or with members 
who have low wage prospects, e.g., due to low education. The extent to which different 
factors of social risk within households produce and prolong nonemployment is a 
central topic of this dissertation. The state represents the third player in the game of 
household nonemployment. Welfare policies can help individuals find and maintain 
employment in difficult times, or they can offer financial support if households are 
partially or fully without employment. Welfare regimes differ regarding the extent to 
which different social risks are compensated for and the manner by which they are 
addressed.  
This ensemble of institutional influences on household income is what Esping-Andersen 
(1999) termed the “triad of welfare producers”, also known as the “welfare triangle” 
(Evers 1990). Configurations within and between the family, the labour market and the 
welfare state are crucial for the production and redistribution of income and thereby 
shape patterns of socioeconomic risk structures in society. Therefore, their interplay is 
an important determinant of income inequality. Figure 1 offers a summary of these 
relationships and places household employment decisions at the interface of family 
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constellations, provisions by the welfare state and opportunities offered by the labour 
market. 
Figure 1: Household employment and income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three papers of the dissertation focus on different aspects of the depicted 
interrelationships. In order to provide answers to the project’s main research questions 
(see introduction), different sets of data sources and quantitative methods are used. 
Paper 1 analyses the influence of social benefit regulation on the connection between 
households’ employment risks and employment outcomes. The focus of the paper is 
therefore on the links between welfare producers that are represented by Arrows a and 
b in Figure 1. Among the dissertation papers, the first study is the most extensive in 
terms of country sample and variety of data sources. The study uses multilevel 
regression models to assess cross-level interactions between policies and households. 
Such an analysis requires a larger number of country cases in order to yield reliable 
results. The household-level data of the study stem from the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Although EU-SILC contains information 
on a total of 32 European countries, only 20 are analysed in Paper 1 because of 
restrictions concerning the availability of institutional data. Therefore, the models are 
computed using Bayesian Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo estimation. This procedure has 
favorable properties over Maximum Likelihood estimation when the number of 
countries is under 25 (Stegmueller 2012). Estimated coefficients are less likely to be 
biased and are generally more conservative. 
The institutional information from which the macro-indicators of the models were 
constructed was retrieved from national legislation and from academic comparative 
databases. The main sources were the EuMin dataset (provided by the Mannheim 
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Centre for European Social Research (MZES)), the CSB-MIPI dataset (provided by the 
Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy at the University of Antwerp) and the DICE 
database (provided by CesIfo in Munich) (Hubl and Bahle 2012; van Mechelen et al. 
2011; DICE database 2011). The institutinal aspects studied in this paper concern 
policies that are designed to increase the labour market supply of the population. 
Demanding activation measures within unemployment insurance and social assistance 
are studied along with the extent to which access to other, functionally equivalent 
benefits is restricted. The study therefore relates to the literature on substitution and 
complementarity effects presented in Section 2.5 (e.g., Inderbitzin, Staubli and 
Zweimüller 2013). The benefits under study are disability pensions, early retirement 
programmes and minimum income protection other than general social assistance. The 
regulation of these benefits constitutes individuals’ possibilities to acquire income 
alternatives to labour earnings and also determines the context in which benefit 
recipients define their situation in the labour market. As the literature discussed in 
Section 2.2 suggests, nonemployed individuals are more likely to consider themselves 
unemployed in countries with large unemployment benefit schemes and restricted 
disability benefits, and they are more likely to define themselves as inactive in countries 
with easily accessible disability- and early-retirement schemes (Erlinghagen and Knuth 
2010). As a consequence, countries differ more in terms of unemployment than in terms 
of total nonemployment..  
Figure 2: Individual and household nonemployment in 20 European countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU-SILC 2011. 
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Figure 2 illustrates variations of unemployment and nonemployment with the data used 
in Paper 1. Household nonemployment varies less than the individual-level indicators, 
reflecting the compensation of labour market risks within households. Nevertheless, the 
graph also suggests cross-national variation in this capacity 
Paper 1 considers benefits for the working-age population, and the micro data are 
accordingly restricted to households that have members under the pension age. In 
addition, households that have no members above 25 are also excluded from the 
analysis. Among these very young households, students and labour market entrants are 
overrepresented. These groups are subject to specific employment and income dynamics 
that go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Although initial labour market entry and 
retirement later in life are highly relevant from a sociological point of view, the focus of 
this project is on dynamics at the core of the working-age population. Therefore, all 
three studies of the dissertation consider households with at least one member over the 
age of 25 and one member under 65. 
Paper 2 also studies connections a and b in Figure 1, but from a longitudinal 
perspective. Given the connection between household worklessness, social vulnerability 
and poverty, the interest lies in the persistency of this situation and in its remedies. 
Therefore, while the first paper analyses the general probability of household 
nonemployment, the second paper narrows down the focus to households that are 
affected by it. The main question is how negative employment outcomes are overcome 
by households in two different institutional settings, i.e., the United Kingdom and 
Germany. These two countries were selected because Germany’s policy trajectory in the 
2000s was frequently described as moving towards the British model of welfare. 
Unemployment benefit reforms were marked by a strengthening of needs-based 
benefits, cutbacks of insurance-based rights and an expansion of activation policies 
(Eichhorst, Grienberger-Zingerle and Konle-Seidl 2008). The second paper analyses 
transitions out of household nonemployment througout the early 1990s until 2009 using 
data from the British Household and Populaiton Survey and the German Socio-
Economic Panel 6 . Employing discrete-time event history regression models, the 
influence of indivudal resources in multi-adult households is analysed together with 
other aspects of household structure. For this purpose, the paper concentrates on 
6 For more information, see http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.221178.en/about_soep.html and 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps. 
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couples. Male and female education, health and prior work experience represent labour 
market resources. Household composition is measured by the number of children, 
members in need of long-term care and the correlation of partners' resources in terms of 
education and age. Changes in institutinal contexts are taken into account by specifying 
the time period during which a nonemployment spell began, i.e., before or after 
important reforms in unemployment and in-work benefits. Changes in labour market 
opportunities are controlled for by accounting for regional unemployment rates. 
Paper 3 shifts the focus to the the societal level without losing sight of the previously 
studied individual- and household-level aspects. In the first two studies, macro-level 
phenomena are treated mainly as input factors for household employment outcomes. 
The third study examines the combined effect of households’ family structures, 
employment outcomes and benefit rights on countries’ income distributions. This link 
between the welfare triangle and  income inequality is depicted by Arrow c in 
Figure 1. The third paper again turns to the EU-SILC as data source and makes use of 
its comprehensive information on individuals’ labour market status, household 
composition and income sources. Four countries are studied in depth concerning the 
influence of these factors on income rankings among households. These countries – 
Germany, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom – were selected because of their 
varying institutional settings and different economic trajectories during the great 
recession that began in 2008. While Germany was able to prevent declines in GDP from 
affecting employment, Poland experienced increases in unemployment during the 
recession despite being the only country with positive growth rates. The UK was initialy 
hit hard by the crisis but recovered faster than many had expected. Spain, in contrast, is 
still struggling with the consequences of the economic shock (Eurostat 2016, OECD 
2012, OECD 2014, OECD 2016). As discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.5, lower 
household employment often coincides with other social risk factors, and policies to 
alleviate these risks have an important impact on poverty and income inequality. In 
order to explore this connection further, Paper 3 analyses the influence of these risk 
factors in different parts of the income distribution. For this purpose, the Apha-Beta-
Gamma method of measuring local inequality is combined with a counterfacutal re-
weighting procedure (Chauvel 2016, Biewen 2001). This strategy relates distributinal 
changes in household work intensity, size and benefit receipt to changes in income 
inequality. 
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3.2 Results 
Table 1 provides an overview of the studies’ results regarding individual-, household-
level- and policy influences on household nonemployment and inequality. Paper 1 
confirms the findings of previous research for individual labour market resources and 
risks. Higher education and better health function as important protectors against 
household nonemployment, while age is a risk factor. A higher number of adults in the 
household reduces the probability of household nonemployment, whereas children and 
members in need of long-term care increase this probability. The effect of children is 
stronger for younger and single parents. Despite these important insights into household 
employment risks, the main interest of Paper 1 is on how these risks are influenced by 
social policies that were designed to address them. The research question behind the 
first paper is therefore:  
How is the context of social protection related to international variation in household 
nonemployment? 
The study shows that social benefit regulation alters households’ probability of 
nonemployment by interacting with social risk factors within them. The study focuses 
on different strategies to make social benefit systems more conditional in terms of 
access requirements and behavioural obligations. Activating social benefits can have 
favourable effects on aggregate employment and reduce social inequalities in labour 
market access. This is the case in countries with intensive activation in unemployment 
insurance, limited access to early retirement and a low number of separate, non-
contributory minimum income benefits. Directing labour market integration policies 
towards mothers on social assistance helps to reduce differences between single mothers 
and couples with children as well as between single mothers and other single 
households.  The inequality-reducing effect of female employment can thus be 
promoted by activation. 
However, there are greater inequalities in households’ employment outcomes in 
countries that generally apply strict activation rules in social assistance. This raises 
questions as to how these policies are carried out towards particularly vulnerable 
population groups with low employability. In these financially tight tax-based benefit 
systems, it is possible that incentives at the policy-implementation level lead case 
managers to concentrate their efforts on clients who are easier to place (Van Berkel, De 
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Graaf and Sirovátka 2012). Recipients with a greater distance from the labour market 
may not profit from work-first policies, and more supportive (and expensive) measures, 
such as training or coaching, may not be available.  
Table 1: Research findings 
Studied resources, risks, and context factors 
of household nonemployment 
Findings 
Study 1: Benefit 
activation and 
nonemployment risks 
Study 2: Duration of 
couples' 
nonemployment 
Study 3: welfare 
triangle and inequality 
between households 
Individual Human capital 
Higher-educated 
households have a lower 
probability of household 
nonemployment. 
The duration of dual 
joblessness varies more 
across households 
based on women's 
education and work 
experience than on 
men's. 
Control variable 
  Age 
Older households are at 
a higher risk of 
household 
nonemployment. 
A higher age of both 
partners reduces the 
likelihood of ending dual 
joblessness. 
Control variable 
  Health 
Household members 
with health-related 
limitations in daily 
activities increase the 
risk of household 
nonemployment. 
In the UK, couples with 
healthier women have a 
comparative advantage 
over other households 
concerning an exit from 
nonemployment. In 
Germany, the health of 
both partners is 
significant. 
Control variable 
Household Marital homogamy not included 
Homogamy in terms of 
age and education 
shows no effects on the 
duration of couples' 
nonemployment. 
not included 
  Long-term care not included 
Long-term care needs 
prolong couples' 
nonemployment. 
 not included 
  Children 
Children increase the 
probability of household 
nonemployment, 
particularly for younger 
households and singles. 
Couples with children 
have shorter 
nonemployment spells. 
This is more pronounced 
for parents of young 
children in Germany. 
The decreasing number 
of households with 
children in Germany, 
Poland and Spain and 
the increasing number of 
children in the UK had 
equalizing effects on the 
income distribution. 
  Number of adults 
Couples and multi-adult 
households have a lower 
risk of household 
nonemployment. 
not included 
Drops in household size 
in Germany and Spain 
and increases in Poland 
and the UK attenuated 
inequality. 
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Continuation of Table 1: 
Welfare state Unemployment benefits 
Countries with strong 
activation within 
unemployment 
insurance have lower 
household probabilities 
of nonemployment and 
lower social inequality in 
nonemployment risks. 
Couples' 
nonemployment 
durations increased over 
time, but multivariate 
analyses suggest that 
reforms were not the 
main reason for longer 
spells. 
Changes in the 
distribution of 
unemployment benefits 
across households had 
equalizing effects in 
Spain and Poland but 
disequalizing effects in 
Germany and the UK. 
  Minimum income protection 
Countries with strong 
activation within social 
assistance show higher 
social inequalities in 
household 
nonemployment. 
Restricting the number 
of other minimum 
income benefits reduces 
household 
nonemployment.  
See results for 
unemployment benefits. not included 
 Disability benefits 
In countries with highly 
selective disability 
pensions, households 
have a higher probability 
of nonemployment, 
particularly among 
lower-educated and 
older households. 
not included 
Changes in the 
distribution of disability 
benefits across 
households had 
equalizing effects in in 
Germany, Poland, and 
Spain but disequalizing 
effects in the UK. 
  Early retirement 
In countries with limited 
early retirement options, 
educational and age 
differences in household 
nonemployment are 
lower. 
not included not included 
  Activating mothers 
In countries that make 
few exceptions for 
mothers, single parents 
have a higher probability 
of employment. 
not included not included 
Labour market Regional unemployment rates not included 
No significant effect is 
found, but an omission 
changes the estimation 
results. 
Control variable 
  Distribution of employment not included not included 
Increases in household 
work intensity soothed 
income inequality in the 
UK, Germany, and 
Poland. Its decrease 
intensified inequality in 
Spain. 
 
Difficulties in evaluating the specific needs of certain risk groups also come to mind 
when assessing the results for disability pensions. Restrictive access is associated with 
higher probabilities of nonemployment for all households, particularly for lower-
educated and older households. As the probability plots of household nonemployment 
for different social risk groups in Paper 1 reveal, effects of disability pensions and early 
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retirement schemes form almost perfect mirror images. Substitution effects between 
early retirement and disability pensions for older and lower-educated households are 
therefore highly possible and need to be considered by policy makers who wish to 
activate the ‘hidden labour market reserve’. 
The second paper investigates several aspects of household composition and context 
regarding their influence on the duration of couples’ nonemployment spells. The study 
aims to provide answers to the following research question: 
What factors influence the duration of household nonemployment in different 
institutional contexts? 
Paper 2 adds to the household-level findings of the first paper by specifying that the 
effects of male and female resources on the duration of couples’ nonemployment differ 
across countries. Women’s education and health matter more than men’s in the UK 
when comparing households’ prospects of re-entering the labour market. In Germany, 
male and female resources contribute to differences in spell durations more evenly. 
Having a household member in need of long-term care increases the time it takes to 
overcome nonemployment. Although Paper 1 finds that having children increases the 
risk of entering household nonemployment, couples with children exit nonemployment 
faster than couples without children. The second paper also assesses the influence of 
marital homogamy in terms of age and education. Neither the descriptive nor the 
multivariate analyses can find that partners’ similarity alters their chances of re-
employment compared with more heterogeneous couples. 
The final aspect of interest in Paper 2 is the context of social policy, which underwent 
significant changes during the observed period. Means-tests and activation for the 
unemployed were expanded in the United Kingdom in 1996 and in Germany in 2005. 
Such policies bear the risk of increasing households’ work incentives. The United 
Kingdom expanded tax benefits for low-wage workers in order to counterbalance this 
affect. The results concerning these changes are mixed. The descriptive analysis 
suggests that nonemployment spells became longer once these policies were introduced. 
The combined view on the descriptive results and event history models leads to the 
conclusion that the reforms have not had a direct impact on the duration of household 
nonemployment. The lengthening of spells is most likely due to changes in the 
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structural composition of the population that entered household nonemployment. 
Whether this is due to policy reforms or other factors requires further investigation. 
Nevertheless, reforms may have had an indirect effect on household nonemployment. In 
both countries, households that entered nonemployment by the mid-2000s had lower 
chances of exiting towards employment than did those who entered in the mid-1990s. 
This is an illustrative example of the interplay between distributional changes in 
population characteristics, their clustering within households and effects on labour 
market status. This interplay is one aspect of the increasing polarisation of employment 
across households, a trend that Paper 2 confirms for couples in Germany and the United 
Kingdom (although this trend appears to have slowed down in the UK after 2005). 
Moreover, such developments have the potential to alter the distribution of work and 
benefit income and therefore also inequality between households. Paper 2 only focuses 
on couples, but changes are also likely to have occurred in other household types. As 
Paper 1 shows, the employment risks of these other household types differ from those of 
couples.  
Building on the insights of the first and second papers, Paper 3 attempts to model the 
joint impact of changing distributions of work and welfare among different household 
constellations. The central interest lies with such changes’ relation to developments in 
aggregate inequality between households. Thus, the paper aims to answer the following 
research question: 
How does the distribution of employment across households influence income 
inequality in a given context of family structures and social protection? 
Paper 1 finds that having children increases the risk of household nonemployment, 
particularly for single mothers. The situation of these mothers is worse in institutional 
contexts that emphasise women's traditional caring role within the family. Therefore, 
having children might be heavily related to welfare risks in some countries, which may 
explain the third paper’s finding that the decreasing number of children per household 
in Germany, Poland and Spain slowed growth in inequality between 2005 and 2010. In 
Germany and Spain, reductions in household size also mitigated inequality. In the 
United Kingdom and Poland, by contrast, inequality was reduced not by shrinkage but 
by growth in household size. The number of potential earners can thus have different 
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effects depending on the overall welfare context. Changes in households’ work intensity 
are easier to interpret: Higher work intensity has an equalising effect and can slow 
otherwise-increasing income inequality. This finding is in line with the studies of 
Kollmeyer (2013) and Nieuwenhuis (2014), who have found that women’s increasing 
contributions to household income had an overall equalizing effect. 
Turning to the influence of the welfare state, changes in the distribution of 
unemployment benefits made households remarkably more unequal in Germany. To 
some degree, changes in unemployment benefits also had disequalizing effects in the 
United Kingdom; and in Poland for the lowest income groups. In crisis-shaken Spain, 
however, unemployment protection balanced some of the worst increases of inequality 
in the lower income groups. Disability benefits educed inequalities in all countries with 
the exception of the United Kingdom. While the effects of benefit changes are most 
likely a result of policy reforms in Germany and the United Kingdom, they may be 
more related to economic developments in Spain and Poland. In the latter case, labour 
migration could also play a significant role.  
Paper 3 demonstrates that the welfare mix of a country can have a significant impact on 
households’ income rankings but that it cannot explain all changes in economic 
inequality. The chosen method has its limitations, for example, by not allowing for 
interactions between different variables of interest. It is also not certain that the changes 
in household composition led to changes in inequality, as a reversed causal argument is 
equally as plausible. The same can be said for the findings of the first paper. The 
observed effects merely indicate that given policies are associated with certain 
configurations of labour market risks. It is, of course, possible that labour markets 
influence risks, which, in turn, trigger certain policy responses. This thesis could serve 
as the starting point for a follow-up project.  
4. Conclusion and outlook 
Since the very beginning of research on labour markets, unemployment and poverty, the 
household has been recognised as an important economic actor, a mechanism of income 
redistribution, and a social stabiliser (Albertini 2008). However, much of the research 
on labour market dynamics focuses on individuals. Households are considered by 
scholars, for example, by adding an indicator of family type to a regression model to 
account for individuals’ living conditions or by equivalising income variables according 
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to household size. The claim of this dissertation is that individuals’ household contexts 
are highly complex and therefore deserve a closer, more direct inspection. Households 
are the merging point of different societal forces that together structure the distribution 
of socioeconomic opportunities and risks. The institutions of the state, the family and 
the labour market interact at the household level (Ranci 2010). Within households, 
members contribute and negotiate their individual needs, resources and economic 
activity (Becker 1985).  
Understanding these interrelationships, within which households are embedded, is 
crucial to understanding social risks, economic inequality and the performance of 
countries’ labour markets and welfare policies (Esping-Andersen 1999; Gregg, Scutella 
and Wadsworth 2010). This dissertation set out to contribute to this research programme 
by exploring different methods of studying the household level and its special position 
in the welfare mix. Bayesian multilevel analyses were performed to study cross-level 
interactions between social protection and social risks. In addition, event history models 
were used to analyse household transitions over a period of more than fifteen years. 
Finally, counterfactual re-weighting methods were combined with a novel measure of 
income inequality to help visualise the effect of welfare-mix changes on households in 
different parts of the income distribution.  
Important insights have been drawn from these studies; however, several questions have 
yet to be fully answered and require further study. The first paper successfully 
demonstrates that certain policy strategies are related to certain inequalities in labour 
market access. In order to gain a better understanding of these relations, different 
policies need to be analysed within the same model, and the interactions between them 
should be considered more closely. Bayesian multilevel models are an attractive 
analytical tool for such explorations. For them to work most reliably with the proposed, 
more complex models, a larger sample of countries is needed. Richer and better 
comparable institutional indicators would be a desirable addition to this approach.  
Future research should furthermore seek new statistical strategies to model households’ 
labour market transitions. Jointly modelling the individual labour market transitions of 
spouses would add tremendously to the findings of the second paper. Exploring the 
possibilities of random-effects event history models for recurrent events and 
simultaneous equation models might be an interesting option (see, e.g., Biewen 2004; 
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Duguet and Simonnet 2007; Goldstein, Pan and Bynner 2004). This strategy would 
increase the sample size and solve some issues of endogeneity that are common in 
studies that aspire to grasp individuals’ employment status relative to their spouses’. It 
could also improve the understanding of how population groups differ in their moves 
between employment and nonemployment in terms of frequency and duration of both 
labour market states. These transition patterns could be linked to various aspects of 
individuals’ household contexts and highlight different pathways towards either 
compensation or accumulation of social risks within households. Finally, further 
exploration of the link between household-level interdependencies and income 
inequality would be an interesting route to follow. A first step would be including 
additional economic and institutional developments in the analysis of individual 
countries. 
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Activating households: nonemployment risks and social benefits in 
Europe 
 
Abstract 
The present study examines the impact of activation within unemployment insurance 
and social assistance schemes on the risk of nonemployment for households. The 
principal aim is to link institutional features of income protection with social risks of 
individuals at the household level. Household-level risk factors include age, low 
education, poor health, household size and the presence of children. The institutional 
parameters to be analysed relate to the scope of employment-related activities that are 
mandatory for recipients in order to stay eligible for benefits. Furthermore, eligibility 
rules of other benefits that may serve as alternatives to unemployment insurance and 
assistance are studied. The data used stem from the EU-SILC wave of 2011, 
comparative institutional databases and national legislation. For the analysis, Bayesian 
multilevel models are used, with a special emphasis on cross-level interactions between 
policy design and household characteristics. The results confirm that activation and 
benefit policy influence how social risks within households affect their probability of 
nonemployment. The magnitude and direction of effects, however, varies across policy 
area and risk factor.  
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Household nonemployment, as an indicator of social exclusion, has gained much 
attention since the EU included the reduction of jobless households as one measure to 
meet the anti-poverty targets of the Europe 2020 strategy for jobs and growth (de Graaf-
Zijl and Nolan 2011, Copeland and Daly 2012). This interest in household 
nonemployment results from the observation that successful job-growth policies of the 
1990s and 2000s were often ineffective in reducing relative poverty. While they 
increased the number of fully employed households, the number of households without 
work remained stable or increased, as well. (Marx et al. 2013 p. 11). This long-term 
trend of polarisation between work-rich and work-poor households has been observed in 
most European countries (Corluy and Vandenbrouke 2013, p 18). With growing levels 
polarisation, individual nonemployment is distributed increasingly unevenly across 
households. Living in a workless household is associated with higher a higher chance of 
individual poverty and coincides with certain risk factors, such as low education and 
disability (p. 24, ibid). Growing polarisation therefore indicates that social risks are less 
likely than before to be compensated within households. Policies that addressing these 
risks can influence the extent to which they affect the households’ possibilities to 
participate in the labour market. 
The present article therefore examines the risk of household nonemployment in 20 
European countries 1 , focussing on the influence of the social benefit system on 
household-level risk factors. Pervious research on individual joblessness shows that 
nonemployment risks vary among social risk groups and that the effects of different 
welfare policies vary according to these risks (Biegert 2011, van der Wel 2011). Studies 
on the nonemployment of households also suggest a strong effect of the design of 
national welfare systems (Gregg et al. 2010). Over the past 20 years, policy advisors 
and international institutions (e.g. the OECD and the EU) have promoted active labour 
market policies as tools to reduce benefit dependency among the working-age 
population (Armingeon, 2007). There is vast research on the effects of such policies on 
individual and aggregate unemployment (cf., e.g. Kluve, 2010 and Martin 2015), but 
comparative studies on the household level are rare (one example being, e.g., Härkönen 
1 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom 
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2011). In order to assess how activation affects different social groups, the study of 
households is crucial as social risks tend to accumulate within them. This study 
therefore takes an encompassing view on the subject of household joblessness by 
looking at social risks as they are present and combined at the household level. The 
principal aim of the study is to link institutional features of income protection with 
social risks of individuals at the household level. Household-level risk factors include 
age, low education, poor health and the presence of dependent children. The 
institutional parameters to be analysed relate to the behavioural or “demanding” aspects 
of activation, i.e. the scope of employment-related activities that are mandatory for 
recipients in order to stay eligible for benefits. In addition, the study investigates the 
impact of exemptions from activation for families with dependent children. Alongside 
activation, access to several types of income replacement is studied regarding its effect 
on household joblessness. Members of the same household may be categorised into 
different states of (non-)employment and may therefore be eligible to a whole range of 
social benefits, depending on their own characteristics, those of their fellow household 
members, and on the national context of welfare state regulations.  
For the analysis, data from several sources are combined into a multilevel dataset. 
Institutional information was gathered from comparative databases on social protection 
(e.g., EuMin, CSB-MIPI, DICE) as well as national legislation, coded numerically and 
merged with household-level data stemming from the survey dataset EU-SILC. 
Bayesian multilevel regression is used to model the interactions between benefit design 
and household-level risk factors. The results suggest that activation and social benefits 
do influence how social risks influence household nonemployment, but that effects vary 
across policies and target groups. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background for the dynamics of 
nonemployment at the household level. It focuses on how activation in its overall 
context of welfare state benefits may affect the way resources and needs of households 
influence their labour market behaviour. Section 3 lays out the research strategy used to 
assess interactions between household characteristics and benefit rules. The subsequent 
section details the hypotheses, followed by a description of the data sources in section 5. 
The sixth part of the paper presents the results of the multilevel models, with a special 
emphasis on cross-level interactions. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Nonemployment and the household level 
Comparative studies of household nonemployment can be categorised according to their 
main perspective. A series of studies has focussed on the dynamics within specific 
household types, mostly couple households (e.g., Härkönen 2007; McGinnity 2002; 
Ultee et al. 1988). Others focus on the societal distribution of household 
nonemployment within and across countries, with a special emphasis on differences 
between social groups or incidents of poverty and material deprivation (Corluy and 
Vandenbrouke 2013; de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011; Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth 
2010; Gregg and Wadsworth 2001). The present paper wants to make a contribution to 
the literature by asking how eligibility rules in social benefit systems influence the risk 
of household nonemployment. 
From the literature on post-industrial labour market risks, we know that the nature of 
social risks in contemporary European societies is multidimensional. These risks result 
from the interaction between the demands of modern economies, dynamic family 
structures and welfare state conditions (Taylor-Gooby 2004). Bonoli (2006) identified 5 
situations that are associated with an increased probability of experiencing welfare 
losses: Problems of reconciling work and family life, single parenthood, having a frail 
relative, possessing low or obsolete skills, and insufficient social security coverage for 
certain groups, e.g. for part-time or atypical workers. Social risks can therefore be better 
understood when considering the household context of individuals. Unemployment, low 
qualification, disability and care needs can be compensated within households or they 
may accumulate, resulting in situations of social exclusion and vulnerability (Ranci and 
Migliavacca 2010). Looking at single social risk factors from a household perspective 
highlights their overlapping nature: Having children, for example, can be an obstacle for 
the labour market integration of lone parents if there are no affordable care services 
available.  Härkönen (2011), however, found that children also enhance the risk of dual 
worklessness for couples. This effect is particularly strong for classic single-earner 
families: Periods of inactivity decrease the employability of those partners who take on 
the role of the housekeeper, which makes it harder to counterbalance earnings losses in 
case the breadwinner becomes unemployed. This effect can be intensified by other risk 
factors, such as bad health or low education. 
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Addressing such risks, institutions of the welfare state affect the labour market 
behaviour of various social groups differently. Biegert (2011) observed that the 
probability of nonemployment varies with the generosity of unemployment insurance 
and social assistance, but that effects differ according to gender, age and educational 
level. Van der Wel et al. (2011) found that nonemployment among the chronically ill is 
more likely for lower-educated individuals, but that this educational inequality is 
reduced in countries with a high level of spending on benefit transfers and active labour 
market policies. The interaction between individual characteristics and labour market 
chances is further complicated by the way these phenomena interact at the household 
level. The division of work within households is, for example, influenced by individual 
preferences, availability of jobs and of childcare as well as parental leave and tax 
regulations that both reflect and shape cultural attitudes towards mothers' work within 
society (Härkönen 2011; Kangas and Rostgaard 2007). As a consequence, the 
distribution of employment across household types varies from country to country 
(Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth 2010; Corly and Vandenbrouke 2013). These 
differences indicate how institutions of the welfare state may influence the impact that 
household composition has on labour market risks. Activation policies that may help 
reduce the number of nonemployed households need to be analysed within these 
nationally distinctive frameworks. The set of welfare elements that were chosen for 
analysis in this paper are described in the following section.  
2.2. Social benefits and activation policy 
When comparing joblessness across European countries, it is important to bear in mind 
that the political regulation of unemployment varies considerably across welfare 
regimes: 
"For a cross-national analysis, an exclusive focus on unemployment benefits can 
be deceptive if one is interested in assessing the benefit dependency of the 
working-age population (…), countries may differ substantially in terms of how 
they administratively configure the risk of unemployment. In particular, those 
unemployed who are hard to reintegrate into the labour market are often referred 
to a range of other out-of-work benefit programmes, which entail different 
behavioural requirements from their beneficiaries. The most often used 
alternative exit routes are work incapacity and early retirement. In absence of a 
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long-term insurance type of benefit, hard to employ persons may also end up in 
social assistance schemes" (De Deken and Clasen 2011, p. 309). 
The present study therefore examines the impact of activation within unemployment 
insurance and within social assistance, and additionally takes into account disability 
pensions, early retirement and non-activating types of minimum income protection. 
When analysing households, this strategy is beneficial because eligibility to benefits 
may not be limited to one type of transfer. Within households, the characteristics of all 
members shape the set of income sources available. The combination of individuals' 
insurance- and employment records, as well as their health, age and education determine 
which benefit regulations are most relevant for a household and whether it is necessary 
and beneficial for its members to engage in labour market participation. 
In many European countries, the answer to high and fast rising structural unemployment 
in the 1970s and 1980s was to decrease labour supply by exempting certain groups of 
the unemployed from job search requirements or by offering alternative benefits such as 
early retirement, parental leave and incapacity benefits (Clasen and Clegg, 2011; 
Ebbinghaus, 2006). By the 1990s, high-scale nonemployment and benefit dependency 
had become a socio-political issue as a consequence of this political response to the 
industrial decline of previous decades. Policies had created work disincentives within 
benefit systems that also influenced the labour supply of younger generations.  The 
fiscal pressure on European welfare systems grew steadily as the increase in social 
expenditure was additionally intensified by the rising number of regular pensioners. In 
order to counteract this development, countries turned to policy instruments designed to 
‘activate’ benefit recipients for the labour market and to ‘make work pay’. Although 
countries differed in terms of the scope and type of policies adopted, the general trend 
was to extend the target groups of activation from those close to the labour market (e.g. 
officially registered unemployed) to those traditionally perceived as “inactive” (e.g. lone 
mothers, older unemployed persons or people with reduced work capacity) (Weishaupt, 
2013; Eichhorst, et al. 2008). 
Clasen and Clegg (2011, p.388) found in their sample of twelve countries that the 
orientation of the benefit system towards labour market integration is highest in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Hungary. Particularly Denmark and 
Hungary target long-term social assistance claimants, others put a stronger emphasis on 
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unemployment insurance claimants. It is likely that activation within both types of 
social protection has a very different impact on households. Access to insurance-based 
benefits builds on previous contributions and the amount paid is often independent from 
the earnings of other household members. In contrast, eligibility for social assistance 
and other forms of minimum income protection is typically dependent on overall 
household income (Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer 2011, p. 14) and an increase in any of the 
household members’ work incomes decreases the amount of the benefit paid. For this 
reason, minimum income benefits are associated with substantial work disincentives on 
the household level (Clasen et al. 2006, Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth. 2010). These 
should be stronger for bigger households and when low wages are to be expected, as is 
common for recipients in minimum income schemes. Activation policy can be seen as 
an effort to overcome these obstacles by introducing financial incentives or several 
kinds of enabling and demanding elements into the rules of benefit eligibility (Marchal 
and van Mechelen 2013). Increasing the conditionality of benefit receipt is also an 
instrument ensure reciprocity: Beneficiaries of minimum income protection generally 
lack the proof of 'deservingness', unlike insurance claimants that have a record of prior 
contributions that signal their merit of support (Albrekt Larsen 2008, van Oorschot 
2006). As entitlement to minimum income protection is typically based on household-
level means testing, activation requirements often include not only the claimant but also 
his household members. The household level is therefore crucial when studying the 
effects of activation policy within such benefit schemes, possibly even more than in the 
case of social insurance.  
When studying household-level effects of activation, the treatment of parents, and lone 
parents in particular, needs to be taken into account as well. Until recently, mothers 
were generally exempt from work requirements in some countries or enjoyed generous 
exemptions based on the age of their children (e.g., the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands and Germany (cf. Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer 2011, p. 211; Haux 2013, p. 
125). These exemptions have been more and more limited, increasing the pressure to 
work for mothers, or, in the case of obstacles towards employment, to turn to other 
benefit schemes for the inactive population. These schemes have, however, also 
witnessed a development towards stronger conditionality. Access to disability pensions 
relies more heavily than before on work capability tests in several countries, e.g., in 
Switzerland, Spain or Hungary. Another group that experiences 'recategorisation' 
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towards employability is the one of older unemployed people. The possibilities to move 
from unemployment benefits into early retirement has been restricted in many countries 
and in some, early retirement was abolished all together, e.g. in Belgium and Denmark 
(Clasen and Clegg 2011, p. 336; Ebbinghaus and Hofäcker 2013). Such restrictions, 
however, do not necessarily lead to marked increases of employment, as a study by 
Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) could show for Austria. After increasing the early 
retirement age, there was only a moderate increase in employment for the highly 
educated, healthy members of this age group. The less employable moved into 
unemployment benefits. Another study on Austria by Inderbitzin, Staubli and 
Zweimüller (2013) found additional substitution effects between unemployment and 
disability benefits for certain age groups. Such spill-over effects demonstrate how ease -  
or difficulty -  to access several kinds of benefits can either restrict - or complement -  
the success of activation policies. It is for this reason that they are integrated in the 
analysis of this paper, whose approach is described in more detail below.  
3. Analytical strategy 
An ideal data source for analysing the effects of activation strategies would enable 
researchers to identify of different types of benefits separately. Unfortunately, the 
internationally comparable micro data available do not have this property. In the 
majority of datasets (e.g., EU-SILC, EU-LFS, ESS), benefits are classified according to 
their target group or principal purpose. Recipients of means-tested benefits can be found 
in the same category as unemployment insurance claimants, pensioners or recipients of 
contribution-based disability benefits. It is therefore not possible to compare households 
dependent on different types of transfers directly using international micro data2. The 
solution proposed in this study is based on the assumption that, if activation and benefit 
availability have measurable effects for households, these should not only be found on 
the micro level, but also as a macro-effect on micro-level risks of labour market 
exclusion. In other words, the policy design itself should have an effect on the groups 
affected by these risks. Therefore, macro-level indicators of activation policy design are 
combined with international micro data and analysed jointly using statistical models for 
multilevel data.  
2 Even the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), whose excellent coding scheme classifies benefits according 
to target group and type (insurance- vs. assistance-based), can provide such detailed information only 
for a small selection of countries. http://www.lisdatacenter.org 
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Three aspects of policy design are examined regarding their effect on the influence of 
labour-market risk factors on household nonemployment. The first aspect is intensity of 
activation. Most evaluation studies of activation concentrate on the effects of specific 
policy instruments on individual employment (cf, e.g., Kluve 2010). In real situations, 
activation measures tend to be combined. Participation in a training program, for 
example, may be one element of an individual action plan that is drawn up between the 
benefit claimant and his case manager. Other behavioural requirements, e.g., the 
mandatory number of job applications per month, may also be part of this contract. This 
article therefore aims to look at the effect of a more global measure of activation that 
takes into account the ensemble of different instruments in unemployment insurance 
and social assistance. For some households with working-age members, activation may, 
however, be less relevant when there are other alternatives to work income. For that 
reason, as a second policy aspect, access to disability- and early retirement benefits are 
included in the analysis, as well as the overall number of available minimum income 
protection schemes. The third policy aspect to be studied concerns the exemption of 
certain groups from activation requirements. Here, special treatment of mothers is 
considered. The age of children on the basis of which such exemptions are made is 
taken as an indicator for the analysis. The question of interest is whether these 
exceptions influence the probability to be out of employment for families in general, 
and for lone parents in particular.  
While the design of benefits and activation may influence whether certain households 
are out of employment, these policies may also affect the way or magnitude in which 
individual characteristics influence the risk of household nonemployment. For instance, 
behavioural conditionality may influence recipients differently according to their 
abilities and their distance from the labour market. Therefore, the interaction between 
policy design and labour-market relevant risk factors will be modelled explicitly in the 
analysis. The risks considered are based on the health, age and education of household 
members. 
The described relationships are analysed by employing a multilevel logit model on 
household nonemployment, which includes household-level risk factors, macro-level 
policy indicators and cross-level interactions between the two. The model is fitted using 
Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) estimation, which is the method of choice for 
multilevel models with limited dependent variables and for models with a limited 
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number of level-2 units, in this case: countries (Stegmueller 2012). MCMC is used for 
Bayesian inference, which has several benefits in the context of comparative studies: 
Frequentist statistics rest on the assumption that the units analysed are sampled 
randomly from a known superpopulation. This assumption is violated in a ‘sample’ of 
countries, as case selection depends on region and data availability (Ebbinghaus 2005). 
Instead of assuming a certain distribution for the variables and coefficients of interest in 
the superpopulation, Bayesian statistics treat them as unknown and estimate them from 
the data at hand. The results in multilevel models are usually more conservative and less 
biased. This advantage is particularly pronounced if the number of level-2 units is 
below 25. Although the probability of bias in models with cross-level interactions is 
also given with MCMC estimation, the results will still be more conservative and are 
therefore preferred over those generated by Maximum Likelihood estimation. 
 4. Hypotheses 
4.1 Household-level risk factors 
The study begins by analysing the effects of household composition on the risk of 
household nonemployment, without taking into account other possible influences. 
Household composition will be analysed in relation to two sets of social risk factors, 
which can be broadly categorised into indicators of resources and needs (Gesthuizen 
and Scheepers 2010, p. 248). The first set defines a household’s distance to the labour 
market by considering the employability of its adult members. Health, education and 
age are three of the most crucial resources that enable individuals to secure employment 
and income. These characteristics can accumulate in a favourable or unfavourable way 
on the household level. The first set of hypotheses of the study therefore defines how 
employability risks increase households’ probability of full nonemployment: 
Hypothesis H1: The probability of household nonemployment increases a) with the 
number of adult household members experiencing health problems, b) with the age of 
household adults and c) with a low overall level of education within the household. 
The second type of risk factors concerns household structure in terms of size and family 
constellation. In general, smaller households face a bigger risk of joblessness than those 
that can rely on the employment of several adults. In addition to the number of adults in 
a household, the presence of children may intensify this effect (Härkönen 2011). While 
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increasing the need for income, having children limits the time a household can allocate 
to paid work, as child care needs are not necessarily covered by the social environment 
or service providers. The study’s second set of hypotheses summarises these 
relationships between household size and family constellations. 
Hypothesis H2: The probability of household nonemployment increases a) with 
decreasing number of adult members, b) if there are dependent children living in the 
household and c) with higher intensity if both risk factors coincide in the case of single 
parents. 
4.2 Intensity of activation policy and employability-based risks 
Disadvantages within households in terms of education, age and health can be positively 
influenced by activation measures such as training or public work programmes. 
Furthermore, recipients may be motivated to escape the duties and tensions related to 
benefit receipt. The threat of sanctions and monitoring may even reduce the inflow from 
employment to out-of-work benefits (Venn 2012, p. 6-7).  Households with a low 
employability profile might therefore reconsider their chances on the labour market. 
Hypothesis H3 therefore proposes a negative relationship between intensity of 
activation and the impact of employability risks. 
Hypothesis H3: Activation within a) unemployment and b) social assistance reduces the 
effects of health limitations, higher age and low education on the risk of household 
nonemployment. 
4.3 Alternative social benefits and employability-based risks 
Complementarity and substitution effects between different elements of the benefit 
system are a common phenomenon in modern welfare states (De Deken and Clasen 
2011). For the working age population, disability pensions, early retirement 
programmes and minimum income benefits that do not require job search for eligibility 
are possible substitutes for unemployment benefits and activating social assistance. 
Restrictive access to these 'inactive' benefits should allocate more jobless households to 
employment or to activating benefits. Therefore, limitations in access to non-activating 
benefits should have effects that point to the same direction as the effects of activation. 
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Hypotheses H4: Restriction of access to a) disability benefits, b) early retirement and c) 
non-activating minimum income protection schemes reduce the effects of health 
limitations, higher age and low education on the risk of household nonemployment. 
4.4 Exemptions for mothers and family-based risks 
Exemptions for mothers are typically based on the age of the youngest child (Haux 
2013). Granting benefits to mothers without making them conditional on job search 
guarantees a certain income to socially vulnerable families, but this comes at a price. 
The longer women stay out of work, the lower are their chances of being in well-paid, 
stable employment later. Rules of this sort should influence all family households and 
single parents in particular. 
Hypothesis H5: a) In countries with generous exemptions of mothers from activation, 
the probability of families to be out of employment should be higher than in countries 
with little exceptions; and b) the high probability of nonemployment for single parents 
should be further increased by generous exemptions. 
5. Description of data and variables 
5.1 Household-level data 
As a data source for this study, the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) offer timely data on the employment, income and living 
conditions of European individuals and households3 . Because the interest of the study 
is on activation policy, the sample was restricted to working-age households. This was 
done by excluding households from the data set whose adult members are either all 
above the age of 64 or under 25. This way, pensioners’ households do not bias the 
dependent variable of household nonemployment. Neither do pure students’ households 
and the specific problematic of labour market entrants. The main focus of the study lies 
on the core of the working-age population. The dependent variable was constructed 
from the current labour market status of the household’s adult members. If none of the 
members was in full-time or part-time work at the time of the interview, the variable 
“household nonemployment” was set to one, otherwise to zero. The frequency of 
3 For more information visit: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introducti
on 
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household nonemployment by country can be seen in Appendix A1. The independent 
variables measure various aspects of household composition that are relevant for their 
chances to compensate for labour market risks. They are summarised in Appendix A2. 
The mean age of adults living in the household, their education and health-related 
limitations in everyday life serve as indicators for lower employability. Health 
limitations are chosen because they tend to offer a more objective measure of labour-
market relevant impairments than subjective health (Eikemo et al. 2008). The extent of 
limitations reported by individuals was summed up per household, resulting in a 
variable of three categories: No health limitations, one person with health limitations, 
two or more person reporting limitations. Education is captured by the highest 
qualification of the household members, grouped into three categories: 1 for up to lower 
secondary, 2 for upper secondary and 3 for tertiary education. Finally, the family 
structure is given by a dummy variable indicating whether there are children in the 
household or not and the number of adults in the household.  
5.2 Institutional data 
The following institutional indicators are used as macro-level explanatory variables in 
the regression model described above. They enter the model in standardised form and 
are summarised in Appendix A3. The starting point for the analysis of activation was a 
collection of indicators published by the MZES project on Minimum Income Protection 
in 16 European Countries (EuMin, see Hubl and Bahle 2012). EuMin offers quantitative 
and institutional information on minimum income protection, including a set of 
indicators on activation requirements. These indicators were updated to match the year 
of the latest available wave of EU-SILC at the time of writing. They were also collected 
for four additional countries (Luxembourg, Malta, Norway and Switzerland) in order to 
achieve the minimum number of countries necessary to get reliable results from a 
multilevel model using MCMC estimation. As sources for the update, national 
legislation was used as well as guidelines for recipients and case managers. They were 
taken from internet sites of the public administration or from online-legislation 
databases. Whenever there were doubts about how to interpret the regulation, results 
were compared with three key resources: The 2009 questionnaires on activation 
gathered by the MIPI project at the CSB in Antwerp (Van Mechelen et al. 2011), the 
indicators that were based on the update of these questionnaires (Marchal and Van 
Mechelen 2013), and an earlier OECD article summarizing the situation within MIP in 
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2007 (Immervoll 2009). Five variables concerning different types of job-related 
activities were compiled. These variables cover the extent to which individual activity 
contracts are mandatory, the need to prove active job-search, the requirement of 
registering as unemployed, and the obligations to participate in qualification measures 
or public work programmes. The items that could take on three possible values (0 - not 
mandatory, 1 - if requested, and 2 - generally requested from beneficiaries) were 
summarised into an additive index of activation intensity within social assistance. 
Another variable measures exemptions for parents from activation. In most countries, 
child-caring parents (or at least lone parents) are not required to participate in activation 
measures if their child is younger than a certain threshold. The variable records this age 
limit for exempting lone parents from work obligations. Those countries that have no 
age-based exemptions from activation were given the value zero. 
The intensity of activation within unemployment insurance was measured using the 
indicator of Venn (2012) on the requirement of being available for work during 
participation in ALMPs. Although at first sight not strictly comparable to the indicator 
related to minimum income protection, a closer look into the country-by-country 
description of the indicator revealed a similar logic behind the coding: Stronger 
availability-to-work criteria correspond to higher intensity of activation because the 
obligation to participate in one measure cannot be offset by taking part in another one. 
Activation should have stronger effects on households if access to other transfer 
incomes is restricted. The extent to which social assistance claimants are subject to 
activation is measured by the level of categorical differentiation within minimum 
income protection, i.e., the overall number of means-tested benefits of last resort in a 
country (variable "prognum" in EuMin). The lower the number, the harder it should be 
to avoid those minimum income schemes that involve activation for the working age 
population. 
Access to insurance-based benefits is operationalised by measuring the requirements 
necessary in order to be eligible for disability benefits and early retirement. The relevant 
information was collected from the Database for Institutional Comparisons in Europe 
(DICE) of CESifo, Munich (DICE Database 2011), as well as national legislation for 
some cases, and subsequently self-coded into comparative macro-level indicators. For 
insurance claims, eligibility is typically based on the number of insured months. Often, 
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a reference period prior to the claim puts an additional condition on eligibility, as the 
insurance record only grants benefits if accumulated within this period. This paper 
therefore measures access to disability insurance benefits by grouping countries 
according to the length of required insurance record and reference period. Access to 
early retirement is operationalised by grouping countries according to the age from 
which these benefits can be claimed and the extent to which certain groups of the 
population enjoy more generous conditions. 
6. Results 
A series of separate random intercept models were fitted for each set of policy variables 
and its cross-level interactions. MCMC estimation of the models was done using the 
program MLwiN. Beforehand, the data was merged and prepared for analysis using 
Stata 13 (StataCorp 2013) and imported into MLWIN using the plugin runmlwin 
(Leckie 2013, Rasbash2014). Hierarchical centering and orthogonal parameterisation 
were employed in order to correct for autocorellated chains. The models were fitted 
using 150 000 iterations and a thinning factor of 30. The model results will be discussed 
in the order of hypotheses in section 4. First, influences the household level are 
discussed, i.e. their employment-related resources and composition. Second, the macro 
effects of activation and benefits for the working age population are analysed. This is 
followed by an analysis of whether and how activation intensity affects household-level 
employability risk factors. Next, the effects of non-activating benefits on the same risk 
factors are modelled. Finally, the interaction between mothers’ exemption from 
activation and household composition are analysed and discussed. 
6.1 Household-level risk factors 
Model 1 as presented in Table 1 is a random intercept model without macro variables 
and assesses the validity of the first two sets of hypotheses, H1 addressing the 
employability of household members and H2 the effects of household structure. The 
first column of parameters presents the mean logit effect of the independent variables 
over the MCMC estimation chains. The standard deviation (in brackets), the Bayesian 
p-value and the effective sample size (ESS) signal high credibility of the estimates. It is 
also confirmed that fitting a multilevel model is worthwhile, as there is considerable 
variation across countries: The Median Odds Ratio (MOR, Larsen and Merl 2009) 
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indicates that, for the base group, moving from a country with a lower risk of household 
nonemployment to another with a higher risk can increase households’ own risk by 46 
percent. 
The model’s constant term refers to an overall reference group of childless, single-adult 
households of average age with low education and no health-related limitations in daily 
life. The indicators for adults’ average age and health limitations have a positive mean 
logit effect, which indicates that poor health and higher age increase the likelihood of 
household nonemployment. The probability of joblessness drops considerably if a 
household's highest degree is of upper secondary or tertiary education, compared to 
lower secondary or less. This is in line with H1 and confirms that employability-related 
resources – or the lack thereof – are important indicators of the risk of households to be 
without work. 
Table 1: Effects of household composition on household nonemployment 
 
 
Mean (SD) Bayes p ESS 
H1a Health limitations in household (ref: none)     Some 0.761 (0.018) 0.000 4712 
 High 1.2324 (0.031) 0.000 5058 
H1b Mean age of adults 0.087 (0.001) 0.000 4639 
H1c Maximum education of adults (ref: lower sec)    
 Higher secondary -0.814 (0.024) 0.000 5070 
 Tertiary -1.381 (0.026) 0.000 4942 
H2a Number of adults in household (ref: one)     2 adults -0.897 (0.023) 0.000 4932 
 3 or more -1.731 (0.040) 0.000 4932 
H2b Dependent children in household 2.652 (0.107) 0.000 4827 
 Age * children -0.058 (0.002) 0.000 4984 
H2c 2 Adults * children -0.710 (0.039) 0.000 5319 
 3+ Adults * children -0.241 (0.06) 0.000 6160 
 Constant -4.446 (0.114) 0.000 5366 
 Level-2 Variance 0.160 (0.058)  5296 
 MOR 1.46    Bayesian DIC 91629.7   
Random intercept logit models of household nonemployment in 20 European countries. 
N households: 122599. MCMC estimation using MLwin (burnin: 1000, chain: 150000, thinning: 30). 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014 
Turning to household structure, H2 seems to hold as well. The likelihood for full 
nonemployment decreases with the number of adult household members. Children 
increase the risk of household nonemployment. This effect is weakened with rising age 
of the adult household members and if more than one adult is present in the household. 
Young, single parents, thereby, have a particularly strong risk of nonemployment. 
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While all of the models shown later also contain the individual-level variables, their 
effects are not reported further in the analysis. They proved stable over models and in 
line with Hypotheses H1 and H2, independently of which macro variable or cross-level 
interaction was introduced.  
6.2 Policy design and employability-based risks 
The set of hypotheses H3 and H4 relate to interactions between the regulation of social 
benefits and the household-level risk factors of impaired health, age and low education. 
Before addressing these interactions, a brief discussion of Table 2 informs about the 
'pure' effects of the policy variables, resulting from multilevel models without cross-
level interactions. The table suggests that some of the policies under study have a 
credible macro effects on of household nonemployment. The random part of the model, 
i.e. the variance of the intercept by country, varies across model specifications, further 
indicating that the policy variables explain some of the differences in household 
nonemployment across countries. In countries with strict activation within 
unemployment insurance, the risk of household nonemployment tends to be lower. 
Activation within social assistance does not have a credible macro effect, which may be 
related to the fact that less people are affected by benefits of last resort. This may also 
be the reason why access to early retirement has no overall effect. In contrast, disability 
benefits and categorical differentiation within minimum income protection do have an 
influence on the probability of household nonemployment. In countries with restricted 
access to disability pensions, households are more likely to be fully out of employment. 
Restricting options within minimum income protection, however, is related to lower 
probabilities of household nonemployment. 
Table 2: Macro effects of benefit system on household nonemployment 
Policy Effects Mean effect Constant 
Level-2-
Variance MOR 
Bayesian 
DIC 
Activation intensity, unemployment Insurance -0.193** -4.448** 0.127 1.40 91629.592 
Activation intensity, social assistance 0.013 -4.448** 0.169 1.48 91629.579 
Strictness of access to disability benefits 0.137 -4.450** 0.144 1.44 91629.759 
Strictness of access to early retirement -0.066 -4.450** 0.166 1.47 91629.529 
Limited categorical differentiation of MIP  -0.154* -4.448** 0.139 1.43 91629.786 
Random intercept logit models of household nonemployment in 20 European countries (N households: 122599). Reported estimates are means of 
logit coefficients resulting from MCMC estimation using MLwin (burnin: 1000, chain: 150000, thinning: 30).  Bayesian p-value <0.1, * Bayesian p-
value < 0.05, ** Bayesian p < 0.01.  ESS for macro effects between 120 and 200 (ESS > 4000 for all individual-level fixed effects). Individual fixed 
effects are controlled for but not reported as they are constant over models and similar to those in Table 1. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI, Venn (2012), CESifo and national legislation. 
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The hypotheses relating to activation intensity and household-level risk factors are 
tested using 6 separate models, which are reported in Table 3. The first three assess the 
cross-level interactions of activation within unemployment insurance with health-, age- 
and educational risks. The fourth, fifth and sixth model assess the cross-level 
interactions of activation within social assistance. The mean coefficients of policy 
variables and of the interaction effects are reported. Interactions are to be interpreted as 
effects of the policy variables on the household-level variables' slopes. These effects are 
illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the predicted probabilities of household 
nonemployment for the different risk groups and levels of activation. 
Table 3: Activation intensity and the effects of household-level labour market risks 
 Hypothesis H3a Hypothesis H3b 
 
Health Education Age Health Education Age 
Activation intensity, unemployment insurance -0.170* -0.253** -0.613**    
Activation *  some health limitations -0.002      
Activation * high health limitations -0.111**      
Activation * secondary education  0.054**     
Activation * tertiary education  0.153**     
Activation * mean age   0.008**    
Activation intensity, social assistance    -0.034 0.091 0.575** 
Activation *  some health limitations    0.083**   
Activation *  high health limitations    0.130**   
Activation * secondary education     -1.104**  
Activation * tertiary education     -0.064*  
Activation * mean age      -0.011** 
Constant -4.449**  -4.453** -4.489** -4.435** -4.455** -4.602** 
Level-2 Variance 0.128 0.136 0.125 0.166 0.174 0.173 
MOR 1.41 1.42 1.40 1.47 1.49 1.49 
Bayesian DIC 91618.370 91593.730 91543.392 91602.173 91616.936 91499.047 
Random intercept logit models of household nonemployment in 20 European countries (N households: 122599). Reported estimates are means of 
logit coefficients resulting from MCMC estimation using MLwin (burnin: 1000, chain: 150000, thinning: 30). * Bayesian p-value < 0.05, ** Bayesian 
p < 0.01.  ESS > 4000 for all individual-level fixed effects (ESS for macro effects between 120 and 200). Individual fixed effects are controlled for 
but not reported as they are constant over models and similar to those in Table 1. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI, Venn (2012) and national legislation. 
The logits of unemployment insurance stay negative across all models, suggesting that 
strict activation is related to lower probabilities of household nonemployment. 
Accordingly, the left-hand-side of Figure 1 shows negative slopes for all plotted lines. 
Their steepness does, however, vary due to the modelled cross-level interactions. In 
Table 3, the mean interaction effect with health limitations is negative and turns credible 
for households having two or more members with substantial health problems. The risk 
of household nonemployment due to health limitations (cf. Table 1) is, thus, less severe 
in countries with strong activation rules within unemployment insurance. Table 1 has 
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shown smaller risks of household nonemployment for medium- to highly educated 
households. The positive interaction effects for education in Table 3 suggest that such 
differences can be reduced by activation policy, and plotting the effects in Figure 1 
specifies how. The middle-left plot reveals that the probability of nonemployment for 
highly educated households varies hardly across countries with different activation rules 
in unemployment insurance. Variation for households with upper secondary education 
is slightly more pronounced, but it is the lower educated households that react strongest 
to activation. Their labour market situation is better in countries that apply strict rules of 
activation within unemployment insurance. Older households, on the other hand, seem 
slightly worse off according to Table 3. This effect, however, is only minimal as can be 
seen in the lower left cell of Figure 1. 
Although activation within social assistance does not have a direct effect (cf. Table 2), it 
does show interactions with social risks at the household level. Interestingly, they are 
contrary to those of unemployment insurance: Health-related risks of nonemployment 
seem to increase in countries that apply strong activation rules to social assistance, 
differences between educational groups are further pronounced, and the effect of age 
decreases.  
In the interaction model between activation in social assistance and age, the policy 
indicator becomes credible and is positive. This indicates that the probability for 
households to be nonemployed is generally higher in countries with strongly activating 
social assistance schemes, but that the probability of older households is slightly lower. 
The lower-right cell of Figure 1 confirms this interpretation by showing a fanning-in 
pattern of the lines for different age groups. The remaining graphs show a fanning-out 
pattern, pointing to stronger differences between health and educational groups in 
countries with intense activation within social assistance, which contradicts the 
hypotheses above. The result may be related to a “creaming”-effect of activation policy 
that occurs under certain conditions (Martin 2015): Those more closely to the labour 
market profit most from integration measures while the least employable remain in 
benefit receipt, despite obligatory programmes and possible sanctions. 
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Highest educational degree of adult 
household members: 
  
Primary or lower secondary 
Upper secondary 
Tertiary 
Adult household members with health-
related limitations in every-day activities: 
 
2 or more persons 
1 person 
None 
Average age of adult household members: 
  
30 years 
40 years 
50 years 
60 years 
Activation intensity within 
unemployment insurance 
Activation intensity within 
social assistance 
Figure 1: Activation policy and household-level labour market risks, cross-level interaction effects 
on the probability of household nonemployment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities of household nonemployment, dependent on activation intensity in unemployment insurance and social assistance, based 
on the results of MCMC estimations of random intercept logit models for 20 countries. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI, Venn (2012) and national legislation. 
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The set of hypotheses H4a-c is based on the assumption that the availability of 
alternative social benefits may counteract activation policies in unemployment 
insurance and assistance. As countries' caseloads of disability pensions or early 
retirement differ more strongly than actual differences in health would suggest, ‘hidden 
unemployment’ is likely to be found if access to such benefits is relatively easy. 
Therefore, limiting access to 'non-activating' benefits could have results that resemble 
those of activation policy. As these benefits are intended for people with reduced 
employability due to health impairments or higher age, access to benefits should affect 
how such risks influence household nonemployment. Table 4 presents the results of 
nine random intercept models that address this assumption. Policy effects and cross-
level-interactions of restricted access to disability pensions, early retirement and non-
activating minimum income protection are reported. Figure 2 illustrates the results. 
Some of the effects in Table 4 match expectations: Restricting early retirement benefits 
reduces age- and educational inequalities in household nonemployment. Other risk 
factors seem emphasised when access to benefits is limited: Educational and age groups 
differ more in terms of household nonemployment in those countries that restrict access 
to disability pensions and minimum income benefits. 
Interestingly, there is no credible cross-level interaction between disability pensions and 
health. Smaller interactions can be found between early retirement and households with 
some health impairment, and between minimum income protection and heavy 
impairment within households. Yet, Figure 2 suggests that they are negligible, as are the 
interactions between the number of minimum income schemes, education and age. 
Nevertheless, the direct negative effect of differentiated minimum income protection on 
household nonemployment remains visible across models. Countries with low 
categorical differentiation within minimum income protection may select more 
claimants into benefits that are tied to activation measures by design. Countries with a 
high number of different minimum income schemes tend to grant more exemptions 
from activation, e.g., for people with reduced work ability, longer work histories or 
exhausted insurance claims.  
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Table 4: Restrictive access to 'inactive' benefits and household-level labour market risks 
 
Health Education Age 
Hypotheses H4a    
Limited access to disability pensions 0.153* 0.276* -0.426** 
Disability *  some health limitations -0.020   
Disability *  high health limitations -0.014   
Disability * secondary education  -0.136**  
Disability * tertiary education  -0.204**  
Disability * mean age   0.011** 
Constant -4.449**  -4.440** -4.463** 
Level-2 Variance 0.143 0.145 0.146 
MOR 1.43 1.44 1.44 
Bayesian DIC 91632.584 91574.781 91471.714 
Hypotheses H4b    
Limited access to early retirement -0.084 -0.188 1.152** 
Early retirement *  some health limitations 0.065**   
Early retirement *  high health limitations 0.045   
Early retirement * secondary education  0.074**  
Early retirement * tertiary education  0.159**  
Early retirement * mean age   -0.023** 
Constant -4.454**  -4.452** -4.436** 
Level-2 Variance 0.163 0.174 0.156 
MOR 1.47 1.49 1.46 
Bayesian DIC 91621.498 91596.362 90916.576 
Hypotheses H4c    
Limited categorical differentiation of minimum income 
protection -0.174* -0.097 -0.487** 
Categorical differentiation *  some health limitations 0.032   
Categorical differentiation *  high health limitations 0.079**   
Categorical differentiation * secondary education  -0.077**  
Categorical differentiation * tertiary education  -0.148**  
Categorical differentiation * mean age   0.006** 
Constant -4.451**  -4.429** -4.445** 
Level-2 Variance 0.139 0.138 0.135 
MOR 1.43 1.43 1.42 
Bayesian DIC 91626.696 91602.967 91581.134 
Random intercept logit models of household nonemployment in 20 European countries (N households: 122599). Reported estimates  
are means of logit coefficients resulting from MCMC estimation using MLwin (Burnin: 1000, chain: 150000, thinning: 30). 
 * Bayesian p-value < 0.05, ** Bayesian p < 0.01.  ESS > 4000 for all individual-level fixed effects (ESS for macro effects between  
120 and 200). Individual fixed effects are controlled for but not reported as they are constant over models and similar to those in Table 1. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CESifo and national legislation. 
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Figure 2: Restrictive access to 'inactive' benefits and household-level labour market risks: Cross-
level interaction effects on the probability of household nonemployment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities of household nonemployment, dependent on activation intensity in unemployment insurance and social 
assistance, based on the results of MCMC estimations of random intercept logit models for 20 countries. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CESifo and national legislation. 
  
Adult household 
members with health-
related limitations in 
every-day activities: 
 
2 or more persons: 
 
1 person: 
 
None: 
Highest education of 
adult household 
members: 
 
Lower secondary: 
 
Upper secondary: 
 
Tertiary: 
Average age of adult 
household members: 
  
60 years: 
 
50 years: 
 
40 years: 
 
30 years: 
Restrictions in access to 
disability pensions 
Restrictions in access to 
early retirement 
Limited number of 
minimum income 
 
`75 
 
As minimum income protection, disability benefits also show credible macro effects on 
household nonemployment, but in contrast to the former, they are positive. The 
probability of household nonemployment is higher in countries that control access to 
disability benefits more. The fanning-out patterns found on the left-hand side of 
Figure 2 show that it is primarily the low-educated and higher-age households that drive 
this effect. Younger households even have lower probabilities of nonemployment in 
countries with restricted disability pensions, which may be a consequence of the long 
insurance records needed to become eligible for benefits. The strong effect for lower 
educated households could be a hidden effect of health issues in this group. The health 
variable used in this analysis may be biased towards physically limiting conditions. 
Incapacity pensions, however, are also granted in the case of other health issues. As 
lower educational groups tend to have a lower health status on average (Haan and Myk 
2009), they may be more likely than others to receive disability pensions in countries 
that grant access to such benefits based on very strict criteria. The cross level interaction 
effects for early retirement are contrary to those of disability benefits, which is 
particularly visible for households' mean age: The lines plotted show a fanning-in 
pattern, indicating that age differences are less pronounced in countries that have few 
possibilities of early retirement. Households above 50 are less likely to be out of 
employment, whereas households with a mean age of 30 or 40 are more likely. Keeping 
older workers in the labour market, thus, may limit the young generations' possibilities 
of employment. This adverse effect appears to be more pronounced for the low-skilled: 
The interaction with education indicates that closing the route of early retirement has 
the strongest effect on lower-educated households. 
6.4 Exemptions for mothers and family-based risks 
The last aspect that this paper looks at is the influence of activation policy on families. 
Higher conditionality towards mothers is expected to reduce household nonemployment 
of family households (Hypothesis H5a), and of lone parent families in particular (H5b). 
The models presented in Table 5 test these hypotheses by interacting exceptions from 
activation based on children's age with family structure. In order to evaluate whether 
families in general react to such exceptions, the policy variable is interacted with a 
dummy that measures whether there are children present in the household. For testing 
the assumption that lone parents are particularly affected by activation, a three-way 
interaction is introduced between exceptions, the presence of children and the number 
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of adults, i.e., whether there are two or more adults present in the household. Results of 
models that only contain the policy variable and the interaction with the number of 
adults are also reported, as they serve as a 'baseline' to the full interaction model, 
together with the one focussing on the presence of children. 
Table 5: Family-based exemptions from activation and the effects of household structure 
 Baseline Hypothesis H5 
 
Policy effect Household size H5a) families H5b) lone parents 
Generosity of age exception -0.099 -0.101 -0.054 -0.015 
Exceptions * 2 or more adults  -0.024  -0.071** 
Exceptions * children in household   -0.137**  -0.227** 
Exceptions * adults * children    0.131** 
Constant -4.559** -4.561**  -4.560**  -4.560**  
Level-2 Variance 0.144 0.145 0.142 0.144 
MOR 1.44 1.144 1.43 1.44 
Bayesian DIC 92191.432 92191.653 92139.268 92131.294 
Random intercept logit models of household nonemployment in 20 European countries (N households: 122599). Reported estimates are means of 
logit coefficients resulting from MCMC estimation using MLwin (burnin: 1000, chain: 150000, thinning: 30). * Bayesian p-value < 0.05, ** Bayesian 
p < 0.01.  ESS > 4000 for all individual-level fixed effects (ESS for macro effects between 120 and 200). Individual fixed effects are controlled for 
but not reported as they are constant over models and similar to those in Table 1. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI and national legislation. 
The baseline models show no credible direct effect of exemptions, nor of its interaction 
with the number of adults. There is, however a sizable interaction with the presence of 
children. Thus, reducing exceptions for mothers in activation reduces the probability of 
household nonemployment for families. This interaction stays credible in the model that 
contains all interaction terms, underpinning that there is an effect on all families. The 
Bayesian DIC value is smallest in the full model, indicating that family structure plays 
an important role and mustn't be ignored. The three-way interaction term is credible and 
positive. This coefficient can be interpreted as the slope effect of the number of adults 
on the 2-way interaction term between exceptions and children. As the 2-way 
interaction is negative, a positive 3-way interaction indicates a weakening of this effect. 
Thus, once there is more than one adult living in a household, the effect of activation-
exceptions on the child-effect on nonemployment is less pronounced. Figure 3 
illustrates this result. On the right-hand side, the slope for lone parents falls more 
steeply than the one for other family households. Families in countries that do not 
exempt mothers from activation have a lower probability of nonemployment as 
compared to countries that exempt them. This effect, however, is much more 
pronounced for lone parents. 
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Figure 3: Family-based exemptions from activation and household structure: Cross-level 
interactions on the probability of household nonemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted probabilities of household nonemployment, dependent on activation intensity in unemployment 
insurance and social assistance, based on the results of MCMC estimations of random intercept logit 
models for 20 countries. 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014, own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI and national legislation.  
Interestingly, in the full model, the 2-way interaction between the number of adults and 
the policy variable turns credible and is negative. The left cell of Figure 3 plots this 
effect as it concentrates solely on households without children. The probability of 
singles to be nonemployed does not vary across countries with different activation rules 
for parents, but there seems to be a slight effect on couples even if they do not have 
children. This might be an indication that activation policy reflects cultural values on 
the division of work within households. It may also be a long-term effect on women's 
employment chances. In welfare states that encourage women to stay employed in the 
phase of childrearing, the probability of couples' joint nonemployment in later life may 
be significantly reduced (cf. Härkönen 2007). Overall, the results show that activation 
does increase the employment of families, especially of single mothers, which is in line 
with hypotheses H5a and H5b. 
 
 
Households without 
children 
Households with 
children 
Limited extent of exemptions from activation 
for mothers  
One-adult households   Multi-adult households 
`78 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
Most studies on joblessness and activation concentrate on individual unemployment or 
model the employment of individuals controlling for household context. Considering 
the household itself as level of analysis is another building block for the understanding 
of the social impacts of worklessness (Gregg et al. 2010). This study analysed the 
general risk for households to be out of work, whether officially unemployed or 
'inactive', as the political regulation of unemployment varies considerably across 
European welfare regimes (De Deken and Clasen 2011). Activation within 
unemployment insurance and minimum income protection were analysed alongside 
access to other benefit types, particularly disability pensions and early retirement, with 
regards to their interaction with household-level risk factors of impaired health, high 
age and low education. Being a small household is another risk factor as it is difficult to 
compensate for a wage loss without other potential workers in the household (Gregg et 
al. 2010). Having children intensifies this risk (Härkönen 2011). In order to grasp such 
constellations, the interaction between household structure and rules for activating 
mothers within activation was investigated. 
The analysis was based on EU-SILC and institutional data collected from 
internationally comparative databases and national legislation. Bayesian multilevel logit 
models could show that the probability of household nonemployment varies 
considerably across countries and that activation and benefit policies have an influence 
on how household-level risk factors affect this probability. An important finding is that 
policies do not influence all household-level risk factors to the same extent. Nor do the 
effects point to the same direction. Disability and early retirement are mainly related to 
education and age, but in a contrary manner, suggesting that they work to some extent 
as substitutes for social risk groups. Activation within unemployment insurance has 
stronger interaction effects with health and education than with age. Overall, it seems to 
decrease social inequalities in terms of household nonemployment. The effects of 
activation within social assistance differ from those of unemployment insurance. In 
countries that emphasise activation within means-tested benefits, health and educational 
differences in household nonemployment are more pronounced, while differences 
between age groups are smaller. Older households seem to benefit, while younger 
households with low education or bad health lose out. On first sight, having access to 
other types of minimum income benefits seems unlikely to influence the dynamics of 
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activating social assistance, since there are no substantial interactions with household 
risks. Nevertheless, there is a direct macro effect of restricting the number of available 
minimum income schemes. Countries with a lower number of such benefit programmes 
have a lower overall probability of household nonemployment. Activation within 
unemployment insurance also has a decreasing effect on household nonemployment. 
There is, thus, some evidence speaking in favour of the assumption that restricting the 
possibilities to obtain transfer income has effects that resemble those of activation. Both 
policies can therefore mutually reinforce themselves, but there are limits. For 
households with limited work capability, restricting disability pensions may have 
adverse effects. A possible scenario is that these households are then dependent on 
minimum income protection, making them subject to household-level means testing, 
which decreases their overall incentives to work (see section 2.2). Since activation 
within means-tested benefits has its own dynamics, policy makers need to take a closer 
look on whether the design of employment programmes and their governance are 
suitable for the specific target groups at hand. Social assistance is typically administered 
and financed on the regional or municipal level, as is activation of such benefits. 
Budgets are therefore tighter than in the case of unemployment insurance. These 
systems may be particularly affected by the general trend in European activation 
policies of improving cost efficiency by outsourcing employment services to private 
providers and monitoring the performance of agencies’ case workers in quantitative 
terms (Van Berkel, De Graaf and Sirovátka 2012). Thus, there are strong incentives at 
policy-implementation level to focus primarily on activating benefit recipients who 
have greater chances of labour market success. In such a system, households with low 
education or severe health problems may be even less likely to exit nonemployment 
than in countries where activation is less intense or evenly distributed across social 
groups. Therefore, policy design should include mechanisms to ensure that the targeting 
of activation programmes works in a reasonable way. Public means on activation should 
not be spent on measures that mainly help those that could be able to find a job on their 
own, while socially vulnerable persons and their entire households are further 
marginalised on the labour market, and in society. 
This discussion of results highlights the complexity of interactions between policies and 
social risks on the household level. It also points to an important issue that stayed 
largely unaddressed in this paper, namely the role of unobserved macro-level variables 
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that may confound with the found effects. In order to test for this possibility, a country 
fixed effects model was computed to reassess the study's results (see Appendix A4). It 
contains the individual predictors, their cross-level interactions with the policies under 
study and dummy variables for all countries, thus controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity on the country level. The results confirm those of the random intercept 
models, which speaks in favour of the conclusions presented. Another caveat is that the 
available information on activation in unemployment insurance and minimum income 
protection are not one-to-one identical. While the indicator for minimum income 
protection includes all activities mandatory for activated recipients, the unemployment 
insurance indicator specifies how work availability requirements might be offset by 
participating in another activation measure. Both of these indicators measure how 
intense activation is for those who are subject to it, but a stricter comparability would be 
desirable. A last word of caution needs to be said about endogeneity issues. As this is a 
cross-sectional study, statements about effects in this paper should not be interpreted 
wholeheartedly as proclamations of causal relationships. In the case of individual risk 
factors, for example, it is clear that nonemployment can be caused by health-induced 
work impairments. Nevertheless, nonemployment has been proven to cause health 
status to decline over time through mechanisms of material deprivation and social 
exclusion (Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2010). Another problem of endogeneity exists 
between policy design and nonemployment. While eligibility rules of benefits do 
influence peoples' employment decisions, it is also the case that regulations change as a 
result of macro-level nonemployment rates (Martin 2015). 
In spite of these constraints, the results underline that household-level problematics 
should be taken into account when discussing the effectiveness of activation policies. 
The findings also demonstrate the importance of the overall welfare state context as 
influencing factor on household nonemployment. The models strongly suggest that 
some elements of social protection interact more with household risks than others. 
Moreover, the effects of some risk factors vary highly according to policy design, but 
others are hardly affected by social policy interventions. As institutional developments 
of welfare states "are driven by changing risk structures in labour markets, but are 
simultaneously defining and cementing them" (Clasen and Clegg 2011, p. 345), future 
research should continue to pay attention to such dynamics. A bigger sample of 
countries would be necessary to study combinations of different welfare state 
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instruments on a large, comparative scale. The next step would surely be the analysis of 
interactions between activation and benefit design. Including the time dimension as 
additional level of analysis could solve some endogeneity issues and shed more light on 
the interplay between nonemployment and social policies and on households' reactions 
to these dynamics. 
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Appendix 
A1:  Macro-level institutional variables  
Country AT BE CH CZ DE DK ES FI FR HU IE LU MT NL NO PL PT SE SK UK Mean 
Activation requirements in social assistance: 
Active job search 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.8 
Register as unemployed 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 1.2 
Participate in training programmes 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.85 
Participate in work programmes 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.8 
Sign an activation contract 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.05 
Sum of activation requirements 3 4 4 5 7 5 4 5 6 7 5 4 2 6 5 5 3 6 1 7 4.7 
Standardised sum of requirements -1.07 -0.44 -0.44 0.19 1.45 0.19 -0.44 0.19 0.82 1.45 0.19 -0.44 -1.7 0.82 0.19 0.19 -1.07 0.82 -2.34 1.45 0 
Availability for work during participation in ALMPs of unemployment insurance 
extent of requirement 8 5 9 7 7 7 7 5 8 4 4 5 9 9 6 5 6 6 9 8 6.7 
standardised extent requirement 0.79 -1.03 1.40 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 -1.03 0.79 -1.64 -1.64 -1.03 1.40 1.40 -0.43 -1.03 -0.43 -0.43 1.40 0.79 0 
Restrictive access to disability pensions 
Ranking of countries 4 2 3 4 4 1 2 1 2 4 4 3 4 1 3 4 3 1 4 2 2.8 
Standardised ranking of countries 1.03 -0.69 0.17 1.03 1.03 -1.54 -0.69 -1.54 0.69 1.03 1.03 0.17 1.03 -1.54 0.17 1.03 0.17 -1.54 1.03 -069 0 
Restrictive access to early retirement 
Ranking of countries 2 2 2 1 2 4 3 4 1 1 4 1 2 4 4 1 1 4 1 4 2.4 
Standardised ranking of countries -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -1.09 -0.31 1.25 0.47 1.25 -1.09 -1.09 1.25 -1.09 -0.31 1.25 1.25 -1.09 -1.09 1.25 -1.09 1.25 0 
Limited categorical differentiation of minimum income protection 
Number of minimum income schemes 3 7 2 1 5 5 7 2 9 3 13 3 12 7 2 1 4 3 1 4 4.7 
Reversed number schemes 11 7 12 13 9 9 7 12 5 11 1 11 2 7 12 13 10 11 13 10 9.3 
Standardised reversed number of schemes 0.50 -0.68 0.79 1.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.68 0.79 1.26 0.50 -2.44 0.50 -2.14 -0.68 0.79 1.09 0.21 0.50 1.09 0.21 0 
Exceptions for mothers 
Age criterion for mothers’ children 2 10 3 3 2 0 0 0 3 14 18 10 10 5 2 0 18 0 0 6 5.3 
Reversed age criterion 17 9 16 16 17 19 19 19 16 5 1 9 9 14 17 19 1 19 19 13 13.7 
Standardised reversed age criterion 0.57 -0.80 0.39 0.39 0.57 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.39 -1.49 -2.17 -0.80 -0.80 0.05 0.57 0.91 -2.17 0.91 0.91 -0.12 0 
Source: Own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI, CESifo and national legislation. 
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 A2: Household nonemployment by country 
 
Country Employed households % Nonemployed households % Total households % 
AT 3,689.00 78.2 1,029.00 21.8 4,718.00 100 
BE 3,415.00 74.8 1,150.00 25.2 4,565.00 100 
CH 4,893.00 87.1 722 12.9 5,615.00 100 
CZ 5,201.00 79 1,383.00 21 6,584.00 100 
DE 7,831.00 79.6 2,004.00 20.4 9,835.00 100 
DK 3,485.00 84.2 656 15.8 4,141.00 100 
ES 7,936.00 78 2,234.00 22 10,170.00 100 
FI 6,026.00 82.4 1,287.00 17.6 7,313.00 100 
FR 6,707.00 79.1 1,768.00 20.9 8,475.00 100 
HU 6,764.00 72.7 2,538.00 27.3 9,302.00 100 
IE 2,180.00 70 934 30 3,114.00 100 
LU 3,796.00 81.3 876 18.8 4,672.00 100 
MT 2,341.00 74.1 819 25.9 3,160.00 100 
NL 7,192.00 86.7 1,107.00 13.3 8,299.00 100 
NO 3,214.00 89.3 386 10.7 3,600.00 100 
PL 7,753.00 74.7 2,623.00 25.3 10,376.00 100 
PT 3,128.00 80.3 767 19.7 3,895.00 100 
SE 4,368.00 89.3 524 10.7 4,892.00 100 
SK 3,530.00 83 722 17 4,252.00 100 
UK 4,517.00 80.4 1,104.00 19.6 5,621.00 100 
Total 97,966.00 79.9 24,633.00 20.1 122,599.00 100 
Source: EU-SILC 2014 (Wave 2011) 
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 A3: Household-level independent variables 
 
Continuous: 
 
      
Mean age of adults in household Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
if at least one person is employed 45.58 10.04 21.50 77.00 97,966 
if household is nonemployed 54.83 11.12 22.00 80.00 24,633 
Total 47.44 10.91 21.50 80.00 122,599 
 
 
Categorical: 
 
  Household Nonemployment 
  0 % 1 % Total % 
Adults in household with health-related limitations         
none 72,076 86.0 11,749 14.0 83,825 100.0 
one 20,910 68.4 9,675 31.6 30,585 100.0 
two or more 4,980 60.8 3,209 39.2 8,189 100.0 
Total 97,966 79.9 24,633 20.1 122,599 100.0 
Children in household 
no 43,627 70.1 18,603 29.9 62,230 100.0 
yes 54,339 90.0 6,030 10.0 60,369 100.0 
Total 97,966 79.9 24,633 20.1 122,599 100.0 
Number of adults in household             
one  20,004 66.6 10,027 33.4 30,031 100.0 
two 67,089 84.1 12,650 15.9 79,739 100.0 
three or more 10,873 84.8 1,956 15.2 12,829 100.0 
Total 97,966 79.9 24,633 20.1 122,599 100.0 
Highest education of adults in household           
up to lower secondary 10,487 57.6 7,712 42.4 18,199 100.0 
higher secondary 44,584 78.9 11,944 21.1 56,528 100.0 
tertiary 42,895 89.6 4,977 10.4 47,872 100.0 
Total 97,966 79.9 24,633 20.1 122,599 100.0 
Source: EU-SILC 2014 (Wave 2011) 
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 A4: Country fixed effects logit models of household nonemployment 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 Health limitations in household (ref: none)   
            
  
Some 0.762 *** 0.732 *** 0.762 *** 0.753 *** 0.759 *** 0.76 *** 0.761 *** 
High 1.233 *** 1.197 *** 1.212 *** 1.231 *** 1.246 *** 1.227 *** 1.232 *** 
Mean age of adults -0.813 *** -0.789 *** -0.801 *** -0.838 *** -0.834 *** -0.841 *** -0.81 *** 
Maximum education of adults (ref: lower sec) 
             
  
Higher secondary -1.381 *** -1.373 *** -1.364 *** -1.418 *** -1.407 *** -1.411 *** -1.376 *** 
Tertiary 0.087 *** 0.091 *** 0.088 *** 0.088 *** 0.087 *** 0.087 *** 0.087 *** 
  
             
  
Number of adults in household (ref: one) 
             
  
2 adults -0.897 *** -0.900 *** -0.9 *** -0.886 *** -0.88 *** -0.894 *** -0.885 *** 
3 or more -1.731 *** -1.737 *** -1.73 *** -1.717 *** -1.71 *** -1.722 *** -1.72 *** 
Dependent children in household 2.652 *** 2.688 *** 2.564 *** 2.741 *** 2.797 *** 2.637 *** 2.632 *** 
Age * children -0.058 *** -0.059 *** -0.056 *** -0.06 *** -0.061 *** -0.058 *** -0.058 *** 
2 Adults * children -0.711 *** -0.700 *** -0.715 *** -0.722 *** -0.719 *** -0.71 *** -0.719 *** 
3+ Adults * children -0.241 *** -0.208 ** -0.267 *** -0.221 ** -0.199 ** -0.244 *** -0.251 *** 
    
            
  
Activation intensity, unemployment insurance   
            
  
Activation *  some health limitations   
 
0.117 *** 
         
  
Activation * high health limitations   
 
0.194 *** 
         
  
Activation * secondary education   
 
-0.107 *** 
         
  
Activation * tertiary education   
 
-0.055 " 
         
  
Activation * mean age   
 
-0.012 *** 
         
  
    
            
  
Activation intensity, social assistance   
            
  
Activation *  some health limitations   
   
-0.016 
        
  
Activation *  high health limitations   
   
-0.144 *** 
       
  
Activation * secondary education   
   
0.06 * 
       
  
Activation * tertiary education   
   
0.155 *** 
       
  
Activation * mean age   
   
0.009 *** 
       
  
    
            
  
Restrictive access to disability pensions   
            
  
Disability *  some health limitations   
     
-0.047644 ** 
     
  
Disability *  high health limitations   
     
-
0.0776644 * 
     
  
Disability * secondary education   
     
-
0.1277197 *** 
     
  
Disability * tertiary education   
     
-0.200375 *** 
     
  
Disability * mean age   
     
0.010995 *** 
     
  
    
            
  
Restrictive access to early retirement   
            
  
Early retirement *  some health limitations   
       
0.121 *** 
   
  
Early retirement *  high health limitations   
       
0.171 *** 
   
  
Early retirement * secondary education   
       
0.062 * 
   
  
Early retirement * tertiary education   
       
0.151 *** 
   
  
Early retirement * mean age   
       
-0.024 *** 
   
  
    
            
  
Limited categorical differentiation of minimum 
income protection    
            
  
Categorical differentiation *  some health limitations   
         
0.011 
  
  
Categorical differentiation *  high health limitations   
         
0.039 
  
  
Categorical differentiation * secondary education   
         
-0.067 
  
  
Categorical differentiation * tertiary education   
         
-0.133 ** 
 
  
Categorical differentiation * mean age   
         
0.006 *** 
 
  
    
            
  
Generosity of exceptions for mothers   
            
  
Exceptions * children in household   
           
-0.23 *** 
Exceptions * 2  adults (ref: 1)   
           
-0.093 *** 
Exceptions * 3 or more adults (ref: 1)   
           
-0.051   
Exceptions * children * 2 adults   
           
0.135 ** 
Exceptions * children * 3 adults   
           
0.191 ** 
    
            
  
Constant -4.909 *** -4.961 *** -4.718 *** -4.991 *** -3.494 *** -5.077 *** -4.862 *** 
Pseudo-R2 0.256 
 
0.257 
 
0.257 
 
0.257 
 
0.262 
 
0.256 
 
0.256   
Log-Likelihood -45783.8 
 
-45676.72 
 
-45707.15 
 
-45671.88 
 
-45386.76 
 
-45745.28 
 
-45748.16   
N= 122599 individuals in 20 cuntries (country-Dummy variables included in models), *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, " p<0.1 
Data Source: EU-SILC 2014 (Wave 2011), own calculations based on EuMin, CSB MIPI, CESifo and national legislation. 
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The duration of couples’ nonemployment in the United Kingdom and Germany: 
Household composition, individual resources and social policy 
 
 
Abstract 
The study focuses on the duration of couples’ nonemployment spells in the United 
Kingdom and Germany from the early 1990s until 2008/2009. The paper analyses the 
influence of household composition and individual labour market resources on re-
employment using the German Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household Panel 
Survey. Case selection is based on the observation that polarisation between work-poor 
and work-rich households has increased in both countries in recent decades. 
Furthermore, both countries implemented comparable reforms of unemployment 
benefits that lowered benefit levels and intensified means testing for long-term 
unemployed persons. Stricter means tests have been associated with a diminished labour 
market attachment of prime-age men and lower work incentives among their household 
members. The descriptive analysis confirms a rising polarisation between couples until 
the mid-2000s. After 2005, the trend came to a halt in the UK but accelerated in 
Germany. The duration analysis reveals that nonemployment spells have become longer 
over the studied time period in both countries. Discrete-time event history models 
suggest that this development is related to changes in the composition of workless 
couples’ households.  
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
While most long-term studies on labour market participation model transitions at the 
individual level, the present paper focuses on the household. This level of analysis can 
provide new insights into inequalities related to the labour market, the influence of 
national social policy and the nature of social risks in general. As Gregg et al. (2010) 
demonstrate, rising individual employment does not necessarily translate to more 
households with at least one person in work. On the contrary, nonemployment rates at 
the household level increased between 1977 and 2005 in many countries (including 
Great Britain and Germany) despite falling individual worklessness. This polarisation of 
the working-age population into multi-earner and non-earner households can also be 
seen as a polarisation of social risks in society. Individual disadvantages, such as poor 
education or health, can be cushioned within the household context or accumulate and 
heighten the risk of household nonemployment, which, in turn, is related to a higher 
chance of poverty and social exclusion (de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011). Gaining 
knowledge about the mechanisms that influence households’ (non-)employment 
transitions is therefore highly relevant to the study of social inequality. 
This study focuses on cases for which an accumulation of social risks has already 
resulted in an entire household’s being out of employment. More specifically, the 
duration of household nonemployment is analysed in order to answer two main research 
questions: 1) How does the composition of households influence the chances of one or 
more members to re-enter the labour market? and 2) How can external factors (namely 
social policy) affect the duration of household nonemployment? The paper applies event 
history methods for time-discrete spell data derived from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Descriptive analyses 
suggest an increase in nonemployment spells and their duration over time. While these 
increases partly coincide with social policy reforms, their influence seems to be 
moderate and indirect. Household composition in terms of care needs and individual 
employability are the main explanatory factors at the household level. Women’s 
resources can be detected as a central factor that helps some households exit joint 
nonemployment more quickly than others. This effect seems to be slightly more 
pronounced in the UK. 
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The paper is structured as follows: First, theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence on the interlinked processes that influence household (non-)employment are 
discussed, followed by a description of the social policy background of Germany and 
the UK. Subsequently, the data sources, analytical strategy and expected findings are 
laid out before descriptive and analytical results are presented. The paper concludes 
with a summary of the findings and a discussion of the further research agenda. 
2. Nonemployment and the household level 
According to Ranci (2010), “The most appropriate scale of observation at which to 
reconstruct social vulnerability seems to be the household” as it is “the basic unit for 
collecting and distributing resources and converting them into well-being” (p. 19). The 
household does so via three ‘fundamental functionings’: First, “the acquisition and use 
of resources necessary for the material survival of household members”, second, “the 
management of major life events (…) that preserves the material survival of household 
members” and third, “the provision of social care for dependent members (…)” (ibid). 
In other words, the household can be identified as a merging point at which social risks 
and opportunities come together. The household structure in terms of the socio-
economic status of its members and their financial and care-related needs determines if 
risk factors result in social vulnerability or if they can be compensated, e.g. by the 
presence of a caregiver in the case of long-term sickness, by a second earner in the case 
of job loss, or via an entitlement to social benefits. The latter may be targeted at the 
household as a whole or at individual members. In either case, benefit transfers 
influence the situation of all household members. Such mechanisms are strongly related 
to differences in individuals’ life course chances, which translate into broader inequality 
patterns at the macro level (Esping-Andersen 2007). 
The goal of this study is to better understand the household’s role in interconnecting 
micro- and macro-level influences by investigating the effects of individual, structural 
and institutional risk factors on the nature of social vulnerability. Situations of 
household nonemployment are defined here as cases in which individuals are unable to 
compensate for the emergence of one or more social risk factors within the household 
context and thus find themselves in a situation of vulnerability as defined, e.g., by Ranci 
(2010). 
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Two factors are of special interest to the study: First, the dynamics between household 
members need special attention and should be treated separately from other aspects of 
household composition and personal characteristics that are known to influence 
individual nonemployment. For instance, the presence of children may increase the risk 
and duration of household nonemployment, and studies on unemployment have found 
the individual labour market status to be correlated with own resources, such as 
education, health, and previous work experiences. However, the literature also points to 
a correlation between partners’ employment statuses (Gangl 2006; Härkönen 2011), 
which may have different but not mutually exclusive causes. Couples have, for 
example, become increasingly more similar in terms of age and education (Esping-
Andersen 2007). This marital homogamy can lead to a correlation between partners’ 
chances in the labour market (Ultee et al. 1988). A causal mechanism that could 
reinforce this correlation within households is the so-called ‘discouraged worker effect’: 
As household members search for work within the same regional labour markets, one 
member’s joblessness – particularly when it isn’t overcome easily – might discourage 
other, non-active household members from searching for work themselves. The contrary 
scenario is called the added worker effect: As one member of a household loses his or 
her job, others are encouraged to take up work in his or her place or to increase working 
hours if already employed (Harkness and Evans 2011). 
The second focus of the study lies on institutional influences on household 
nonemployment. As a provider of income that substitutes or supplements private 
earnings, the welfare state needs special attention as it may help or hinder households in 
overcoming joblessness. Tax regulations and social benefits affect the overall income 
that households can obtain through work and transfers and are therefore relevant for 
employment decisions within households. Benefits that are paid to the individual 
regardless of his or her household context are associated with lower disincentive effects 
than those that are means-tested at the household level. In the latter case, an increase in 
any member’s income may lower the benefit paid, leading to a higher marginal tax rate 
for those living with a benefit recipient (Härkönen 2011). This is especially true for 
households with higher financial needs, i.e. households with children or other dependent 
members. Policy instruments that could counteract such disincentives are those targeted 
at the lower wage spectrum of the labour market, e.g. minimum wages and tax 
reductions for low-paid workers (Eichhorst et al. 2008). 
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In order to reduce the complexity of the subject and to exclude those cases for which 
individual- and household nonemployment are the same (single households and lone-
parent households), this paper focuses on couple households1. In all countries studied by 
Gregg et al. (2010) (with the exception of Great Britain), most growth in employment 
polarisation could be found within couple households. This indicates a gradual split of 
this group into dual-earner and non-earner couples. In Great Britain, however, one-adult 
households seemed to grow more unequal over time than did couples. 
McGinnity (2002) compared the employment behaviour of the wives of unemployed 
men in the UK and Germany and found that in the UK, they were less likely to move to 
employment than were women with employed partners, and if they did, they mainly 
moved to part-time employment. In Germany, on the other hand, the probability of 
women to take up employment increased if their husbands were out of employment, and 
they were more likely to enter full-time employment than were the wives of employed 
partners. The effects were stronger the longer the husbands’ unemployment spells were. 
Moreover, in the UK, the transition hazard of women was influenced negatively by 
having young children, while no such effect could be found in the German data. Thus, 
evidence for the discouraged worker effect was found for Britain, whereas for Germany, 
there was more evidence of an added worker effect. This contrast is ascribed to 
differences in the countries’ unemployment protection systems as Britain relies more 
strongly on means-tested benefits than Germany. However, these results were generated 
with data for the 1990s, and it is very likely that the picture has changed by now. The 
German system of unemployment benefits was reformed in 2005 and today resembles 
the British system much more than it did in the 1990s (see below). In the UK, a 
minimum wage was introduced in 1998, and in-work benefits in the form of tax-credits 
for low-wage earners have been extended considerably. In his studies on dual 
joblessness in Europe, Härkönen (2007; 2011) observed that exits from household 
worklessness were more likely due to a transition to the male breadwinner model in 
Germany compared with the UK, although in the latter case, transition rates out of dual 
joblessness were smaller, regardless of which partner re-entered employment. However, 
1 The study leaves same-sex couples out of consideration due mainly to a lack of data: The number of 
spells for this group was extremely low in both datasets, partly because only 1 spell per couple was 
investigated. 
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this finding stems from ECHP data and therefore also describes the situation before 
most of the aforementioned social policy reforms. 
3. Benefit reforms in Germany and the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom and Germany were selected for this study because reforms have 
lowered benefit levels and intensified means testing for long-term unemployed persons 
in both countries. The UK’s Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) was introduced in 1996 and 
consists of two subtypes of benefits: The contribution-based JSA replaced the former 
Unemployment Benefit (UB), while the non-contributory JSA was installed in place of 
Income Support (IS) for the unemployed. The change to the JSA system implied cuts 
both in terms of benefit levels and the payment period of contributory benefits: A lower 
benefit rate was introduced for persons under 25, and the maximum payment duration 
was reduced from 312 to 182 days. As was the case before 1996, non-contributory 
benefits that have the same basic benefit rate can be claimed after the contribution-
based rights expire. Compared with the IS, however, the non-contributory JSA applies 
stricter rules of means testing as a claimant’s partner’s earnings affect the benefit 
amount more strongly than before. For recipients of both types of JSA, job searching 
requirements were altered regarding the hours of work for which a claimant must be 
available and the frequency of job applications. Before 1996, setting up a ‘back to work 
plan’ was a voluntary option for UB recipients. In the JSA scheme, signing a 
Jobseeker’s Agreement is a precondition for receiving any benefit (Department for 
Work and Pensions 2005; Finn and Schulte 2008). 
A very similar reform was carried out almost a decade later in Germany. Until 2004, 
unemployed persons with expired insurance claims could apply for the Arbeitslosenhilfe 
(ALH), a tax-financed, less generous assistance benefit. The benefit levels of 
unemployment insurance and assistance were wage-related and ALH was not limited in 
terms of entitlement duration as long as the conditions of a rather mild means test were 
met. Jobless persons without insurance rights depended on the general social assistance 
scheme (Sozialhilfe), which was the main minimum income protection programme in 
Germany at that time. In 2005, the benefit system was fundamentally restructured 
during the so-called Hartz IV reform. The maximum entitlement period for the 
insurance benefit was reduced, although this mainly affected individuals older than 45. 
For persons aged 57 or above, for example, the benefit duration was cut from 32 to 18 
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months (OECD 2012). More importantly, the ALH was abandoned and replaced by the 
Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende, or Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II). There are two 
main differences between the ALG II and the ALH. First, ALG II benefit levels are 
equal to those of social assistance and are thus unrelated to former earnings. Second, the 
eligibility for benefits is tested against the income and assets of all household members, 
including cohabitant children. Hartz IV also affected most social assistance recipients as 
those able to work were also incorporated into the new scheme. The reform therefore 
led to a division of the unemployed into two groups: those covered by contributory 
benefits and those on minimum income protection. As a result, the German system of 
unemployment benefits became more similar to the British one, although contributory 
benefits are still wage-related and available to the insured for a longer time than in the 
UK (Bahle et al. 2011). 
Clasen et al. (2006) found that in the British case, the Jobseekers’ Allowance Act of 
1996 lowered the labour market attachment of prime-age men. Similar findings were 
presented by Little (2007): The likelihood of unemployed men to move to inactivity 
doubled between 1995 and 2003 and has only slowly declined since then. Clasen and 
his colleagues predicted a similar effect for the new ALG II in Germany. Moreover, 
they expected the stricter means test of the new scheme to lower work incentives not 
only for the unemployed but also for their household members, leading to an increase in 
the number of nonemployed households and a rising persistency of household 
joblessness. In line with this argument, Koulovatianos et al. (2007) were able to show 
that negative incentives to take up work exist for all types of households on ALG II but 
are the highest for multi-person households, particularly for couples with children 
despite the fact that they are relatively worse off compared to singles: The benefit levels 
for lone and coupled parents do not meet the higher needs that come with additional 
household members.  
Other scholars, however, predicted higher work incentives and shorter unemployment 
spells as a consequence of the reform. A simulation study by Schmitz and Steiner 
(2007) concluded that the reform might have reduced the unemployment duration of 
older men and women as the shortened insurance benefit entitlements could lead to a re-
entry into the labour market when the benefit right expires. The authors found no effect 
of the changing benefit rates of the ALG II compared with the ALH, but they note that 
this might be because they were not able to model the means test in their data.  
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For recipients who had relatively high wages prior to their job loss, the incentives for 
finding employment as the date of insurance right expiration approached were 
heightened by the reform because the benefits to follow were no longer wage-related. 
Claimants that do not re-enter employment after their insurance rights expire can no 
longer draw on follow-up benefits if their partner’s income is too high to claim ALG II 
(Koch et al. 2009). Fehr and Vobruba (2011) find significant differences in the socio-
economic structure of the recipients of the former ALH and ALG II, which is – apart 
from the tighter means test – also due to the inclusion of former beneficiaries of social 
assistance. In their ex-post assessment of the ALG II introduction, Fehr and Vobruba 
tested whether the policy change had an effect on the duration of unemployment spells. 
Although the reform was meant to increase the incentives of the long-term unemployed 
to seek work, the authors could not find a reduction in benefit duration compared with 
the time prior to the reform. On the contrary, there was a decrease in the transition rates 
of unemployment benefit recipients to any other possible (non-) employment status. No 
significant change was found if only the transitions to employment were observed, 
thereby leaving other events (e.g. entering education, retirement, or maternity) out of 
consideration. Such developments at the individual level might also have an effect on 
household joblessness. Additionally, the aforementioned change in the socio-economic 
structure of the recipient groups may have resulted in a population of beneficiaries 
whose household-level clustering of social disadvantages is stronger than it was for 
beneficiaries before 2005. 
In the UK, a broadening of the scope of in-work benefits may have had an impact on 
employment behaviour in a way that counteracted the negative effects of the means-
tested benefits. In 1999, the Family Credit (FC), a regular cash benefit that had been 
paid out to the carer in a household, was replaced by the Working Families Tax Credit 
(WFTC). The threshold under which parents’ net incomes had to fall to claim this tax 
reduction was significantly higher than the income threshold for the FC. In 2003, the 
WFTC was replaced by two separate programmes: The Child Tax Credit (CTC) for 
working families and the Working Tax Credit (WTC), which is available for all low-
wage earners with and without children (Finn and Schulte 2008; Harkness and Evans 
2011). In Germany, there is no policy change that strictly compares with those of the 
British tax credits. In 1996, however, the base amount of personal income that was 
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exempt from taxation was raised significantly. This reform is incorporated in the 
analysis below. 
4. Data and method 
The empirical analyses in this paper are based on two long-term panel datasets from 
Germany and the UK. The German SOEP is an ongoing study conducted by the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. It began in 1984 and provides 
information on 20,000 individuals in 11,000 households up to the year 2010. The BHPS 
was launched in 1991 by the Institute of Social & Economic Research (ISER) at the 
University of Essex and covers 10,300 persons in 5,500 households throughout the UK. 
Since 2010, the BHPS has been integrated within the new panel study Understanding 
Society. In the present study, only data up to 2009 are used.2 For the purpose of this 
study, the monthly employment calendars of SOEP and BHPS respondents are merged 
with data collected on a yearly basis, such as individual health and the number of 
dependent children living in a household. In order to construct a variable on household 
nonemployment, an indicator for individual employment status must first be created, 
which is done on a month-by-month basis. In the case of overlapping labour market 
states, the status is defined on the basis of a clear hierarchy, which, for example, gives 
priority to employment over maternity breaks over retraining. Based on this variable, a 
dummy is created that indicates whether respondents are employed or nonemployed. 
With the help of spouse identifiers derived from the individual-level datasets, 
nonemployment spells for couple households are created. Subsequently, the dataset is 
collapsed to the couple level while maintaining information on household- and 
individual traits that are assumed to be relevant influences on household 
nonemployment. One set of household-level indicators relates to marital homogamy 
measured by the difference in partners’ age and education. Another two variables assess 
the financial and time requirements within the household via the presence and age of 
children and the presence of persons in need of long-term care. The measurements of 
the labour market-relevant resources of partners are their health, age, education and 
work experience. Actual health is approximated using individually perceived health 
status, coded as a dummy variable that pools together good and fair/satisfying health in 
one category and bad/very bad health in the other. Age is grouped into three categories 
2 For more information, see http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.221178.en/about_soep.html and 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps. 
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(younger than 30, between 30 and 49, and 50 or older), which that roughly reflect the 
phases in life most relevant for labour market entry, family obligations and (early) 
labour market exit, respectively. Education, which was originally measured according to 
ISCED 1997 (cp. http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/ ISCEDMappings), is 
aggregated to low, middle and high education. Work experience is measured in years of 
full- or part-time employment prior to the spell. A summary of the household- and 
individual-level variables is given in Appendices A3 and A4. 
Two additional indicators are included that represent household-external influences on 
employment. One is a categorical variable that indicates whether a nonemployment 
spell begins before or after a social policy reform. For Germany, this is an indicator 
with three possible values: 1 for spells beginning in the years before 1997 (when the 
basic tax exemption for private earnings was significantly raised), 2 for spells beginning 
between 1997 and the introduction of the ALG II in 2005, and 3 for the years 2005 to 
2009 (when both means testing and activation were intensified compared with the 
preceding periods). For Britain, the distinction of spells according to their starting point 
takes on four values: 1 for those that began before the introduction of the JSA in 1996, 2 
for spells beginning between 1996 and 1999 (while the old FC scheme was still in 
place), 3 for the period between 1999 and 2003 (when the WFTC applied), and finally, 
4 for spells that began after the introduction of the more generous WTC in 2003. In 
addition to these indicators of policy periods, regional unemployment rates3 account for 
the influence of labour market demand since periods of economic growth followed the 
reforms in both countries and regional differences in macro-economic performance are 
an important factor for the risk of unemployment and social exclusion (Green 1997). 
The empirical assessment of household worklessness is performed in three steps: First, 
the development of national nonemployment rates for individuals and couple 
households is explored using the non-aggregated full dataset, including all possible spell 
months for persons between 25 and 65.4 This is done to provide an overview of the 
relevance of nonemployment from a macro-sociological perspective and to check the 
findings of other authors, namely Gregg et al. (2010), which is performed by calculating 
3 On Nuts Level 1, taken from the Eurostat database (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
4 For couples, those with at least one partner between 25 and 65 were selected. This age restriction was 
introduced to concentrate on the stages in life after labour market entry and before pension age. 
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a polarisation indicator following the recommendations of Gregg and Wadsworth 
(2001). The indicator measures inequality in the distribution of work and worklessness 
among couples by contrasting the empirical nonemployment rate of couples with the 
counterfactual scenario of equal nonemployment chances for every individual in every 
couple. In this scenario, the probability of nonemplyoment for a one-person household 
would correspond to the aggregate individual nonemployment rate. The probability of a 
couple’s being nonemployed is defined as the square of this value. Aggregating these 
rates to the total population of couples gives the counterfactual nonemployment rate, 
which is then subtracted from the actual rate for couples in order to obtain the final 
polarisation measure. The resulting value indicates the level of polarisation between 
couples. A value close to zero indicates equality between couples, while a negative 
result points to more equality than expected due to a high compensation of social risks 
in couples. Positive results, however, speak for a concentration of labour market risks 
within some couples, while others experience extremely low risks of being jobless.  
The following analytical stages examine the duration of household worklessness using 
methods of survival analysis. For this purpose, only one nonemployment spell per 
couple is evaluated, i.e. the first spell that begins within the observation period is 
selected, excluding those cases for which both partners are in education before they first 
enter the labour market and those for which both are above retirement age. The final 
dataset in couple-period format in Germany has 80,593 cases and represents spell 
months for 3,088 couples between 1991 and 2009. 1,598 of these spells end with an exit 
out of household nonemployment. The UK dataset is considerably smaller, containing 
only 26,523 observations for 857 couples between 1990 and 2007. The number of non-
censored spells is 330. 
In order to gain a first impression of these data, life tables for the selected household 
spells are investigated to find evidence of the influence of household composition and 
the changes in social policy. After this general descriptive assessment, a multivariate 
regression model is fitted to the data to test the relevance of each influencing factor in 
context. The exit from household worklessness is analysed using a complementary log-
log model, which can be defined as the discrete-time equivalent of the proportional 
hazards model for event histories measured in continuous time (Singer and Willet 
2003). Time dependence is specified by including the logarithm of spell duration and 
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the nesting of observations within the couples is taken account of by estimating robust 
standard errors. 
The model fitted to the data is described by the equation 
log [-log(1-h(t,X))] = αlog(t) +  β´X 
where h stands for the hazard of leaving a spell. This hazard is dependent on time t (i.e. 
spell duration in months) and on a set of independent variables X. The parameter α 
describes the shape of the baseline hazard log(t) (i.e. time dependence), while β is the 
vector of intercept and slope parameters related to X. 
5. Expected findings 
The analyses aim to capture three possible sources of influence on couples’ 
nonemployment duration: factors originating outside of the household (i.e. social policy 
in the form of benefits and taxation), household composition (i.e. marital homogamy 
and care needs), and the individual partners’ labour market-relevant resources (i.e. 
health, age, education and work experience). 
5.1 Household-external factors 
Given the results of the previous research discussed in Section 3, it is unlikely that the 
benefit reforms in the two countries had a favourable impact on jobless couples. On the 
contrary, I expect to find an increase in the share and duration of dual nonemployment. 
Due to the change in eligibility conditions, the composition of such households might 
have changed, as well. For Germany, ex-ante studies (see above) have postulated 
negative impacts on the prime-age workforce and larger households, which would 
increase the number of families in nonemployment. Increased activation measures and 
shorter insurance coverage for older persons might additionally lead to a decrease in the 
number of older, childless couples and to a higher share of families among the 
nonemployed. In the UK, the JSA’s disincentive effects should show some effect in the 
data, especially for couples with children. The later tax reforms are expected to have 
increased the number of couples in work and to have shortened spell durations, but the 
disincentives for families to take up work may nevertheless remain high. Still, the wider 
scope of the tax credits could have weakened discouraged-worker effects to some 
extent. Germany, in contrast, should have experienced a weakening of added-worker 
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effects within households as a consequence of the policy changes. Couples in Germany 
should therefore experience longer nonemployment spells. 
5.2 Household composition 
Regarding the mechanisms at the household level itself, educational and age-related 
homogamy should have a negative impact on couples’ way out of employment as both 
partners might be equally exposed to a number of social risks, e.g. bad health or weak 
demand in the labour market for certain kinds of jobs that both partners would qualify 
for. The presence of children and persons in need of care can have an effect in two 
directions: The higher financial needs might increase couples’ efforts to overcome 
nonemployment more quickly; however, the higher time needs for care work might lead 
to a gendered division of labour that – in the long run – decreases the woman’s chances 
of re-entering the labour market and gaining an income that meets the household’s 
needs (Becker 1985) or that pushes the household above the benefit level. Care needs 
within the household could therefore also lengthen the duration of dual worklessness. 
5.3 Individual resources 
Partners’ individual characteristics influence their own employability and thus the 
length of dual nonemployment. Young age, good health, high education and work 
experience are generally expected to enhance the chances of leaving worklessness. 
Nevertheless, these factors might impact men and women in their household contexts 
differently depending on the structure of the nonemployed population and the 
employment patterns within society in general. In Germany, for example, the male 
breadwinner model is still more common than in the UK (Härkönen 2007). Women’s 
education might therefore have a weaker effect than in the UK as the tendency to exit 
employment may be higher for partnered women in all educational groups. 
6. Results 
Figure 1 plots the development of the nonemployment rates for individuals and couples 
living in the same household for Germany and the UK and the polarisation indicator 
described above. Both graphs are in line with the findings of Gregg, Scutella and 
Wadsworth (2010). For the 1980s and early 1990s, the authors found that household 
nonemployment in the UK had increased significantly, whereas individual worklessness 
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was more stable. From the late 1990s up to 2005, individual and household 
developments became more similar and the growth of polarisation stagnated. Germany 
was marked by low polarisation throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with rather high 
individual nonemployment and low household nonemployment rates. Only towards the 
end of the observation period did polarisation begin to grow. The data in Figure 1 seem 
to reproduce and update these findings while focussing on couple households. The 
British case reveals lower nonemployment rates for individuals than in Germany as well 
as a smaller difference between individual and household rates, resulting in a higher 
level of polarisation overall. Nevertheless, the growth of polarisation is smaller than in 
Germany, and the curves are nearly parallel. The German nonemplyoment rates are 
further apart at the beginning of the observation period. While individual worklessness 
decreased significantly after the late 1990s, couples’ rates have remained more stable, 
which indicates that the equalizing effect of mating has diminished in recent decades. 
Accordingly, Germany began with a lower level of polarisation that increased more 
strongly than in the UK. Interestingly, some changes in the slope of the polarisation 
curve coincide with the dates of reforms described in Section 3. The steepest increases 
in polarisation can be detected between 2005 and 2007 in Germany and between 2003 
and 2005 in the UK. While a rapid fall in the individual nonemployment rates coincided 
with a slower fall in couples’ rates in Germany, the UK had a slight decrease in 
individual rates, while couples’ rates slightly increased.  
Figure 1 therefore speaks in favour of the polarisation thesis, i.e., a split of the 
population into persons living in fully employed and fully nonemployed households. 
The graph might also reflect effects of benefit and tax reforms. In Germany, the 
introduction of the ALG II (in combination with economic growth) seems to have led to 
better labour market performance in general, while the most vulnerable persons (i.e., 
those out of employment) cluster in certain households. In the UK, the split of tax 
credits into the WTC and the CTC might have had some positive effect on individual 
employment, but there are signs of adverse effects for certain households, as well. 
Regarding the structure of households with and without work (see Appendices A1 and 
A2), age increased and health diminished in Germany for both groups between 1997 
and 2007. The most notable change is that there were fewer low-educated persons living 
in nonemployed households in 1997 compared with 2007, while the share of highly 
skilled persons increased. Such a development is also visible in the UK data, as is a 
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general increase in age. Health, however, has improved over the years. There has been a 
notable fall in the average number of children living in nonemployed households in the 
UK sample. There is also a decrease in the German data, but it is more modest and 
stronger for employed households than for nonemployed ones. In the British case, this 
development might indicate that the situation of families with children seems to have 
improved, which may be due to the changes in tax regulations. If so, the reforms should 
have some visible effect on the data in nonemployment spells. Even if the development 
of the nonemployment rate of households hasn’t undergone any significant change of 
course at the aggregate level, the policy changes might still have affected the nature of 
household joblessness in terms of its persistence. 
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Figure 1: Nonemployment of individuals and household couples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: SOEP, BHPS, own calculations. 
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In order to detect a possible influence of policy changes on the duration of dual 
worklessness, the life tables of spell duration in Figures 2 and 3 differentiate for the 
time period when a spell began. Because the overall educational composition of the 
groups changed in both countries, a change in educational differences is also possible; 
therefore, couples with high vs. low differences are also examined separately in the 
charts. As the number of children has changed dramatically in the UK but not in 
Germany, the exit out of nonemployment is also plotted separately for households with 
and without dependent children. The survival functions of dual nonemployment are 
furthermore broken down by the age of the male and female partners.  Figures 2 and 3 
show that many spells end within a short time span in both countries, but there is also a 
considerable proportion of long-term survivors. Examining the chart’s differentiations 
for time periods, it is clear that spells came to an end more quickly prior to the mid-
1990s in both countries. The pace of overcoming nonemployment slowed down in 
Germany between 1997 and 2004, and even more so after 2005. In the UK, the 
difference between spells that began before and after 1996 is rather pronounced. 
Differences are not as clear between the later periods, but the chances of re-employment 
might have improved slightly since 1999.  
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Figure 2: Life tables for Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: spell duration in months. 
 
 
Line pattern Start of spell Educational difference Children in household Age group 
Solid – 1997 Low No < 30 
Long dash 1997 – 2004 High Yes 30-49 
Dots 2005 –   50+ 
Source: SOEP, own calculations 
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Figure 3: Life tables for the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: spell duration in months. 
 
 
Line pattern Start of spell Educational difference Children in household Age group 
Solid – Sep 1996 Low No < 30 
Long dash Oct 1996 – Mar 1999 High Yes 30-49 
Dots Apr 1999 – Mar 2003   50+ 
Short dash Apr 2003 –    
Source: BHPS, own calculations. 
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The third plots in Figures 2 and 3 examine marital homogamy in terms of education. In 
both countries, couples who are similar to each other do not differ in their re-
employment patterns from those who differ in their levels of education. Having a 
dependent child, in contrast, is a clear indicator for shorter nonemployment spells. 
Despite Härkönen’s (2011) findings that children generally raise the risk of dual 
joblessness, parents’ spells tend to be shorter in Germany and the UK, which is 
surprising because previous studies have suggested strong work disincentives for 
families in both countries (Koulovatianos et al. 2007; Finn and Schulte 2008). Although 
having a child may diminish both partners’ chances of being able to look for a job, the 
higher financial needs seem to motivate couples to leave dual nonemployment quickly. 
Moreover, couples with children may be younger, which is correlated with better 
employment prospects in general. The lower two charts in Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how 
strong such age effects can be: For couples in which both partners are younger than 50, 
at least one partner re-enters employment quickly, while dual nonemployment is 
extremely persistent for couples with at least one partner older than 50.  
The influencing factors on dual joblessness seen in Figures 2 and 3 cannot be 
interpreted correctly as long as their interdependence is not taken into account. How 
they operate within the broader household context is therefore analysed in a multivariate 
discrete-time proportional hazards model. The results for Germany are presented in 
Table 1. The baseline hazard (i.e. the coefficient of the logarithmised spell duration) is 
negative, indicating a diminished hazard of ending a nonemployment spell as its 
duration increases. Regional unemployment is negative but insignificant.  This finding 
might, however stem from the rough nature of the measure used: Unemployment rates 
on the NUTS 1- level might not adequately capture the influence of local labour markets 
on households and their members. Although there are observable differences between 
policy periods in the life tables, the effect is not significant in a regression model that 
controls for household composition and individual resources. This may indicate that the 
structure of nonemployed households has indeed changed over the course of the reforms 
and that this is the reason for longer household spells. 
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Table 1: Results of complementary log-log-model, SOEP 
 Hazard Ratio Robust Standard Errors 
    
Regional unemployment (in % of population 25-64) 0.996  0.005 
Start of spell (reference: 1991-1996):    
1997-2004 0.975    0.057   
2005- 
 
1.011    0.074    
     Age difference (in years) 1.003    0.008    
Educational difference (high) 1.056    0.067    
Age of youngest child (reference: no children):    
0-2 years 1.217   *** 0.089    
3-5 years 1.349   *** 0.129    
6-10 years 1.185    0.131    
11-15 years 1.200    0.142    
Household member in need of long-term care 
 
0.704   
 
* 0.129   
     Health status of man (good) 1.155   * 0.088    
Health status of woman (good) 1.155   * 0.086    
Man’s age (reference: < 30):    
30-49 1.003    0.084    
50+ 0.426   **** 0.075   
Woman’s age (reference: < 30):    
30-49 0.883    0.071   
50+ 
 
0.201   
 
**** 0.034   
     Man’s level of education (reference: low):    
Medium 1.259   *** 0.107    
High 1.278   ** 0.129    
Woman’s level of education (reference: low):    
Medium 1.270   *** 0.089    
High 1.614    **** 0.144    
Man’s work experience (in years) 1.001    0.005    
Woman’s work experience (in years) 
 
1.007   
 
* 0.004    
     Spell duration (logarithm) 0.590   **** 0.013   
Constant 0.117   **** 0.018   
 
Observations: 73,896 
Non-zero outcomes: 1,400 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 
  
     Source: SOEP, own calculations 
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Table 2: Results of complementary log-log-model, BHPS 
 Hazard Ratio Robust Standard Errors 
    
Regional unemployment (in % of population 25-64) 1.069   0.052    
Start of spell (reference: Jan 1991 - Sep 1996):   
Oct 1996 - Mar 1999 0.744   0.178   
Apr 1999 - Mar 2003 1.155   0.249    
Apr 2003 - 1.094   0.282    
    Age difference (in years) 1.007   0.014    
Educational difference (high) 0.967   0.119   
Age of youngest child (reference: no children):   
0-2 years 1.033   0.212    
3-5 years 1.007   0.232    
6-10 years 1.124   0.275    
11-15 years 1.212   0.324    
Household member in need of long-term care 
 
0.719   
 
0.139   
    Health status of man (good) 1.269   0.266    
Health status of woman (good) 1.704   ** 0.388    
Man’s age (reference: < 30):   
30-49 0.898 0.177   
50+ 0.383 ** 0.149   
Woman’s age (reference: < 30):   
30-49 0.793   0.144   
50+ 
 
0.476    
 
* 0.180   
    Man’s level of education (reference: low):   
Medium 1.003   0.143    
High 1.168   0.201    
Woman’s level of education (reference: low):   
Medium 1.276   0.190    
High 1.560   ** 0.261    
Man’s work experience (in years) 0.999   0.007   
Woman’s work experience (in years) 
 
0.988   
 
** 0.006   
    Spell duration (logarithm) 0.544   **** 0.029   
Constant 0.062   **** 0.032   
 
Observations: 22,475 
Non-zero outcomes: 271  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 
  
      Source: BHPS, own calculations 
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As could be expected from Figure 2, educational homogamy is not a predictor of spell 
duration, nor is the age difference between partners. Also in line with the descriptive 
findings, the model suggests that couples with young children are more likely to leave 
nonemployment than are childless couples. The hazard of leaving the spell is 1.21 times 
higher for parents whose youngest child is below the age of 3 and 1.35 times higher if 
the youngest child is between 3 and 5. No effect can be found for couples whose 
children are 6 or more years old. Despite the fact that higher care needs can interfere 
with at least one partner’s job search, parents of small children seem to exit 
nonemployment faster. In contrast, having a household member in need of long-term 
care decreases the prospects of ending nonemployment, although the model’s 
coefficient is only mildly significant at the 10% level. Turning to the individual 
characteristics of partners, good health shows positive effects at the 10% significance 
level. In line with the life tables, the likelihood of ending dual joblessness is 
significantly diminished if either partner is older than 50. Higher education enhances the 
prospects of one partner’s re-entering employment. Here, female education shows a 
stronger and more significant influence. Accordingly, the labour market experience of 
the woman shows some effect, while the experience of the man does not. 
As in Germany, the model for the UK suggests negative duration dependence, and 
neither regional unemployment (see Table 2), the coefficients for the time period when 
a spell began, nor the indicators of marital homogamy turn out to be significant. In 
contrast to the SOEP model, the British model does not show any effects of children in 
the household on leaving dual nonemployment. The need for long-term care, however, 
is a factor that shows a negative effect at the 10% significance level, as in Germany. 
One interesting finding that manifests in the results is that female labour market 
resources turn out to be more important than men’s. Women’s health and tertiary 
education increase couples’ likelihood of ending dual worklessness by 70.3% and 
56.0%, respectively. A puzzling result is that female labour market experience seems to 
work in the opposite way: All other things being equal, every year of activity prior to 
the spell decreases a couple’s probability of exiting nonemployment by 1.2%. Stronger 
negative effects on the likelihood of spell exit can be found for the age of both partners: 
Compared with the youngest age group, the risk of leaving dual nonemployment is 
61.7% lower if the man’s age is 50 or higher and 57.4% lower if the woman belongs to 
this age group. 
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7. Discussion 
In Sections 1 and 2 of this paper, household nonemployment was defined as a situation 
resulting from the accumulation of social risks within the household context. How 
easily it is overcome depends on factors originating from within the household (i.e. its 
structure and the characteristics of its members) and external influences (e.g. labour 
demand and social benefits offered by the state). The household level can be defined as 
a merging point for these intersecting influences. In order to reduce the complexity of 
this issue, this paper concentrates on couples and leaves aside one-person and single-
parent households. The following sections discuss the results regarding household-
external influences on nonemployment duration, household composition and individual 
resources. 
7.1 Household-external factors 
One assumption of this study is that reforms of the tax-benefit system in Germany and 
the UK may have influenced the share of nonemployed couples in the population. The 
intensifying of household-level means testing is often associated with a weakening of 
work incentives for all members of a household, while the extension of tax credits 
should have a stimulating influence on job take-up. The reforms might also have 
influenced the composition of nonemployed households in terms of their socio-
economic characteristics as eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits changed 
while new types of benefits were created and others were abandoned or merged. 
The descriptive analysis has confirmed increases in the polarisation of 
(non-)employment in the populations of couples studied. Furthermore, there are signs of 
an impact of tax and benefit reforms. While individual worklessness decreased after 
2005 in Germany and after 2003 in the UK, couples’ joint nonemployment did not react 
very strongly in Germany and even increased slightly in the UK. At the same time, there 
was an increased rise in polarisation. Furthermore, the life tables presented in this paper 
reveal that dual nonemployment has become more persistent over time. However, the 
policy periods had no significant effects in the multivariate models when individual and 
household characteristics were controlled for, which suggests that the increases in spell 
duration are related to changes in the socio-economic structure of nonemployed 
households. 
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Among the nonemployed couples in both countries, there were fewer low-educated and 
more highly educated persons in 2007 compared with 1997. Other differences between 
both time points can be observed for employed and nonemployed couples alike: In 
Germany, age increased and health decreased in general, while in the UK, age also 
increased, while health generally improved. These changes may mirror broad 
developments in the structure of the panel population. Nevertheless, the country-specific 
findings on the number of children are in line with the assumptions regarding the 
influence of tax/benefit policies on family households: While the number of children 
per couple decreased within the whole sample in Germany, the decrease was stronger 
for employed couples and weaker for nonemployed ones. This difference may have 
been caused by a weakening of work incentives within larger households as predicted 
by Clasen et al 2006. In the UK, the number of children per nonemployed couple was 
dramatically lower in 2007 compared with 1997, while the decrease in children per 
employed couple was much more moderate. Previous literature suggests that tax credits 
reduced work disincentives for low-wage earners and benefit receivers, which were 
especially severe for families. The survival analyses presented here do not suggest such 
an influence on the duration of couples’ nonemployment. A combined interpretation of 
the descriptive and analytical findings could therefore be that these policies decreased 
families’ risk of fully exiting employment, while there was no effect on incentives once 
the situation of dual worklessness occurred. 
7.2 Household composition 
In Sections 2 and 5, care needs were discussed along with marital homogamy as factors 
of household composition that are likely to influence couples’ employment decisions, 
irrespective of how social transfers are institutionalised. Two conflicting hypotheses 
were discussed for households with children or members in need of long-term care: On 
the one hand, the higher financial needs should motivate individuals to re-enter 
employment quickly after losing a job; on the other hand, the need for medical or child 
care may limit the employment possibilities of one or both partners in both the short and 
long term. In both countries, nonemployment spells of couples with children are 
remarkably shorter than those of childless couples. For Germany, this finding was 
confirmed in the multivariate regression for couples whose children were younger than 
6. The need for long-term care had the opposite effect and diminished the likelihood of 
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ending dual joblessness. In the UK model, the coefficients for this set of variables point 
in the same direction but are not significant. 
Regarding marital homogamy, similarity within couples was assumed to diminish their 
chances of ending nonemployment as both partners tend to search for work in the same 
spheres of the labour market. However, homogamy in terms of age or education showed 
no effect in either country in the descriptives or in the regressions. Instead of assortative 
mating as such, the specific combination of partners’ characteristics seems to influence 
the dynamics of household nonemployment. 
7.3 Individual resources 
Individuals’ levels of age and education, as well as their work experience and health, are 
strong predictors of couples’ nonemployment duration. A couple has more difficulties 
ending dual joblessness when one partner is older than 50. The man’s age seems to have 
a stronger impact on spell duration than does the age of the woman. In contrast, the 
favourable effects of higher education are stronger for female education. In the UK 
model, only the woman’s education is significant, not the man’s. The same is true for 
health, while in Germany, the influence of both partners’ health status is equally strong. 
In both countries, work experience turns out to be significant only for the woman. 
While the coefficient is in line with expectations in Germany – the more experience, the 
shorter the spell – the coefficient for Britain points in the opposite direction. A country 
difference in the constellation of partners’ work experience is notable in this respect and 
becomes apparent when looking at Appendices A3 and A4. In the BHPS sample, the 
women have been employed for a longer period of time on average than the men. In the 
SOEP data, the opposite is true. The couples observed in the BHPS therefore have a 
fundamentally different employment (and nonemployment) history than do those in the 
SOEP, and there seem to be more female breadwinner couples in the UK sample 
compared with the German data.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper has assessed the effects of household composition, individual resources, and 
social policy on the duration of couples’ nonemployment. Understanding such 
influences can enhance our knowledge about how social risk factors manifest 
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themselves within vulnerable households and how they translate into social inequality 
and poverty at the aggregate level. 
The differences found in the results for both countries need to be partly interpreted with 
caution. A direct comparison of effect sizes and significance levels is, of course, not 
possible as they were generated on the basis of two different data sources. Some 
findings nevertheless seem valid with regard to the discussed literature: 
The additional time and income needs that come with dependent household members 
can affect the risk of nonemployment both negatively and positively. Although having 
children increases the risk of dual joblessness (Härkönen 2011), it also increases the 
likelihood of re-entering employment. The presence of household members in need of 
long-term care has the opposite effect. Marital homogamy is not a good predictor of 
spell duration, at least when it measures the similarity of partners across all levels of 
education and age. Women’s resources, in turn, seem to play a decisive role in 
ameliorating couples’ potential to overcome joblessness compared with men’s. This 
might be connected to the so-called ‘macho effect’, i.e. the still-common preference of 
the male breadwinner model over the female breadwinner model of household 
production (cp. Härkönen 2007). Although educational heterogeneity as such is not 
helpful for couples, inequality in favour of the woman seems to be a key to ending dual 
joblessness as it makes the female breadwinner model more attractive. The models 
presented here reveal that couples have a comparatively higher chance of exiting 
nonemployment if the woman is in good health or highly educated, indicating that these 
women are more likely to take on the role of the single earner than are women in other 
households. This effect is a bit more pronounced in the UK model, which could be an 
indicator of a weaker macho effect in the UK compared with Germany.  
Future studies could add to the presented findings in several ways. Contrary to the 
evidence of a weaker macho effect in the UK, former studies on the 1990s (e.g., 
McGinnity 2002) found that wives of unemployed men work more often in Germany 
than in the UK. Modelling the transitions of both partners simultaneously would 
perhaps provide more insight into how and why these patterns appear in the data. 
Another interesting route to follow would be the inclusion of the available life-history 
data for the BHPS and SOEP in order to model recurrent events. This could raise the 
number of observations, which is rather low in the case of the BHPS. The generally 
lower significance of results for the UK might be caused by a lack of variation in the 
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data, which is particularly true for the effect of care needs as the number of couples with 
children or household members in need of long-term care is very low. Taking couples’ 
full employment history into account may also reveal changes in compositional and 
partner dynamics within households over time, which could provide a more precise 
picture of how reforms may have changed the face of social risks in both countries.  
Furthermore, alternative explanations of the changes in the rates and composition of 
jobless couples’ households should be tested. The increasing importance of activation 
measures, for instance, might have pushed more employable persons into the labour 
market while excluding the most vulnerable groups from it. 
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Appendix 
A1: Household structure, Germany 
Individuals 25-64, in couple households Educational level 
 primary secondary post-secondary Total 
1997         
Dyads with at least one employed partner         
n° (%) of individuals 1,036 (17.35) 3,286 (55.02) 1,650 (27.63) 5,972 (100) 
average age 42,65 41,11 42,28 41,70 
average health 0,84 0,88 0,91 0,88 
average number of children in household 0,86 0,86 0,81 0,85 
Dyads with none of the partners employed         
n° (%) of individuals 344 (32.33) 550 (51,69) 170 (15.98) 1,064 (100) 
average age 54,04 52,96 52,67 53,26 
average health 0,70 0,73 0,79 0,73 
average number of children in household 0,35 0,37 0,36 0,36 
Total         
n° (%) of individuals 1,380 (19.61) 3,836 (54.52) 1,820 (25.87) 7,036 (100) 
average age 45,49 42,81 43,25 43,45 
average health 0,80 0,86 0,90 0,86 
average number of children in household 0,73 0,79 0,77 0,77 
          
2007         
          
Dyads with at least one employed partner         
n° (%) of individuals 761 (10.12) 4,077 (54.23) 2,680 (35.65) 7,518 (100) 
average age 45,46 44,50 46,42 45,28 
average health 0,80 0,87 0,90 0,87 
average number of children in household 0,69 0,70 0,74 0,71 
          
Dyads with none of the partners employed         
n° (%) of individuals 200 (20.39) 573 (58.41) 208 (21.20) 981 (100) 
average age 54,08 54,86 56,92 55,13 
average health 0,58 0,71 0,77 0,69 
average number of children in household 0,33 0,21 0,23 0,31 
          
Total         
n° (%) of individuals 961 (11.31) 4,650 (54.71) 2,888 (33.98) 8,499 (100) 
average age 47,25 45,78 47,17 46,42 
average health 0,76 0,85 0,89 0,85 
average number of children in household 0,61 0,64 0,70 0,65 
Source: SOEP, own calculations 
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A2: Household structure, United Kingdom 
Individuals 25-64, in couple households Educational level 
  primary secondary post-secondary Total 
1997         
          
Dyads with at least one employed partner         
n° (%) of individuals 777 (21.90) 1,468 (41.38) 1,303 (36.72) 3,548 (100) 
average age 45,44 40,84 40,95 41,88 
average health 0,90 0,93 0,95 0,93 
average number of children in household 0,84 0,91 0,90 0,89 
          
Dyads with none of the partners employed         
n° (%) of individuals 229 (51.93) 137 (31.07) 75 (17.01) 441 (100) 
average age 51,05 49,51 54,53 51,16 
average health 0,65 0,77 0,79 0,71 
average number of children in household 0,94 0,85 0,45 0,83 
          
Total         
n° (%) of individuals 1,006 (25.22) 1,605 (40.24) 1,378 (34.54) 3,989 (100) 
average age 46,71 41,58 41,69 42,91 
average health 0,84 0,92 0,94 0,91 
average number of children in household 0,86 0,91 0,88 0,89 
          
2007         
          
Dyads with at least one employed partner         
n° (%) of individuals 611 (15.49) 1,739 (44.09) 1,594 (40.42) 3,944 (100) 
average age 49,16 44,92 44,07 45,24 
average health 0,91 0,94 0,95 0,94 
average number of children in household 0,65 0,81 0,90 0,82 
          
Dyads with none of the partners employed         
n° (%) of individuals 197 (44.67) 131 (29.71) 113 (25.62) 441 (100) 
average age 53,73 53,80 58,92 55,08 
average health 0,73 0,76 0,88 0,78 
average number of children in household 0,53 0,50 0,13 0,42 
          
Total         
n° (%) of individuals 808 (18.43) 1,870 (42.65) 1,707 (38.93) 4,385 (100) 
average age 50,27 45,55 45,06 46,23 
average health 0,87 0,92 0,95 0,92 
average number of children in household 0,62 0,78 0,85 0,78 
Source: BHPS, own calculations 
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Source: SOEP, own calculations 
A3: Independent variables: Germany 
Variables Mean, 
categorial variables in % 
Std. dev. 
Spell duration 28.7 32.8 
Age difference 4.1 4.0 
Woman’s work experience (in years) 18.7 13.9 
Man’s work experience (in years) 27.8 14.2 
   
Start of spell   
 – 1997 34.7 %  
1997 – 2004 42.3 %  
2005 – 23.0 %  
Educational difference   
Low 72.0 %  
High 28.0 %  
Age of youngest child   
no children 70.6 %  
0-2 years 14.5 %  
3-5 years 5.5 %  
6-10 years 5.0 %  
11-15 years 4.4 %  
Household member in need of long-term care  
No 96.5 %  
Yes 3.5 %  
Health status of man   
Poor 20.8 %  
Good 79.2 %  
Health status of woman   
Poor 21.1 %  
Good 78.9 %  
Man’s age   
< 30 12.8 %  
30-49 26.2 %  
50+ 61.1 %  
Woman’s age   
< 30 17.6 %  
30-49 25.8 %  
50+ 56.6 %  
Man’s level of education   
Low 15.6 %  
Medium 55.0 %  
High 29.4 %  
Woman’s level of education   
Low 26.9 %  
Medium 55.7 %  
High 17.4 %  
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Source: BHPS, own calculations 
A4: Independent variables: United Kingdom 
Variables Mean, 
categorial variables in % 
Std. dev. 
Spell duration 32.8 35.3 
Age difference 4.6 4.7 
Woman’s work experience (in years) 25.6 17.5 
Man’s work experience (in years) 16.5 14.1 
Start of spell   
– Sep 1996 38.4 %  
Oct 1996 – Mar 1999 11.9 %  
Apr 1999 – Mar 2003 26.2 %  
Apr 2003 – 23.5 %  
Educational difference   
Low 47.9 %  
High 52.1 %  
Age of youngest child   
no children 73.6 %  
0-2 years 9.8 %  
3-5 years 6.3 %  
6-10 years 6.3 %  
11-15 years 4.0 %  
Household member in need of long-term care  
No 79.5 %  
Yes 20.5 %  
Health status of man   
Poor 14.9 %  
Good 85.1 %  
Health status of woman   
Poor 14.1 %  
Good 86.9 %  
Man’s age   
< 30 13.1 %  
30-49 23.0 %  
50+ 63.9 %  
Woman’s age   
< 30 8.8 %  
30-49 23.5 %  
50+ 67.7 %  
Man’s level of education   
Low 39.6 %  
Medium 36.9 %  
High 23.5 %  
Woman’s level of education   
Low 33.8 %  
Medium 36.9 %  
High 29.3 %  
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The many shapes of the welfare triangle: 
How employment, family structures and welfare rights relate to 
changes in the distribution of household income in different countries 
 
Abstract: 
Income inequality within countries is commonly related to the role of the market, the 
state and the family in the national context of welfare production and redistribution. 
This article seeks to explore how developments regarding the welfare mix are related to 
changes in inequality in Germany, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. The focus 
lies on the shape of inequality among households and on the question of how 
household-level manifestations of the welfare triangle influence this shape. For this 
purpose, the Apha-Beta-Gamma method proposed by Chauvel (2016) is used to detect 
local inequalities in different parts of the income distribution. This method is combined 
with a counterfactual re-weighting technique (Biewen 2001) to visualise how changes in 
welfare aspects relate to changes along the income distribution. This combination of 
methods is applied to EU-SILC data of waves 2006 and 2011. Results point to distinct 
patterns and trends of household inequality in each country. Common trends found for 
some of the aspects studied, e.g. shrinking household size and fertility, or changing 
benefit rights, can have equalizing or disequalizing effects, depending on the country 
and on the part of the income distribution in question. 
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
A society’s production of social and economic wellbeing is dependent on a variety of 
factors that are related to three central institutional areas, often referred to as the 
“welfare triangle” (Evers1990): the market, the state and the private household. 1 
Institutions of these three spheres of welfare production – as well as interactions 
between them - have a significant impact on the distribution of socio-economic 
resources and risks in a given population (Albertini 2008; Bahle, Ebbinghaus and Göbel 
2015; Esping-Andersen 1999). In their influential study on household income dynamics, 
DiPetre and McManus (2000) demonstrated that income mobility is dependent on the 
rate of events that trigger and counterbalance income change. These events are, for 
example, job loss and recuperation, child birth, union formation and separation. Their 
financial impact is modified by the tax-benefit system. The short- and long-term effects 
of income-changing events are therefore highly dependent on national configurations of 
the labour market, the welfare state and family structures (Ranci 2010).   
This paper relates changes in these three areas to changes in income inequality between 
2005 and 2010 in 4 European countries – Germany, Poland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. The studied time span is relatively short but saw rapid changes in the rates of 
trigger events as well as their welfare context in many countries. The case selection 
represents an interesting group of countries because of their rather distinct economic 
and institutional trajectories during and after the economic recession of 2008/2009. 
Germany, for instance, is among the few EU member states that did not experience 
rising unemployment in this period. This was attributed mainly to the policy of 
temporary short-time working schemes that preserved jobs during the crisis and kept 
workers available to companies when markets recovered. Spain, in contrast, is one of 
the crisis-countries that suffered the strongest increases in unemployment and still 
struggles with an unemployment rate of over 20 percent. Youth unemployment is even 
higher, at about 50 percent - a result of high employment protection for older, 
permanent workers and little-to-no security for newcomers to the labour market. The 
Polish economy was exceptionally robust during the recession. Poland, in fact, was the 
only EU country that achieved positive economic growth rates in 2009. The economic 
1 The concept of welfare mix / welfare triangle was proposed in the research on welfare pluralism in the 
late 1980s / early 1990s. This concept locates welfare provision between the poles of the market, the state 
and the private community (i.e. families and households) while acknowledging the existence of 
intermediary institutions, the so-called “third sector” (Evers and Laville 2014). 
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slowdown did, however, cause unemployment to grow in Poland but this trend came to 
a halt in 2014 without ever reaching the high unemployment levels of the years before 
EU accession. In the United Kingdom, unemployment increased only until 2012 and 
reached below-crisis levels again by 2015. This quick and unexpected recovery was 
ascribed to the flexibility of labour market regulations concerning lay-offs and re-hiring 
as well as possibilities for cuts in wages and work hours (Eurostat 2016a, OECD 2010, 
OECD 2014, OECD 2016a, OECD 2016b). 
Three of the studied countries - Germany, Poland and Spain - experienced decreases in 
household size and changes in fertility between 2005 and 2010 (Eurostat 2016b, OECD 
2016c), two factors that are likely to influence the effect of job losses on household 
income. Although such components of family structure are frequently taken into 
account when studying income inequality, the principal unit of analysis typically 
remains the individual (Jenkins and Van Kerm 2008). Here, the household level is 
chosen instead for two reasons. First, the household can be identified as key social unit 
of income pooling redistribution (Albertini 2008; Barbieri and Bozzon 2016), and 
second, it is the level of intersection where welfare states and labour markets produce 
their joint effects on the income distribution. Studying the household level directly 
promises important insights into these interactions and into the relationship between 
them. This article examines changes in all three areas of the welfare triangle in relation 
to household-level effects on income inequality. The interest lies on disposable, 
equivalised household income. This measure sums up households’ state- and market 
incomes net of taxes and corrects for household size while considering household-
internal economies of scale. 
Changes in the areas of the market, the family and the state will be operationalised with 
view to their potential effects on household incomes. In the first area, labour market 
conditions affect households’ opportunities to earn income from employment, which is 
the main source of market income for the majority of the population and important 
protector against individual poverty (De Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011; Jenkins et al. 
2012). The earnings possibilities of households are measured by household work 
intensity, i.e. the percentage adult household members’ time spent in full- or part-time 
employment. Related to changes in households’ earnings possibilities, as well as to their 
income needs, are transformations of household and family structures. This paper will 
focus on changes in household size reflected by the number of adults and children in the 
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household. As for the influence of the state level, the study focuses on welfare benefits 
as alternative and addition to market income. The concrete measurement is households’ 
probability of receiving unemployment and disability benefits, stemming from both 
insurance- and tax-based schemes. These two broad categories of transfers cover the 
central types out-of-work benefits for the working-age population in most European 
countries (Erlinghagen and Knuth 2009; De Deken and Clasen 2011). Unemployment 
transfers as well as sickness and disability benefits underwent important changes in 
many European countries. Shifts between the insurance and assistance principle and 
changes in eligibility conditions are two common examples. In the course of the 
German ‘Hartz-reforms’, for example, wage-related long-term unemployment 
assistance was abolished in 2005 and replaced by a means-tested benefit with amounts 
varying by household size. This system also integrated large parts of former social 
assistance recipients. At the same time, the duration of unemployment insurance was 
cut and activation measures were introduced for both types of benefits (Biewen and 
Juasz 2012). In other countries, unemployment benefits are generally less important for 
the population and disability benefits serve as important, functionally equivalent income 
source. Also in this area, changes can be found. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
the Employment and Support Allowance replaced the passive Incapacity Benefit in late 
2008. For those recipients deemed able to work, benefit rates are lower and eligibility is 
tied to the participation in work-related activities and counselling (Lefresne 2010). Also 
in Poland, there was an expansion of policies aimed at increasing labour market 
participation. Between 2004 and 2008, activation programmes were introduced for 
registered unemployed and eligibility to disability pensions and early retirement 
schemes became more restrictive (Portet and Sztandar-Sztanderska 2010). Spain, in 
contrast, opted for an extension of unemployment benefit rights in 2009 as a means to 
mitigate the extreme impact of the recession on the highly segmented Spanish labour 
market (Gutierrez 2009). The benefits where designed as short-term measure for those 
that lacked the opportunity to build up claims in the core systems of social security, in 
spite of prior employment.2 
 
2 in 2012, i.e. after the time span studied here, a series of reforms have been introduced to reduce labour 
market duality, e.g. in the areas of active labour market policies, collective bargaining (OECD 2012). 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 will discuss how household composition and 
work arrangements interact differently depending on the conditions of the welfare state 
context. These interactions are crucial for social risk constellations within societies and 
therefore produce distinct patterns of income inequality. The analytical strategy to study 
these patterns will be presented in section 3, which describes the two methodological 
approaches and their combination in a step-by-step manner.  Afterwards, the data source 
is introduced in section 4, along with descriptive statistics on the variables used. Section 
5 presents the analytical results, which are then summarised and evaluated in the 
conclusion.  
2. Background 
When looking at the distribution of income, the structure and demand of the labour 
market has a direct impact on the types of employment and on the range of salaries that 
can be yielded by individuals with a given profile (e.g., with a certain skill set, age, 
gender or health status). The tax-benefit system of the welfare state interacts with 
institutions of the labour market, creating supply-side effects.  Wage regulation, 
employment protection and social benefits that replace market income during 
unemployment or sickness are well-documented factors influencing labour market 
activity (Amable, Demmou and Gatti 2011).  While generous out-of-work benefits may 
diminish incentives to work, in-work benefits for low-wage earners (e.g. in the form of 
tax credits) can have the opposite effect (Marx et al 2013). Both tax reliefs and out-of-
work benefits can be effective tools to reduce the poverty rates of vulnerable population 
groups. This is less evident for other welfare state policies that target the labour market 
and have gained in importance over the past two decades. Activation policies, if well-
designed, can enable (re-)employment of individuals with otherwise low prospects for a 
job (Konle-Seidl and Eichhorst 2008). This does, however, not guarantee an adequate 
level of income by itself. In some cases, “successful” activation may be connected to an 
increase in low-paid or marginal employment (Bahle, Ebbinghaus and Göbel 2015).  
Even if counterbalanced by minimum wages or in-work benefits, such a situation could 
have a substantial influence on the income level of individuals in these programmes, as 
well as on the overall structure of wages and household incomes.  The distribution of 
household incomes is influenced not only by wages and benefits related to work or 
worklessness. Welfare states also support households by granting family benefits or 
providing childcare. These policies differ in their levels of targeting versus universalism 
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and the focus on caregivers’ support versus work-family reconciliation. States 
furthermore apply different rules of taxation to different household types.  Taken 
together, these factors affect how the employment potential of parents can be realised 
and which division of labour within households is beneficial regarding their overall 
income situation. In other words, the system of taxes, benefits and social services affect 
the strategies families employ to balance care and income needs (Becker 1985; Sarasa 
2008; Kangas and Rostgaard 2007). The way different family types are treated in this 
system has an influence on inequalities among them, e.g. between single parents and 
couple families. It also affects their situation relative to non-family households (Esping-
Andersen 2009). Such differences may, in turn, stimulate the formation of certain 
household types while discouraging the choice of other living arrangements. Welfare-
state policies therefore play an important role in shaping cross-national differences in 
union formation and fertility (Cooke et al. 2013).  
The public debate on effects of the economic crisis in many European countries focused 
on rising unemployment. This concept, however, refers strongly to population groups 
that are registered as unemployed and receive unemployment benefits. Other situations 
of worklessness that can increase as a result of economic crises are ignored.  
Erlinghagen and Knuth (2009) demonstrated that Western countries differ strongly in 
their institutional definitions of unemployment and inactivity. Individuals with the same 
profile in terms of education, health, age and gender are therefore registered 
administratively as unemployed (“active”) in some countries and as disabled or early 
retired (“inactive”) in others. The latter may still search for employment and therefore 
show up as unemployed in survey data that apply the International Labour 
Organization’s definitions of employment and unemployment. Nevertheless, the study 
of Erlinghagen and Knuth strongly suggests that recipients of welfare benefits base the 
judgment of their status on the type of benefits they receive. For this reason, this article 
does not study unemployment within households but includes other situations of 
nonemployment as well. More specifically, the focus will be on the work intensity of 
households and how its changes between 2005 and 2010 affected income inequality 
among them. 
De Graaf-Zijl and Nolan (2011) found that low work intensity and household 
nonemployment are strongly related to relative poverty risks on the micro level. There 
is, however, strong variation across Europe and the relationship is less evident on the 
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macro level. Courluy and Vandenbrouke (2013, p. 27-28) offer a comprehensive 
explanation for the contrasting results between the individual and aggregate level: 
“First, household joblessness correlates positively with pre-transfer poverty, but 
the impact of household joblessness on post-transfer poverty is mitigated by 
social spending. Second, national pre-transfer and post-transfer poverty rates are 
also influenced by the poverty rates prevailing in ‘non-jobless’ households, 
which carry a large weight in the overall poverty record of many countries. 
Third, in a cross-country comparison higher individual employment rates are 
associated with lower levels of pre-transfer poverty among the ‘non-jobless’ 
households. Hence, higher individual employment rates reduce pre-transfer 
poverty rates both because of their impact on household joblessness (individual 
and household employment correlate with each other) and because of their 
impact on pre-transfer poverty among the ‘non-jobless’ segment. Finally, higher 
individual employment rates are associated with higher levels of spending on 
working-age cash benefits. Higher levels of spending are associated with a larger 
extent of poverty reduction through social transfers, both within the jobless and 
the non-jobless segment of the population. Together, all these elements explain 
why in a cross-country comparison post-transfer poverty correlates with 
individual joblessness but not with household joblessness.” 
In contrast to their results for workless households, the authors did find a slightly 
positive correlation between the number of individuals living in work-poor households 
and post-transfer poverty, as well as between changes in both indicators between 2004 
and 2008. Overall, their results highlight the diversity of EU countries. Changes in 
poverty are linked to developments in work-rich and work-poor households, as well as 
the level of polarisation between them in different ways. This diversity is exemplified 
by Corluy and Vandenbrouke’s results for the four countries that are subject of this 
study. For Germany, they found that rising individual employment and the declining 
share of individuals living in work-poor households did not lead to a decrease in 
household worklessness due to rising polarisation between employed and nonemployed 
households. Nor did it reduce at-risk of poverty rates, as these increased significantly 
for all working-age households, although more so for households with low work 
intensity. In Poland, sharply rising individual employment was accompanied with 
decreases in household joblessness and polarisation. This contributed to strongly 
declining poverty risks in the working-age population, although the decrease of poverty 
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rates in work-rich households was even more pronounced. Changes in Spanish poverty 
rates were less pronounced although individual and household nonemployment 
decreased substantially. In the UK, the reduction of household joblessness and 
polarisation as well as the reduction of poverty in jobless households lead to a decline in 
overall poverty within the working age population. The authors attribute this 
development to activation and benefit policies which were obviously less successful in 
reducing poverty in the first mentioned case, Germany. 
The logic and principles of the social benefit system thus play an important role for the 
distribution of income across households. For some time, scholars were puzzled by 
what seemed to be a “paradox of redistribution” (Korpi and Palme 1998): Countries that 
targeted their benefits more strongly towards the poor appeared to have lower levels of 
redistribution than countries that granted benefits to a bigger proportion of society.  A 
recent study by Marx et al. (2013) found this result to be partly driven by country 
selection, data source and the operationalisation of targeting and income sources. 
Moreover, many countries originally included in the study of Korpi and Palme 
underwent substantial changes in their benefit systems. While targeted benefits were 
traditionally associated with a strictly means-tested provision for the nonemployed, their 
logic has changed towards providing incentives and support for labour market 
reintegration. In-work tax credits, benefits topping up low wages and mandatory 
activation programmes for benefit recipients have been introduced in many countries 
while social insurance rights have become more restrictive or are harder to achieve due 
to changed labour market conditions. Today, there are a number of countries that 
allocate most of their social transfers to lower income groups and achieve a high level 
of redistribution. The opposite case can, however, still be observed. In the four countries 
selected for this study, Germany combines a relatively high level of redistribution with 
medium-level targeting, while Poland scores high on both axes. Spain allocates a high 
percentage of benefit transfers to lower income groups but does not achieve higher 
levels of redistribution than the United Kingdom with a much lower level of targeting.  
Confirming the importance of the welfare state and the household for real differences in 
people’s standard of living, Medgyesi’s (2014) study of income inequality in the 
European Union between 2004 and 2010 shows that changes of market income are 
generally more pronounced than those of disposable income (i.e., an income measure 
that is corrected for household size, taxes and transfers). The study furthermore found 
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that the contribution of different kinds of market- and state-based income sources to 
changes in inequality varied strongly across countries. Market income and pensions 
were found to be inequality enhancing in most countries while other social transfers and 
taxes had the tendency to reduce inequality slightly. Turning to the household level, 
Medgyesi found that the effects of household composition in terms of family 
constellation, age and education on overall inequality vary more across countries than 
the contribution of household work intensity. In the countries studied in this article, the 
estimated contribution of work intensity in 2010 was between 10 and 15 %. Between 
2004 and 2010, its importance increased in Poland and Spain and decreased in 
Germany. In the United Kingdom, it backlashed to its initial level after decreasing 
slightly in 2007. In constrast, the contribution of household type was estimated to 
around 2% in Spain, 3% in Poland, 4% in the United Kingdom, and over 8% in 
Germany. In Poland, household structure lost steadily in importance while in Germany, 
a steep increase could be observed. 
This result for Germany is in line with Peichl, Pestel and Schneider (2012), who found 
that decreases in household size were related to increasing inequality, poverty and 
richness in the 20 years after the German unification. Nevertheless, shifts in the income 
distribution would have also occurred in the absence of the observed changes in 
household structures. Biewen and Juhasz (2012) found that the most important 
explanatory factor for Germany’s increase in inequality was increasing inequality in 
labour earnings, followed by changes in employment outcomes of households and 
alterations of the tax system. Changes in household structures and in the transfer system 
seemed less important. This could, however, be different in countries where the family’s 
importance in the welfare mix is traditionally more pronounced. Barbieri and Bozzon 
(2016), for example, demonstrated that the household-structure altering event of child 
birth is more poverty-inducing in the traditionally ‘familistic’ southern European 
welfare states than in the rest of Europe. The lack of direct monetary support for 
families is aggravated by a strong insider-outsider divide on the labour market that 
exposes young workers (i.e. potential parents) to high levels labour market insecurity 
and low levels of social protection. 
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3. Analytical approach 
The preceding discussion clarified that the interaction of labour markets, welfare states 
and work-family arrangements can have very diverse effects on economic inequality 
between households. This study aims to explore the effects of these aspects of welfare 
production further by combining two different strategies of analysing income 
distributions. The first is the Alpha-Beta-Gamma method (ABG) introduced by Chauvel 
(2016) that aims at measuring both the intensity and shape of inequality via a set of 
three indicators: α, which measures inequality around the median of the distribution, β, 
that corrects for deviations from α in the upper tail of the distribution and γ, which 
accounts for deviations at the bottom. 
This approach is based on the ranks of income units within a society, i.e. their position 
within the income distribution.3 For each given household, its standardised income rank 
pi is defined by the proportion of households above it in the income distribution. The 
proportion below is given by 1-pi. Its quantile rank is consequently defined by pi/(1-pi). 
To model the distribution of quantile ranks, a log-logistic distribution of the 
Champernowne-I-Fisk type is defined by 
(1)     𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗� =  𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖� 
with medianised income mj (i.e. income devided by median income) the parameter α 
measures the stretching out of the distribution curve, hence inequality. Following 
Chauvel (2016), ln(mj) will further on be referred to by Mi and ln(pi/(1-pi)) by Xi, re-
formulating equation (1) into the simplified notation 
(2)        𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
In a next step, the empirical divergence from the CF distribution is measured by the ISO 
function 
(3)        𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
with ISO(Xi) being the ratio between Mi and Xi. In the case ISO is a constant, inequality 
along the entire distribution is described by one single parameter, α. Because this may 
not be the case empirically, two further shape parameters, β and γ are introduced that 
correct for deviations from α in the upper and lower tails of the distribution. Chauvel 
3 The following description is a summary based on Chauvel 2016, p.54-59. 
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(2016) uses linear combinations of hyperbolic tangent functions for describing the 
shapes of the upper and lower asymptotes of ISO(X):  
(4)         𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋) =  𝜃𝜃1(𝑋𝑋) +  𝜃𝜃2(𝑋𝑋)2  
 (5)         𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋) =  −𝜃𝜃1(𝑋𝑋) +  𝜃𝜃2(𝑋𝑋)2  
where θ1(X)=tanh(X/2) and θ2(X)=tanh2(X/2). Redefining ISO(X) as 
(6)        𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) 
results in the adjustment of the ISO function (3) to 
(7)        𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . 
Using this linear function, α, β and γ can be estimated jointly using OLS regression. In 
this paper, this is done by using the ABG ado for STATA (Chauvel 2014). A special 
interest will be on the built-in tool of ISO-graphs that plots ISO(Xi) against Xi, i.e. the 
local empirical deviations from the CF function along the income spectrum measured 
by the logit rank. 
The second method that will be used is based on Biewen’s (2001) application of 
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux’s (1996) reweighting-procedure to construct 
counterfactual income distributions (henceforth, DFL). The re-weighting method is a 
regression-based technique that simulates the contribution of certain variables to 
differences between income distributions. The procedure is based on a simple thought 
experiment: How would the distribution of incomes look in one population if income 
units (e.g. individuals, households) were more similar to another population regarding a 
specific aspect of interest (e.g. their education or employment)? At the same time, 
compositional differences in other characteristics are held constant. In the case of this 
study, the country-level distributions of household income are compared between two 
time points, t0 and t1. The question is therefore specified to: How would the income 
distribution in t1 differ from what we observe if selected characteristics of households 
would be the same as in t0, while changes in other variables are controlled for? By 
comparing this counterfactual distribution with the observed ones of both time points, 
the influence of changes in household characteristics becomes visible.  
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There are alternative methods for investigating changes of inequality, namely 
decomposition of inequality indices by income source or population subgroups (e.g., 
Shorrocks 1982). Suitable indicators of inequality differ in terms of which parts of the 
income distribution they are more or less sensitive to. The ABG method has proven 
itself to describe inequalities in the middle, top and bottom of the distribution 
adequately and fits empirical data better than a simple CF distribution or the GB2 
(Chauvel 2016, p. 64). Also, ABG does fulfil the criteria for decomposability (Chauvel 
2016, p. 60). The choice of applying DFL instead of decomposition is related to the fact 
that effects of changes in single factors can be isolated more clearly than in subgroup 
decomposition (Biewen 2001, p. 185). When modelling the effect of one variable, it is 
simple to control for other, possibly correlated variables by adding them to the 
regression equations that are computed to produce the weights of counterfactual 
distributions. Another advantage of DFL is the intuitive interpretation offered by the 
counterfactual question that leads the analysis. By re-weighting ABG, the observed and 
counterfactual distributions can be visualised by plotting their ISO functions. In 
addition, three sets of indicators are derived that describe factual and counterfactual 
inequality at the middle, top and bottom of the distribution. This makes the proposed 
approach superior to classic regression-based decomposition that merely compares the 
means of distributions (Jenkins and Van Kerm 2009). While the original DFL approach 
uses re-weighted kernel-density estimates from which factual and counterfactual 
indicators and visualisations are derived, the procedure of Biewen (2001) directly 
reweights the discrete distribution in the data at hand. This makes it straight-forward to 
combine the DFL method with ABG. 
The modified DFL re-weighting method proceeds as follows.4 A measure of discrete 
household income in a given sample at time t, I(t), can be described as 
(𝑎𝑎)        𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)  =  �𝑔𝑔�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖� 𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where yi is the income of household i, g(yi) is the function of the income measure and 
P(yi│t) is the weight of household i, i.e. the probability that household i has income yi at 
time t. For modelling the influence of a changing household characteristic xi on income, 
4 The following paragraphs closely follow Biewen 2001, p.186. 
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the variable of interest needs to be incorporated into the equation, along with relevant 
control variables zi.  This is done by including these variables in the household weight:  
(𝑏𝑏)         𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) =  ���𝑔𝑔�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,   𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ,    𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘│𝑡𝑡�𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
 
                        =  ���𝑔𝑔�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖│𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ,   𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ,   𝑡𝑡� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖│𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ,   𝑡𝑡) 𝑃𝑃�𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘│𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
. 
The three weights ‒ i.e. the probability of 1.) income given the variable of interest, the 
control variable and time t; 2.) the variable of interest given the control variable and 
time t; and 3.) the control variable given t ‒ can now be used to re-weight the income 
function g(yi) according to changes in either y, x, or z. 
(𝑐𝑐)      𝐼𝐼�𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)     =  ���𝑔𝑔�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖│𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ,   𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖│𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥) 𝑃𝑃�𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘│𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
. 
In the case of the present analysis, there are two time points, 2005 and 2010. We are 
interested in knowing whether changes of variable x contributed to changes in y. Thus, 
we ask ourselves: How would g(y) look like in 2010 if x hadn’t changed since 2005. At 
the same time, we want to control for the possible influence of changes in the 
distribution of another variable z. We are therefore interested in I(ty=2010, tx=2005, 
tz=2010). 
Following Biewen (2001), the original DFL framework is now adapted to the case of 
survey data. The dataset to be re-weighted is S(ty=2010). The re-weighting factors will 
be derived from S(tx=2005). The estimation function of I(.) would be given by 
(𝑑𝑑)     𝐼𝐼�𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�     =  � 𝑔𝑔(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠)�𝜋𝜋�𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� 
𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆�𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� 𝜓𝜓�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 � 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠,   𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� 𝜓𝜓�𝑧𝑧�𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠 � 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�� 
where  𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠|𝑡𝑡) represents the sample weight of a respondent. The re-weighting factor 𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥 
measures the ratio of probabilities for observing x given the control variables z between 
2005 and 2010: 
(𝑒𝑒)    𝜓𝜓�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠�𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 , 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� =  𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 | 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥)𝑃𝑃��𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 � 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� 
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The probabilities are estimated using regression models that are selected according to 
the scaling of x (i.e., logit for binomial, ordered logit for ordered variables and 
multinomial logit in the nominal variables).5 
The re-weighting factor for the remaining control variables  𝜓𝜓𝑧𝑧  is estimated from the 
pooled sample of S(ty) and S(tx) by: 
(𝑔𝑔)   𝜓𝜓�𝑧𝑧 �𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦� =  𝑃𝑃��𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 � 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠�1 − 𝑃𝑃��𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 � 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠�  =   𝑃𝑃��𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 � 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠�𝑃𝑃�(𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥  | 𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠) 
For combining the DFL method with ABG, equation (6) is “plugged into” equation (d), 
where 𝜋𝜋∗ is the normalised product of π, ψx, and ψz. The resulting equation estimates 
the local deviations from the CF distribution’s alpha in a dataset re-weighted according 
to changes in variable x, holding other changes constant: 
(6𝑑𝑑)      𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼� �𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�     =  � [𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵�𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠)� + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺�𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠)��
𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆�𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�  𝜋𝜋∗�𝑠𝑠,   𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 ,   𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥� 
As mentioned above, in the specific case of this study, ty represents 2010 and tx 2005. 
The interest lies not only on changes in one variable but on several, and the set of 
control variables changes according to which variable is considered as x. Therefore, 
equation (6d) will be estimated several times for building different sets of counterfactual 
ABG coefficients and ISO-curves. In addition, the ABG procedure will also be used to 
visualise the factual distributions for 2005 and 2010, where the only weights applied are 
the household sample weights included in the original datasets. 
4. Data source and variables used for weight estimation 
As data source for this study, the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions) was selected for its unique combination of individual- and 
household-level socio-economic information.6 The EU-SILC was launched in 2003 by a 
group of 7 European countries and was gradually extended to include all EU member 
5 This study follows Daly and Valetta (2004, 2006) in choosing logit instead of probit estimation as in 
Biewen (2001). The construction of weights from multinomial and ordered logit models was adopted 
from Daly and Valetta (2006 Appendix B). 
6 EUSILC UDB 2011 – version 3 of March 2014, EUSILC UDB 2010 – version 5 of March 2014, 
EUSILC UDB 2006 – version 4 of March 2010, EUSILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009;  more 
information: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living- 
conditions 
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states as well as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. In a nutshell, EU-SILC data 
stem from national data sources that are harmonised for the purpose of comparability in 
accordance with an agreed set of guidelines. The dataset covers a wide range of 
indicators on individuals’ life situation, including, for example, employment and 
education, family and care arrangements, health and well-being. In addition, there is a 
rather detailed assessment of both individual and household incomes. This makes EU-
SILC highly valuable for investigating socio-economic inequality in a comparative 
research design. For the purpose of this study, the household was chosen as level of 
analysis. 
The sample was restricted to households having at least one adult member between the 
age of 25 and 64. The author believes that this focuses the analysis on the group that is 
most affected from interactions between all three areas of income production and re-
distribution, i.e. the state, market and family. Among households with very young 
members, students are over-represented. The family may play an indirect role through 
private transfers and less so by income pooling within the household. Among older 
households, pensions are the main source of income. Although some types of pensions 
may be considered market incomes (e.g. private or occupational pensions), they reflect 
former market conditions of the past more than present ones. As for the group below 25, 
family bonds beyond the household may also play a role for the elderly, e.g. in terms of 
economic impact of long-term care needs. Although these kinds of relations are 
important for household incomes, they are beyond the scope of this study that focuses 
on effects of family structures within households. Older and younger individuals are 
thus only included in the study if other members of their household belong to the target 
group of this study, which is the working-age population.  Incomes in this age group are 
particularly affected by all three areas of welfare production. Labour market conditions, 
the regulation of social transfers and household composition are of particular interest. 
Equivalised annual disposable household income (variable HX090 in EU-SILC) serves 
as dependent variable in the analysis because it is affected by changes in market 
income, taxes and benefits alike. The variable measures the income accumulated over 
the year prior to the interview, i.e. 2005 and 2010.7 Disposable household income is 
7 The income reference period in Germany, Poland and Spain is the preceding calendar year. In the 
United Kingdom, the variable refers to the year of the interview. In order to compare the same income 
years across countries, four different waves of EU-SILC are used. For Germany, Poland and Spain, data 
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equivalised according to the number of adults and children living in the household. 
Therefore, the variable is a suitable candidate for a ranking strategy because it makes 
income positions comparable across households. In order to avoid difficulties that can 
arise with outliers, negative or zero-incomes when constructing the re-weighting factors, 
the variable was winsored, i.e., the upper and lower percentile of the distribution were 
excluded from the analysis. 
The variables used for re-weighting comprise information on household structure, 
household employment and benefit receipt. Because of its simplicity when computing 
the counterfactual re-weighting factor ψx, benefit receipt shall be discussed first. As 
mentioned above, unemployment and disability benefits seem to be of special interest 
for this study as they were subject to substantive reforms in some countries, while 
remaining relatively stable systems in others. In this analysis, changes in benefit rights 
are operationalised as shifts in the propensity of households to receive a benefit, while 
holding household’s characteristics and composition constant. The variables used to 
model benefit receipt are PY090N, PY120N and PY130N (net amount of 
unemployment, sickness and disability benefits received by individuals over the income 
reference period). On the basis of these variables, dummy-indicators were constructed 
that measure whether a household includes a member receiving the given benefit or not. 
These indicators were then used as dependent variables in logit estimations in order to 
predict the probability of receiving the benefit in the year 2005 and in 2010. Based on 
these,  ψx, can be constructed simply by calculating the ratio of both probabilities. Note 
that in the logit models, the other x-variables of this study are used as control variables, 
in addition to further controls of age, education and region, which will be discussed 
further below. 
The changes in household and family structures investigated in this analysis include the 
number of adults and the number of children living in working-age households. 
Household members are considered children if they are younger than 16 or between age 
16 and 25 and living with their parents in the same household.8 The variable counting 
are taken from waves 2006 and 2011 (income reference years 2005 and 2010). Data on the United 
Kingdom stem from waves 2005 and 2010.  
8 Further definition of truly “dependent” children over 16 proved difficult for two reasons: First, EU-
SILC does not allow for differentiating between regular employment and paid apprenticeships or tertiary 
degree programs that involve paid work. Second, in order to detect households’ main and secondary 
earners (the latter being, e.g., children in above-mentioned programmes), households with self-employed 
members would need to be excluded from the analysis. In EU-SILC, income from self-employment in 
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household-adults was restricted to three categories.  Category one stands for a single-
adult household, category two for a two-adult household and category three includes 
households with three or more adults. Four categories were chosen for counting the 
number of children. The first indicates that there are no children in the household, the 
second stands for a single child, the third for a household with two children and the 
fourth for three children or more. In order to model the effects of changes in these 
variables of household composition, it is necessary to estimate the propensity of a 
household to have a certain number of adults or children. Following Daly and Valetta 
(2006), multinomial logit models are used. To construct ψx, year-ratios of the predicted 
probabilities are calculated for each of the variables’ values and subsequently added.  
Household employment was measured in terms of household work intensity using the 
EU-SILC variables PL070 and PL072 from waves 2005 and 2006, and PL073, PL074, 
PL075 and PL076 from waves 2010 and 2011. These variables count the number of 
months a person was working full- or half time over the income reference period 
(including self-employment). These variables were used to compute the total number of 
working months of adults within a household.9 This sum was divided by 12 and by the 
number of adults in the household, resulting in the household-percentage of months in 
paid work. Because certain combinations of household size and scope of employment 
are more often than others, the resulting variable had peaks around certain values and 
was therefore summarised into three categories. Category one represents low work 
intensity, i.e. a percentage of household-employment up to 25 percent. This percentage 
would, for example, be assigned to a household with two adults of which one worked 
part-time over the income reference period while the other was nonemployed. The 
second category captures work intensity between 26 percent and 74 percent, 
representing, for example, a single person working half-time over a year, a couple with 
one full-time earner or three adults of whom one is non-employed while the others work 
full-time. Finally, category three stands for high work intensity, i.e. household 
employment of over 75 percent. High work intensity values would be assigned to a fully 
employed household, a 1.5-earner couple or, for example, a household with three adults 
of whom two work full time and one works half time throughout the reference period. 
The three categories of work intensity represent “threshold values” in an underlying 
some cases includes all gains and losses from business and is therefore not comparable with other 
household members’ wages.  
9 In order to account for low work intensity, a month in part-time work is considered half a working 
month. 
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continuum of household work intensity. For this reason, an ordered logit model is used 
to predict the probabilities of a certain work intensity in a household. The procedure of 
constructing ψx from the model’s results corresponds to the one used for household and 
family structure. 
A re-weighting factor ψz was constructed for each of the counterfactual cases in order to 
control for the marginal changes in variables other than those modelled explicitly by x. 
These re-weighting factors measure the ratio of the probability of being observed in 
2011 against 200610, given a certain set of z characteristics in both years. In addition to 
the variables used for constructing the counterfactual weights, additional controls were 
introduced in all models: The mean age of household adults as well as the square of 
mean age (constructed from variable RX010 of EU-SILC), the highest education of 
adults in the household (derived from variables PE040 and PE010), and a variable 
measuring the degree of urbanisation (DB100), which serves as rough indicator for 
economic opportunities in the region a household is situated. 
5. Results 
Table 1 contains descriptive information about the above-described variables and merits 
further investigation before moving to the analytic results of the paper. The structure of 
the welfare production aspects under study have changed quite dramatically in some 
cases, given the fact that a relatively short time span is observed. Household size has 
dropped considerably in Germany due to a shrinking percentage of households with two 
or more adults. This development is even more pronounced in Spain. Poland, in 
contrast, has a rising share of households with more than three adults while the 
importance of other households decreased. The United Kingdom also experienced a 
drop in the number of single households and in households without children. In the 
other countries, the percentage of childless households increased by between three to six 
percent.  
 
 
 
10 2010 against 2005 in the United Kingdom 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Country Germany Poland Spain United Kingdom 
Year (a) 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Number of households in sample 10452 9835 12236 10401 9407 10307 8134 5742 
Summary statistics (b)                 
Household income (c) 17852.81 21599.91 3932.98 6136.06 13720.05 14690.79 24174.97 21626.35 
1-adult households 40.03% 42.54% 18.88% 17.82% 13.17% 20.05% 32.20% 31.01% 
2-adult households 56.55% 54.06% 59.85% 55.84% 64.25% 59.91% 61.38% 62.45% 
3 or more adults in household 3.42% 3.02% 21.26% 26.33% 22.57% 20.04% 6.43% 6.54% 
Households without children (d) 59.21% 62.31% 41.00% 44.88% 45.64% 51.86% 55.46% 53.16% 
1 child in household 20.14% 19.11% 25.61% 25.30% 25.33% 23.24% 18.25% 18.40% 
2 children in household 15.67% 14.10% 22.22% 21.39% 24.96% 19.98% 18.23% 19.65% 
3 or more children in household 4.99% 4.48% 11.16% 8.43% 4.07% 4.92% 8.06% 8.79% 
Work intensity <= 25% 29.13% 24.30% 28.96% 24.91% 16.37% 24.33% 27.07% 25.72% 
Work intensity > 25% & < 75% 29.15% 25.06% 35.86% 37.91% 42.72% 36.32% 26.01% 25.91% 
Work intensity >= 75% 41.72% 50.54% 35.18% 37.48% 40.88% 39.36% 46.92% 48.37% 
Unemployment benefits receipt 21.84% 19.29% 9.71% 6.65% 12.41% 24.26% 2.86% 4.63% 
Sickness/disability benefits 
receipt 10.57% 10.17% 17.76% 15.00% 9.07% 7.09% 12.66% 13.33% 
(a) Information on number of adults and children refers to 2006 and 2011 for Germany, Poland and Spain. All other data 
refer to 2005 and 2010. (b) Weighted means and proportions (c) Mean equivalised disposable household income  (d) 
Households with at least one adult aged 25 to 65 
Source: EU-SILC 2005, 2006, 2010 and 2011 
Household employment intensified in Germany and the United Kingdom due to an 
increase in fully employed households and decreasing shares of medium and low work 
intensity households. In Poland, low-work intensity decreased as well while the shares 
of medium-to-fully employed households increased. The exact opposite can be observed 
for Spain. In the area of welfare benefits, the data confirm that the German system puts 
a stronger emphasis on unemployment compared to disability schemes than Poland and 
the United Kingdom. 
The share of unemployment benefit recipients dropped slightly between 2005 and 2010 
in Germany and more significantly in Poland. In the latter case, also the share of 
disability benefits decreased.  As these data include insurance and assistance benefits, 
the drop is most likely explained by increased employment. It may, however, be 
possible that institutional changes at the beginning of the observation period changed 
the overall composition of benefit recipients. This would not be captured by a general 
percentage as in Table 1. When modelling the propensities of benefit receipt, such 
structural changes could, however, play a role. They may also be at play in the UK 
where unemployment- and disability benefit receipt increased slightly despite of 
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increasing employment. In Spain, the share of households receiving disability benefits 
decreased while the share of unemployment beneficiaries almost doubled. This is 
certainly an effect of collapsing labour markets but could also be connected to reforms 
in the course of the crisis.  
How exactly did these changes influence income inequality across households? And 
what if some of the observed changes had not occurred since 2005/2006? What if, for 
example, German and Spanish households had just as many kids as in 2006? How 
would the income distribution look like if the British had less fully employed 
households? Would the Polish be less well off with fewer adults living together, 
contributing to their households’ overall income? Table 2 presents the results of the 
DFL-re-weighting procedure applied to the ABG method of measuring local 
inequalities. 
The pattern dominating Table 2 is one of negative beta-coefficients and positive 
gamma. This means that empirically, both the rich and the poor are poorer compared to 
the CF-distribution without shape-coefficients. The resulting isograph has a negative 
slope.  There are two exceptions from this pattern among the factual distributions. In 
2005, Poland had negative values for both beta and gamma. The poor were richer and 
the rich were poorer than around the median, leading to an isograph that was bent 
downwards on both ends. The other income distribution that deviates from the general 
pattern is that for Spanish households in 2010. Beta and gamma are both positive, 
indicating that the rich are richer and the poor are poorer than in the CF distribution. 
The confidence interval for beta, however includes zero and the R-squared is low 
compared to the modelfit reported for the other estimations in Table 2. The combination 
is found twice more for Spain in the counterfactual simulations for the number of 
children and unemployment benefits. Here, the confidence bands of all three shape 
indicators are even wider and R-squared is at only 71% and 57%, respectively. Overall, 
the dispersion of Spanish household income ranks in 2010 fits less well into the ABG 
framework than in 2005. A possible reason could be the higher incidence of extremely 
low and negative incomes in the 2010 data. Yet, a more generous trimming of the 
income variable proved not to improve the modelfit. Table 2, however, shows that some 
of the simulations lead to higher values of R2. Re-weighting observations according to 
the 2005/2006 distribution of adult household members, employment intensity and 
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disability benefits improved the modelfit. Re-weighting for number of children and 
unemployment benefits, in contrast, diminished it.  
The ISO-graphs in Figure 1 visualise the results of the analysis and clarify how changes 
in alpha, beta and gamma translate into changing income rankings of households. Graph 
1 compares actual household income inequality in 2010, plotted as black lines, with 
those of 2005, shown as the grey lines. The ISO graph plots empirical deviations from 
the CF distribution of income quantiles. Without these deviations, the plotted lines 
would be flat lines with varying intercepts.  Higher values of ISO on the y-axis indicate 
higher inequality at a particular point on the x-axis, which represents the logit of the 
income quantile. Inequality here is understood as a stronger “stretching out” of the 
distribution compared to the median.  
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Table 2: Re-weighting of ABG using DFL procedure: Factual and counterfactual coefficients 
 Alpha 95% conf. min 95% conf. max beta 95% conf. min 95% conf. max gamma 95% conf. min 95% conf. max R
2 
Germany           
factual 2010 0.3506 0.3504 0.3509 -0.0990 -0.0998 -0.0982 0.0133 0.0116 0.0151 0.9992 
number of adults as in 2006 0.3464 0.3460 0.3468 -0.1007 -0.1018 -0.0995 0.0340 0.0316 0.0364 0.9984 
number of children as in 2006 0.3346 0.3343 0.3348 -0.0887 -0.0895 -0.0879 0.0410 0.0394 0.0427 0.9993 
work intensity as in 2005 0.3427 0.3424 0.3430 -0.0925 -0.0934 -0.0917 0.0349 0.0331 0.0366 0.9991 
unemployment benefits as in 2005 0.3121 0.3118 0.3123 -0.0642 -0.0648 -0.0636 0.0555 0.0543 0.0567 0.9995 
disability benefits as in 2005 0.3450 0.3447 0.3452 -0.0963 -0.0972 -0.0954 0.0383 0.0363 0.0402 0.9990 
factual 2005 0.2669 0.2667 0.2671 -0.0027 -0.0035 -0.0019 0.0572 0.0559 0.0584 0.9993 
Poland 
          factual 2010 0.3387 0.3385 0.3388 -0.0167 -0.0171 -0.0163 0.0270 0.0264 0.0276 0.9998 
number of adults as in 2006 0.3316 0.3314 0.3317 -0.0078 -0.0082 -0.0075 0.0350 0.0346 0.0355 0.9999 
number of children as in 2006 0.3270 0.3269 0.3271 -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0055 0.0344 0.0340 0.0348 0.9999 
work intensity as in 2005 0.3281 0.3280 0.3282 -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0049 0.0398 0.0394 0.0403 0.9999 
unemployment benefits as in 2005 0.3286 0.3284 0.3287 -0.0069 -0.0073 -0.0066 0.0432 0.0428 0.0437 0.9999 
disability benefits as in 2005 0.3233 0.3231 0.3234 -0.0098 -0.0100 -0.0095 0.0356 0.0352 0.0360 0.9999 
factual 2005 0.3748 0.3747 0.3749 -0.0217 -0.0221 -0.0213 -0.0078 -0.0083 -0.0073 0.9999 
Spain 
          factual 2010 0.3688 0.3569 0.3807 0.0115 -0.0277 0.0508 0.3398 0.2513 0.4282 0.7354 
number of adults as in 2006 0.4154 0.4120 0.4187 -0.0724 -0.0835 -0.0613 0.1656 0.1408 0.1905 0.9787 
number of children as in 2006 0.3920 0.3774 0.4066 0.0219 -0.0265 0.0702 0.3410 0.2313 0.4506 0.7093 
work intensity as in 2005 0.3936 0.3919 0.3953 -0.0510 -0.0566 -0.0455 0.1271 0.1152 0.1389 0.9898 
unemployment benefits as in 2005 0.3613 0.3366 0.3859 0.1188 0.0369 0.2006 0.6872 0.5005 0.8738 0.5735 
disability benefits as in 2005 0.4106 0.4090 0.4123 -0.1028 -0.1083 -0.0973 0.1838 0.1712 0.1963 0.9919 
factual 2005 0.3506 0.3503 0.3509 -0.0667 -0.0678 -0.0656 0.0505 0.0483 0.0526 0.9992 
United Kingdom 
          factual 2010 0.3502 0.3499 0.3506 -0.0410 -0.0420 -0.0400 0.0131 0.0110 0.0152 0.9994 
number of adults as in 2005 0.3652 0.3646 0.3658 -0.0516 -0.0533 -0.0499 0.0073 0.0039 0.0107 0.9991 
number of children as in 2005 0.3576 0.3571 0.3581 -0.0461 -0.0476 -0.0445 0.0099 0.0065 0.0132 0.9994 
work intensity as in 2005 0.3610 0.3605 0.3615 -0.0509 -0.0525 -0.0493 0.0123 0.0090 0.0156 0.9994 
unemployment benefits as in 2005 0.3258 0.3252 0.3264 -0.0159 -0.0177 -0.0141 -0.0012 -0.0046 0.0023 0.9989 
disability benefits as in 2005 0.3496 0.3490 0.3502 -0.0418 -0.0437 -0.0400 0.0066 0.0027 0.0106 0.9991 
factual 2005 0.3597 0.3595 0.3600 -0.0402 -0.0410 -0.0394 0.0117 0.0101 0.0133 0.9996 
Source: EU-SILC 2005, 2006, 2010 and 2011 
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Figure 1: Change of local inequality between 2005 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Household income refers to equivalised disposable income. 
Figure 1 shows that Inequality increased in Germany and Spain. The increase in 
inequality among German households is concentrated around the middle of the 
distribution. The highest values are found in the lower middle ranks of household 
income.  This picture of rising income polarisation confirms previous findings of an 
increasing gap between the relatively poor and rich in Germany due to a shrinking 
middle class (Grabka and Goebel 2014). Spain, in contrast, shows a pattern of strong 
differences between the very rich and very poor. This difference has become more 
extreme between 2005 and 2010 due to higher inequality in the lower ranks of the 
distribution. Inequality decreased, in contrast, among Polish households. While this is 
true for the entire distribution, middle and high incomes profited the most from this 
development. Finally, the United Kingdom stands out as a case of very little change. 
Overall, the graph suggests a weak tendency towards decreasing inequality among 
households. 
In Figure 1, the axes were harmonised for the sake of comparability across countries. 
Across Figures 2 to 5, the scales of the y-axes are allowed to vary in order to enhance 
readability. These graphs address the counterfactual results obtained by the DFL re-
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weighting procedure and are therefore more complex. Along with the lines for 2005 and 
2010 that are identical to those in Figure 1, five additional lines are plotted that are the 
re-weighted versions of the 2010 line. A re-weighted line represents the counterfactual 
case if the distribution of one variable had not changed since 2005-2006, while all other 
variables are kept constant on the 2010/2011 level. It is important to note that these 
counterfactuals are not to be interpreted as causal effects of the re-weighting variables. 
In the following, the term ‘effect’ will refer to descriptive results about the contribution 
of distributional changes in one variable to changes in the distribution of another. This 
does not account for possible unobserved confounders and complex interaction 
structures with and among control variables. Despite of this caveat, the counterfactual 
graphs are nevertheless informative and helpful in gaining knowledge about how 
inequality is shaped by different aspects.  
Figure 2: Germany, counterfactual results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Household income refers to equivalised disposable income. 
Figure 2 presents the counterfactual results for Germany.  The graph shows that 
inequality would be slightly higher among poorer households, and slightly lower for 
middle-to-high income groups if the work intensity of households hadn’t increased and 
the number of children hadn’t dropped over the studied time period. Both developments 
thus had a weak equalizing effect. The effects of the number of adult household 
members and of disability benefits point to the same direction, but are more pronounced 
for lower incomes: Holding everything else constant, without shrinking household size 
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and changing distribution of sickness or disability benefits, inequality would be higher 
among low-to-medium incomes and lower among medium-to-high incomes. 
Unemployment benefits take an outlier position both in terms of magnitude and 
direction of impact. If the probability of receiving unemployment benefits had not 
changed since 2005, the distribution of household incomes would, ceteris paribus, be 
much flatter: Inequality would be slightly higher for the very poor but considerably 
lower for the remaining income groups. Distributional changes in this type of benefit 
thus had an important disequalizing impact on household income rankings, even if 
changes in household employment, size and other benefits are controlled for. This can 
have several reasons. The year 2005 represents a phase of institutional transition in 
which a new system of unemployment benefits was installed (see Introduction in this 
paper). Unemployment rates peaked, which was partly a continuation of a trend on the 
German labour market and partly due to the large-scale re-categorisation of the 
nonemployed population. Insurance claimants were partly only affected by the reform in 
2006, when the maximum duration of their payments was restricted to 12 months for 
those younger than 55 and 18 months for those above this age. In 2008, benefit duration 
was extended again to 24 months for persons older than 58 (Hochfellner, Hofmann and 
Wolf 2016). Nevertheless, the 2005 data should include more households with 
insurance claims than that referring to 2010. In later years, older and long-term 
unemployed persons were more likely to receive flat-rate assistance benefits.  
These institutional changes, in combination with subsequent economic growth led to a 
decrease in the percentage of short-term insurance claimants among all unemployment 
benefit claimants. This created sharper contrasts between household incomes of short-
term and long-term benefit recipients. While insurance benefits are wage-related and 
allow for additional benefits and earnings by other household members, assistance is 
flat-rate and means-tested against most other household incomes (Dingeldey 2011). 
Additional reasons for rising inequality in lower income groups may be the increase in 
part-time jobs, atypical employment and low-paid jobs between 2005 and 2010. Until 
2015, Germany did not have a general statutory minimum wage111 but offered top-up 
benefits for households under a certain income threshold. At the same time, earnings 
exemptions in the means-test of unemployment assistance encouraged the take-up of 
marginal employment in order top up benefits (Eichhorst 2012). Together with the 
11 Germany introduced a minimum wage in 2015 (BMAS 2015)  
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general increase in low wages and work hours, this may have resulted in higher 
inequality within lower income groups, between those eligible for combination benefits 
and those who were not or did not make use of it. 
Figure 3: Poland, counterfactual results 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: household income refers to equivalised disposable income. 
Figure 3 shows the Polish development of decreasing inequality among all income 
groups. The biggest improvements can be seen in medium-to high incomes. Inequality 
among the poor is thus still relatively high and decreasing faster for those who are 
higher up on the income scale. The main result of Figure 3 is that the observed changes 
in household welfare characteristics did not contribute to this trend. If households’ 
work, benefit and family situations had not changed since 2005 and 2006, inequality 
would have decreased even more. The only exception is unemployment benefit receipt 
in the lowest income quantiles. As these benefits are highly targeted, the drop in benefit 
claims affected mainly the lowest incomes. Without this drop, inequality would be 
slightly higher for these groups. Overall, however, the socio-economic and demographic 
changes in Polish households had disequalizing effects which were offset by other 
factors which are not captured by this analysis. These factors could be related to the 
overall growth in GDP and wages and may also reflect incomes that come from abroad: 
With the accession of Poland to the EU, an increasing share of Polish citizens moved to 
work in other EU countries, leading to an increased amount of income transfers to 
Polish households from their family members abroad. While in the past, such 
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opportunities were restricted to seasonal and temporary work contracts for many 
citizens from Central and Eastern European countries, the admission to the Schengen 
treaty increased the share of better, higher paying  jobs and long-term emigration 
(Chmieliński 2013). 
Figure 4: Spain, counterfactual results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Note: household income refers to equivalised disposable income. 
In Spain, as in Poland, inequality is higher among poorer households (see Figure 4). But 
in contrast to the Polish case, the level is much higher and the situation worsened 
between 2005 and 2010. The green line shows clearly that inequality would be less 
severe in the lower and more pronounced in the higher income groups if the distribution 
of work had remained as in 2005. The recession that hit Spain harder than many other 
countries certainly contributed to this result. However, studies of the Spanish case 
indicate substantive levels of dualisation in employment and social protection already 
before 2008 (Häusermann and Schwander 2012)  It is possible that this structural divide 
between labour market insiders and outsiders made poorer households more vulnerable 
to the impact of the recession while higher income ranks were less affected. Changes in 
the distribution of benefits buffered this effect to some extent. Another ‘buffer’ came in 
the form of a dramatic drop in household size (cf. Table 1), especially for the middle 
class and the richer end of the distribution.  
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Figure 5: United Kingdom, counterfactual results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: household income refers to equivalised disposable income. 
Figure 5 presents the results for the United Kingdom. As seen in Figure 1, inequality 
decreased slightly between 2005 and 2010. The strongest effect can be seen for 
unemployment benefits. Holding the other factors constant, inequality would be lower 
in 2010 if the distribution of this benefit hadn’t changed since 2005. The same can be 
said to some extent for sickness and disability benefits. It is possible that these results 
are caused by socio-structural shifts within benefits caused by welfare reforms. With the 
introduction of the Employment and Support Allowance in 2008, different benefit levels 
were defined for claimants with partial and full disability (see Introduction in this 
paper), and long-term benefit receipt for people with partial work ability became more 
difficult. Another path of reforms in the United Kingdom is the gradual reduction of 
exceptions for mothers on benefits to participate in activation programmes (Wright 
2011). Both reforms may have pushed recipients from other systems into jobseeker’s 
allowance, increase inequality among social benefit recipients and lower income groups 
in general. The distributional impact of the remaining variables is less clear, with a 
tendency towards equalizing effects. The slight increase in bigger households with more 
children and employed adult members therefore contributed to decreasing inequality. 
The results for work intensity may be related to the finding that the long-term increase 
of employment polarisation across households came to a halt in the early 2000s and 
began to drop thereafter (Corluy and Vandenbrouke, 2013). 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
The study investigated changes in the shape of inequality in Germany, Poland, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. The main interest was on the impact of changes in factors that 
are related to the key areas of societal welfare production. For this purpose, 
distributional changes in household-level manifestations of the welfare triangle were 
analysed regarding their impact on household income inequality. These manifestations 
include the extent of households’ labour market participation, the receipt of 
unemployment and disability benefits, and household size in terms of adult household 
members and dependent children. Labour market participation stands for the 
opportunities of households to gain incomes on the market, while welfare benefits 
indicate the extent to which states secure a certain standard of living in the absence of 
market incomes. Household size is an indicator for both the need and the resources to 
generate income. The bigger a household, the more income is needed to make ends 
meet. The possibility to participate in the labour market may, however, be heavily 
restricted by the presence of children or frail adults if care services are not available or 
affordable.  On the other hand, the number of adults can be also interpreted as the 
number of potential wage earners and benefit claimants. 
The overall impact of household and family structure on inequality thus depends on the 
overall context and the interactions between all three areas of welfare production. The 
distributional changes of the respective household-level manifestations were therefore 
analysed while keeping the other factors and a set of control variables constant. The 
methodological approach of the analysis combined two important methods in the field 
of inequality research. The Alpha-Beta-Gamma method proposed by Chauvel (2016) 
was chosen as core of the analysis as it offers an efficient way to empirically map the 
shape of income distributions. These indicators were integrated with Biewens’ 2001 
adaption of the well-established re-weighting technique of DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996). This procedure generated a set of factual and counterfactual indicators 
and ISO-graphs that visualised the effects of changes in household-level welfare 
indicators on the distribution of disposable household incomes. 
The descriptive investigation of the household-level variables found and increase in 
household work intensity in Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom but a strong 
decrease in Spain. Household size was shrinking in Spain and Germany. Fertility is also 
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dropping in both of these countries and in Poland. The United Kingdom stands out with 
slight increases in household size and number of children. Changes in benefits were 
rather minor in Britain while they were more substantial in Germany, Poland and 
particularly in Spain. There are thus some similarities between the countries concerning 
the development of single indicators. Looking at their combination, though, reveals four 
distinct trajectories. The comparison of the four countries’ factual ISO-curves for 2005 
and 2010 additionally highlights the difference between them: Their initial levels and 
shapes of inequality varied as much as the pattern and magnitude of change. Germany is 
marked by a polarisation of incomes with rising inequalities at the middle of the 
distribution. Spain shows a strong and increasing contrast between high inequality 
among the poor and lower levels for the rich. Poland can be interpreted as opposite case 
with a very constant level of inequality across the distribution. The curve of the UK is 
also flat except for the lowest income ranks. 
In the counterfactual analysis, the contribution of changes in household-level welfare 
factors to developments in national inequalities was investigated on a country-by-
country basis. The increase in household employment had equalizing effects in 
Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom. Decrease contributed to rising inequalities 
in Spain. This was partly cushioned by unemployment benefits. The opposite was found 
in Germany, where changes in the probability of receiving unemployment benefits 
increased inequality from the lower-middle ranks of the income distribution upward, to 
a larger degree than other factors decreased it. For the lowest ranks of income in 
Germany, but also in Poland, changes in unemployment benefits reduced local 
inequalities. Changes in disability benefits had a tendency to reduce inequalities in all 
countries except Poland. Changes in household composition are very diverse, both 
between countries and along the income distribution. In Spain, for example, they 
seemed to have dampened the impact of the crisis for the middle and upper classes at 
the price of reduced union formation and fertility. In Poland, fewer children per 
household seem to have shifted the entire distribution upward and in Germany, 
decreasing fertility contributed to the trend of increasing income polarisation. 
The results show how different elements of the welfare triangle shape income 
distributions differently according to their unique combination in different countries. 
The ISO-graphs are, however, also informative in what they do not show: In all cases, a 
considerable gap remains between the re-weighted curves of 2010 and the factual 
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distribution of 2005. This indicates that there are a number of influences on inequality 
that have not been captured by this analysis. Possible candidates could be changing 
wage structures or capital incomes. Changes in migration patterns and transnational 
inter-household transfers may also play a role.  Other factors that could alter the income 
ranking of households include welfare state institutions that have not been observed 
here, e.g. changes in the availability of care services and benefits for children and for 
the elderly, or reforms of the tax system. Investigating their impact on the entire shape 
of inequality using ABG would be an interesting path to follow. 
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